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This book hinges on the assumption that the world is facing threats to the 
survival of the planet. The security and prosperity of humankind is at stake 
because of climate change, forced migration, terrorism, pandemics, cyber 
breakdowns, the erosion of privacy and growing inequality. The puzzle is 
simple: why are governments not prioritizing these threats and treating 
them as the large-scale crises that so many experts argue they are?
We arrived at this topic through a long and winding road. We came 
together as a research team with a common research theme that focused 
on the crisis management capacity of the European Union. We subse-
quently began focusing on the capacity of the European Union and other 
regional associations to prepare for, and cope with, so-called transbound-
ary threats and crises. We discovered that quite a few of these transbound-
ary crises had long histories, which made it hard to pinpoint a bifurcation 
between the ‘incubation phase’ and the actual manifestation of a crisis. 
Our interest in creeping crisis was born.
We were lucky to find a great partner in MSB, the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency, that funds pressing but relatively ‘risky’ research—
a rarity these days. Their experience with the migration crisis had prompted 
an interest in creeping crises. Our research proposal survived the review 
process and we started a research team, recruiting promising students to 
help us collect and analyze cases of creeping crises. The students were so 
talented that we decided to collect and publish a selection of their case 
studies. We proudly present these young talents and their work to the 
world of crisis scholars and practitioners.
Preface
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This project is but a first step in a long-lasting research project. We 
intend this collection of essays as a proof of concept, showing that the idea 
and perspective of the creeping crisis has analytical purchase. We hope you 
agree and will join us on this adventure.
Leiden, The Netherlands Arjen Boin
Stockholm, Sweden  Magnus Ekengren
Stockholm, Sweden  Mark Rhinard 
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CHAPTER 1
Understanding and Acting Upon a Creeping 
Crisis
Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren, and Mark Rhinard
Abstract The notion of a creeping crisis is a conceptual one, a heuristic 
device useful for helping to uncover hidden dimensions of today’s more 
pressing—some might say existential—societal problems. In this introduc-
tory chapter, we present our definition of creeping crisis and unpack the 
analytical dimensions of the concept. We review what existing research 
does and does not tell us about those dimensions. The chapter concludes 
by highlighting key research questions and outlining how the case studies 
in the book help to answer those questions.
A. Boin (*) 
Department of Political Science, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
e-mail: boin@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
M. Ekengren 




Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden 
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
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Keywords Creeping crises • Crisis management • Early warning • 
Crisis incubation • Crisis detection • Crisis response
1.1  IntroductIon
Modern societies are beset by a special species of trouble. We may know 
they exist, damage may be accumulating, and they may eventually become 
a full-blown crisis. But little is done to intervene or manage them. 
Authorities act insufficiently, or fail to act at all, essentially sleepwalking 
into greater troubles in the indeterminate future. We refer to these slowly 
emerging threats in terms of “creeping crises.”
Creeping crises are telling characteristics of our time. The financial crisis 
in the U.S. was lurking behind success stories about a steaming-hot 
economy. Immigrants were reaching the borders of Europe in ever- 
increasing numbers, but it took years before the immigration was 
recognized as a continental-wide crisis that could tear the European Union 
apart. The Covid-19 pandemic is just the most recent example of a 
creeping crisis that turned into a disaster.
Other potential crises simmer on the horizon. Climate change may well 
cause increasing number of forest fires and weather-related disasters. The 
undermining of public institutions and elections by foreign entities may or 
may not constitute a crisis for national governments. A long string of 
technical disturbances (cyber breakdowns, energy outages) may or may 
not be signals of impending infrastructural crises. The continuing depletion 
of eco-diversity may spell disaster.
Our goal in this book is to introduce and explore the utility of the 
creeping crisis concept. We aim neither to displace traditional crisis 
definitions nor to start a new field of inquiry. The concept of creeping 
crisis is an analytical device. With it, we can better characterize the key 
features of modern societal problems, some of which are addressed in 
existing literature but few of which are brought together in a single 
concept. It trains attention on some neglected aspects of crises research: 
incubation periods, precursor events, attention-action feedback, crisis 
ownership, and legitimacy declines. For societies increasingly faced with 
major policy challenges ranging from pandemics to migration, and from 
climate change to cyber threats, the creeping crisis notion helps to untangle 
key dynamics of growing problems—to help understand our world better, 
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to drive new research, and to question the organization of crisis manage-
ment at all levels of governance.
The chapters in this book offer a proof of concept: exploring diverse 
cases using the creeping crisis approach, extracting key insights, and 
outlining future research questions. In this introductory chapter, we first 
define the creeping crisis and consider the novelty of the term. We outline 
four key features of creeping crises and review what we know from existing 
literature in contrast to what we need to know with the help of this volume. 
We then consider the implications for practitioners before outlining the 
book’s contents.
1.2  defInIng the creepIng crIsIs
Traditional definitions of crises emphasize their fast-burning nature 
(’t Hart & Boin, 2001). The term “crisis,” especially in the way it appears 
in popular culture, connotes something that surprises us. Crises explode 
on the scene but usually disappear into the history books after they have 
been brought under control. They are seen as a discrete event, an excep-
tional situation with a clear beginning and end. This matches the tradi-
tional definition of crisis as a widely recognized threat to shared societal 
values that requires an urgent response under conditions of deep uncer-
tainty (Rosenthal, Charles, & ’t Hart, 1989).
A creeping crisis is akin, but not perfectly aligned, to the notion of a 
slow-burning crisis (’t Hart & Boin, 2001). Creeping crises have a long 
incubation time and may keep simmering long after the “hot phase” is 
over. They do not have a clear beginning or end. What seems like the hot 
phase may only be a precursor to even hotter phases or a gradual cooling 
of the threat. The creeping crisis can remain undetected, or be widely 
acknowledged as an urgent problem that is nevertheless not fully addressed. 
These dynamics lead to the following working definition (cf. Boin, 
Ekengren, & Rhinard, 2020):
A creeping crisis is a threat to widely shared societal values or life-sustaining 
systems that evolves over time and space, is foreshadowed by precursor 
events, subject to varying degrees of political and/or societal attention, and 
impartially or insufficiently addressed by authorities.
This definition emphasizes that threat and urgency are social construc-
tions. Crisis is the label that observers attach to the shared sense among a 
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group that something they value is under threat. This raises questions of 
when and how the perceptions of many individuals begin to converge. In 
traditional crises—an explosion, an invasion, an earthquake—there is ini-
tially little room for different interpretations. For creeping crises, the col-
lective perception of a threat is the result of a social process that plays out 
over time. That process may be instantaneous, or it may take years. It 
allows for a wide variance of interpretations.
This definition also incorporates the (relatively) objective nature of cri-
ses. An objective definition views crisis as an empirical phenomenon—a 
real threat—that has the potential to cause serious damage to critical values 
or systems. In this line of thinking, the development of threats attracts 
much interest. How problems originate and evolve, whether through 
natural systems, technical systems, or the socio-ecological-technical 
interface is the focus of study. If causes and development pathways are 
better understood, then perhaps points of intervention can be recognized 
and the crisis halted before it is too late.
Our creeping crisis approach brings together the objective and subjec-
tive perspectives. As we will see below, the subjective crisis definition 
emphasizes the importance of attention: if political elites, media, and the 
public do not collectively share a sense of crisis, it is hard to speak of a crisis 
in this perspective. The objective definition emphasizes the importance of 
accumulation of threat potential. In this objective perspective, a crisis is 
best understood as a developmental process with root causes, an incubation 
phase, an acute phase, and an aftermath.
What sets the creeping crisis apart from other types of undesirable 
events is the temporal and spatial dimension. Both the actual threat 
potential and attention develop over time and space. The “creeping” refers 
to the incremental, often slow speed of development when compared to 
other types of events. It can be described in terms of evolving disruptions 
that may be detectable but are hard to agree on. Such crises may evolve 
over space, too, owing to distant but interacting conditions not limited by 
geography or other limits. Their manifestations may pop up anywhere in 
the world, not least because of the interconnected nature of modern 
society. The pace and place complexity of creeping crises raise challenging 
questions for both researchers and practitioners, which we discuss in the 
next section.
We see a relation with other concepts. The notion of “vulnerability” is 
useful, usually defined as a weak point in a system or society. Research on 
that topic, however, is wide, diverse, and primarily focused on prevention 
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rather than the broader scope of development of vulnerabilities and 
political attention (McLaughlin & Dietz, 2008). “Risk management” 
bears some affinities to our agenda, although risk management approaches 
tend to take a highly technical view on identifying and calculating 
probabilities of known—rather than unknown—future troubles. “Wicked” 
or “intractable” problems characterize persistent policy challenges that 
resist solutions (Rittel & Webber, 1973; Schön & Rein, 1994). While 
useful, the literature surrounding those terms assume converging social 
perspectives that the problem exists.
In short, our definition of creeping crisis shines analytical light on four 
interlinked dynamics:
• the emergence and gradual development of threat potential, owing 
to interacting conditions over time and space;
• the foreshadowing of the threat through precursor events;
• the shifting nature of threat attention, amongst societal groups and 
public officials;
• the partial or insufficient response to the threat.
1.3  the dynamIcs of creepIng crIses
We now breakdown the four dynamics to understand what the literature 
does—and does not—already tell us about creeping crisis, and what this 
book helps to shed additional light on.
1.3.1  Origins and Development of Creeping Crises
A distinguishing feature of creeping crises is their often long and drawn- 
out development. Many traditional crises, even “slow onset” crises 
(Seabrooke & Tsingou, 2019), can be tracked back to a specific point of 
time and a linear escalation trajectory. Creeping crises evolve in time and 
space and may be the result of non-linear processes. While such features 
complicate analysis, they also offer hope that understanding these early 
dynamics will lead to intervention opportunities.
A socio-technical systems approach to understanding crises offers some 
starting insights (La Porte, 1975). Modern societies build life-giving 
systems that are complex to the point of inscrutability. Even for those who 
design and operate these systems, including financial derivative models, 
power grids, cyber infrastructures, and transportation networks, their 
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functioning and vulnerabilities cannot always be clearly understood. The 
consequence of complexity is that small errors or glitches can develop into 
powerful threats. Yet operators and regulators are rarely aware of these 
“pathogens” (Turner, 1978), making their detection and abolition exceed-
ingly difficult. In effect, the complexity of the system hides the breakdown 
from public and expert view, allowing it to grow and morph (Perrow, 
1984). This basic description of complex systems leads to a crucial lesson: 
crises often are the result of an incubation process. The idea of incubation 
is, of course, temporal at heart.
The dynamics of onset and incubation are not confined to Turner’s and 
Perrow’s worlds of high-risk technology. The way we organize society and 
design essential infrastructures increases the likelihood of problems 
“simmering” for long periods of time. The design of a single currency in 
Europe contained the seeds of its possible breakdown (Jones, Kelemen, & 
Meunier, 2016). Deviations that might have self-corrected under the right 
conditions (debt accumulation), built up over time and were then acceler-
ated by interdependent developments (cross-border capital flows, poor 
oversight); some of these, as we examine more closely below, were eventu-
ally triggered into a full-blown crisis.
By introducing the concept of tight coupling, Perrow (1984) explained 
that many complex systems are interwoven with other systems. This means 
that a small incident or glitch may travel, invisibly and unnoted, from one 
system to the other. The incubation concept is thus enriched with the 
concept of escalation: time and tight coupling may lead to unnoticed 
accumulation and acceleration of a crisis.
Another helpful insight emerges from a complexity perspective 
(Buchanan, 2000; Scheffer, 2009; Taylor, 2001). Originating in the study 
of physical and biological systems, this perspective lays the foundation for 
understanding the characteristics of a complex system as emergent from 
micro-interactions within the system. Systems organize their own com-
plexity, building up to a “tipping point” that brings a complex system to 
the edge of disaster. The idea of temporality is further enriched here by 
emphasizing the non-linearity of the incubation phase (Ansell & 
Bartenberger, 2017). Crises incubate, develop, and escalate toward a tip-
ping point—but the temporal dynamics can vary wildly during this process.
Finally, we gain analytical purchase on the spatial dimension by drawing 
on what can be termed “transboundary complexity.” The deep integration 
of complex systems creates fertile soil for new types of mayhem, their 
development hidden by a level of complexity that renders small glitches 
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from detection by unknowing policymakers. The question is then not 
where in a nation or policy sector a crisis originates, but where in the 
world. This creeping crisis follows transboundary trajectories that originate 
in distant lands or seemingly unrelated policy domains, creeping up in 
national domains where they eventually transform into a large-scale crisis. 
(We note that spatiality is relative, with some crises emerging and 
developing close to home.) This transboundary spatiality of crisis creates 
deep uncertainty with regard to causes, dynamics, potential solutions, and 
consequences.
Under such conditions, slight disruptions have the time and space to 
morph: to take on new characteristics, owing either to their transfer into 
new threats or to new vectors. The shift of an infectious disease from one 
limited to animals toward one transmittable to humans (a zoonosis) 
creates a new threat spectrum. Migrants moving north become exploited 
by criminal networks intent on making money to transport desperate 
individuals, often by life-threatening means. Health threats interact with 
religious practices and rapid travel to eventually ignite a measles outbreak 
in Brooklyn, New York.
We asked our authors to explore the essential dynamics behind the 
emergence and development of “their” particular crisis. We want to know 
why and how their crisis originated and developed, in time and space, and 
how it may have morphed into a new threat. We are open to the fact that 
not all creeping crises escalate. Some may stall or recede during incubation 
processes. Regardless, one intriguing and puzzling feature of creeping 
crises, compared to traditional crisis, is we know they exist. We can almost 
see them coming, not least because of the potential for “precursor events.” 
It is to that question we now turn.
1.3.2  Foreshadowing by Precursor Events
What sets a creeping crisis apart in our perspective from a “full-blown” 
crisis is the lack of remedial action that allows a creeping crisis to build-up 
its damage potential. Crises may not only build-up: they may even travel 
and reveal themselves across time and space. We not only know they exist; 
we witness regular (and potentially dangerous) manifestations of a bigger 
problem: small earthquakes, in the case of oil exploration; privacy breaches, 
in the case of Big Data; forest fires, in the case of climate change; isolated 
illness, in the case of antimicrobial resistance; or drowning migrants, in the 
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case of the migrant crisis. Experts sound alarms, activists rally around the 
problem, and yet a crisis response fails to materialize.
What are precursor events? From an objective perspective, the litera-
ture on socio-technological systems suggest precursor events are signals 
in complex systems—signals that may be difficult to detect in the first 
instance. Signs given off by the accumulating problem (the release of 
pent-up energy, using Turner’s terminology) are concealed by the com-
plexity of the system, by not knowing what to look for. Research on 
industrial crises suggests that certain features in the development of an 
organization or technology offer signs of trouble ahead: an unexpected 
decline in the normal trajectory of an economy, for instance, or anoma-
lies in organizational processes (Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, & 
Miglani, 1988).
The subjective element here concerns how these precursor events are 
framed and characterized. Are these events recognized as isolated, discrete 
events or part of a broader incubation process? This question touches 
upon the politics of crisis recognition and sense-making. The literature 
reminds us politicians may not want to intervene. Attention for a creeping 
crisis may, after all, suggest previous neglect. They might want to intervene 
but don’t know how to solve these creeping crises. Or the costs may be 
too high. For political purposes, it may simply be beneficial to play a 
potential crisis up or down. Indeed, a society may be unwilling to address 
the problem because it relies on its source—the case chapters in this book 
illustrate the point.
Precursor events in a creeping crisis point us to two intriguing ques-
tions. First, what might constitute a tipping point in the process of crisis 
development and the progression of precursor events? A tipping point 
marks the transition between gradual development and sudden escalation. 
In theory, a crisis may have multiple tipping points. Presumably, a crisis 
may also have a final tipping point (after either a massive crisis emerges, of 
after which the crisis has spent all of its energy). We are not sure in the case 
of creeping crises.
A second question concerns the dynamics of feedback loops. Precursor 
events, as a key dynamic in creeping crises, offer an excellent laboratory for 
studying feedback loops: how do certain crisis constructions (or lack 
thereof) and remedial action interact, shaping the accumulation of the 
problem? We want to know whether these relations may display self-pro-
pelling features: this is the case when an escalation in crisis development 
spurs political attention, which, in turn, may fuel the crisis (through 
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ill-fated interventions, for instance). We also want to know how such 
cycles terminate or screech into reverse. Especially after the creeping crisis 
has burst into view and political attention has peaked, it is intriguing to 
study how a “crisis in slow motion” wears out political attention spans, 
picking up speed again as societal and political stamina wane.
1.3.3  Varying Attention
Crises are often described as rare moments of convergence when almost 
everybody, however briefly, agrees on the importance of a certain event or 
development. The creeping crisis complicates this widely accepted idea of 
crisis as a point of convergence. It has the potential to trigger convergence, 
but it has not attracted sufficient levels of attention so that we can state 
with reasonable certainty that a society is gripped by this or that particular 
problem.
The creeping crisis shares certain characteristics with the problem that 
is neglected by politicians and policymakers. Political scientists have paid 
ample attention to the question why people—citizens, journalists, 
politicians—consider certain societal features problematic, even labeling 
them as threats or crises, when they ignore many other features and 
developments (which, objectively speaking, may carry much more damage 
potential than those on which attention is lavished). This question of 
attention is usually discussed in terms of “agendas.” Policy agendas are 
said to have limited “carrying capacity”—meaning that they only can hold 
so many problems deserving attention (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; 
Kingdon, 1995). The attention of the public, the media, and the political 
arena is inherently limited and selective. In addition, this attention also 
tends to be short-lived: citizens, journalists, and politicians can only 
remain interested in a certain problem for so long (Downs, 1972).
Why do people focus their attention on one problem, ignoring others? 
Intriguingly, the characteristics of the problem at hand do not seem to 
matter much. People can worry about problems for which no evidence 
exists (UFOs come to mind). They can blissfully ignore problems for 
which mountains of data exist, suggesting that disaster is imminent. 
Politicians in liberal democracies may choose to ignore certain problems, 
especially those that stretch into a future that exceeds their term or those 
that require too steep of a sacrifice, such as climate change or Big Data 
accumulation.
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To understand attention foci and cycles, we must, therefore, return to 
creeping crises as social constructions. This reminds us of the idea that 
various actors may work hard to push certain social constructions—we 
speak of “frames” in this context—because a certain frame serves their 
interest. How growing problems are framed has a major role in the extent 
to which societal interests are mobilized to consider something a problem 
(Schattschneider, 1960) and the “entrepreneurs” behind those framing 
efforts who attempt to pursue their own interests. Here multiple literatures 
converge: crisis scholars speak of “crisis exploitation” (Boin, McConnell, 
& ’t Hart, 2008) while security scholars speak of “securitization”—an 
effort to draw an issue not only up the normal policy but also into the 
realm of extraordinary treatment (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998).
The process of problem framing is a social process that is political at 
heart. The process is influenced by societal paradigms and fashions—
influential ways of viewing problems and their effects on society. It is 
influenced by public institutions, which typically prefer certain problems 
(Schattschneider, 1960) as well as the structuring effects of existing para-
digms and public debates (Turner, 1978). Some threats may simply escape 
the imaginary capacity of policymakers and citizens alike (Smet, Lagadec, 
& Leysen, 2012; cf. Boin, Brown, & Richardson, 2019). As we see in the 
2015 migration crisis case, the Swedish public debate did not allow for 
proper preparation of the crisis: arguments for strong preparation and 
response were seen by some as a sign of xenophobia.
A key characteristic of the creeping crisis is the absence of attention 
(whereas a crisis is defined by a high level of attention). The damage 
potential of a threat may grow, but it matters in this definition whether 
different segments of society label the growing threat as a crisis. There 
may be another tipping point, which marks the threshold that must be 
passed for the crisis to attract sufficient social and political attention so 
that it is experienced as a crisis. The tipping point is not necessarily a 
moment of eruption after which the crisis quickly fades—the creeping 
crisis may keep on creeping. Both the beginning and the ending of these 
creeping crises are blurry.
A creeping crisis perspective thus raises the question of when and how 
does the level of attention to the problem escalate? Creeping crises, by our 
definition, are largely recognized as problems and, even manifest 
themselves occasionally (see above) but little is done. The colloquial way 
to put this: when is “enough,” enough? What requires societies to 
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construct an issue as worthy of attention, resources, and sacrifice? This, 
again, directs attention to tipping points.
When studying creeping crises, we must distinguish between three 
kinds of attention: expert attention, media attention, and political 
attention. It is the relationship between these interests, and feedback 
loops, that deserve analysis. We asked the chapter authors in this volume 
to consider all three kinds of attention, and the extent to which one drives 
the other(s). We also asked them to consider—even if the short length of 
these case studies does not allow full exposition—what might explain lack 
of attention or certain kinds of attention at different points in the 
development of a crisis. We asked them to search for tipping points that 
may explain a rise in political attention and how that related to crisis 
development.
1.3.4  Insufficient Responses
Creeping crises pose a unique combination of managerial challenges. They 
confront policymakers with a complex problem that is not easily resolvable 
without the sustained attention of politicians. By the time political 
attention reaches a tipping point that enables concerted and urgent action, 
there is no longer just a complex problem to solve but a crisis to manage. 
Crisis management is hard enough for public managers (Boin, ’t Hart, 
Stern, & Sundelius, 2016), but these challenges are compounded by the 
slow onset of the crisis: media and citizens will demand to know why this 
long-coming crisis was not addressed earlier.
Creeping crises certainly place a premium on governments’ ability to 
detect the onset of a crisis. After all, the origin and evolution of creeping 
crises are complicated. Traditional crisis detection, as the literature tells us, 
is already challenging. First, there are psychological factors that explain 
why people fail to recognize impending danger (Kahneman, 2013). It is 
hard to wrap your head around “unknown unknowns.” If you cannot 
imagine a particular threat, you are unlikely to recognize it. Second, we 
know that most organizations find it hard or do not even try to detect 
crises. The challenge is not easy: it is hard to recognize creeping crises that 
manifest themselves in far-away locales.
Creeping crises pose yet another challenge (Boin & Lodge, 2019). Due 
to their ambiguous character, the “ownership” of these crises tends to be 
ill defined. We know that defined, agreed-upon risks are monitored and 
addressed (through regulation, for instance) in the risk area. This area is 
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dominated by professionals who are trained to minimize the chance that a 
known risk will materialize. When risks do unexpectedly materialize, their 
management is shifted to the crisis arena. Here trained crisis professionals 
try to organize an effective and timely response. The problem with 
creeping crises is that they qualify neither as an agreed-upon risk nor as a 
full-blown crisis. Without defined ownership, an organized response in the 
early phase is unlikely (Boin et al., 2020).
Another key challenge is the translation from ambiguous information 
to a strategic decision-making agenda. If you don’t know, exactly, what is 
going on, what decisions should be made? In the absence of verified 
knowledge, a rational problem-solving approach cannot work. A crisis is, 
after all, political at heart (’t Hart, 1993; Boin et al., 2016).
Due to the highly ambiguous nature of creeping crises, we expect polit-
ical motives to play an important role in the decision-making process. 
Research tells us that most politicians will seek to avoid the blame that may 
be assigned to them in the wake of a crisis (Boin et  al., 2008; Hood, 
2011). Their decision-making calculations are informed by the probability 
that they will be cast as the villain during the aftermath of a crisis. The 
outcome of this calculation will inform their willingness to take ownership 
of the creeping crisis.
We asked our authors to explore the dynamics of official responses to 
the crisis at hand. What was the response, if any? Who, if anyone, took 
ownership? What might explain these dynamics?
1.4  ImplIcatIons for practItIoners
Our research on creeping crisis is not just an academic exercise. Many of 
society’s current ills bear the hallmarks of creeping crises and cast into 
question governments’ readiness to manage them. In some respects, 
creeping crises magnify the challenges traditionally associated with manag-
ing crises (Boin et  al., 2016). In other respects, these kinds of crises 
demand new thinking about how they should be dealt with.
Traditional crisis management challenges for practitioners include the 
detection challenge. How can societies improve their ability to “see” a 
crisis emerging, and what tools are fit for that purpose? Early warning and 
anticipatory governance are popular themes in the academic literature. 
But for practitioners the challenges are myriad. Few emerging crises 
resemble their forebearers, making it difficult to know what to look for 
(crisis emergence is easy to see only in retrospect). Creeping crises add a 
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new wrinkle to the detection challenge. Long incubation periods offer 
opportunities to detect their emergence, if we know where to look. But 
the complicated nature of that incubation—intertwined with human and 
ecological systems, evolving over time and space—make detection 
exceedingly difficult. “Horizon scanning” for creeping crises requires a 
different and perhaps rare sort of expertise, which reaches across a wider 
segment of government and society than traditional crises demand.
Detection is less a problem for the creeping crises that are already with 
us. The challenge then becomes one of preventive intervention rather 
than detection. Long incubation periods offer plenty of opportunities for 
governments to act, foreboding massive criticism about accountability if 
creeping crises turn into a major, destructive event. But intervening too 
early may be counterproductive. Growing problems can dissipate on their 
own accord. Implementation of draconian measures while the consequences 
of the crisis are still uncertain leads to public outcries and a loss of 
governmental legitimacy. Moreover, who should intervene and how? 
Acting on a crisis establishes ownership, too, which risk-averse governments 
may wish to avoid.
Creeping crises also introduce specific management challenges for prac-
titioners. First, creeping crises signal their existence through precursor 
events long before “the big one,” leading to questions of who should act 
and when. A single event can be managed, even successfully, by skilled 
crisis managers. But those crisis managers are likely to see the deeper 
problem continuing to evolve at the same time as politicians are ready to 
move on. Finding a longer-term, sustainable response may be the real 
challenge here. Second, an adequate response is complicated by the sheer 
breadth of societal actors required to act. Many of the creeping crises 
outlined in this book cannot be dealt with by formal crisis managers alone. 
They require a mix of experts, technicians, private sector actors, NGOs, 
even diplomats to fully understand how crises evolve (often far away and 
over time) and how they are best addressed (in the here and now).
Third, and perhaps most critical for practitioners, is the fact that man-
aging creeping crises requires societal sacrifice. As demonstrated in this 
book, many creeping crises accumulate within the essential arteries that 
power our societies. From food supply systems to information technology, 
and from energy grids to social media and travel networks, we depend on 
the systems that bring efficiency and choice—but also dangers. Addressing 
those dangers requires sacrificing what we enjoy in the short term for lon-
ger term societal sustainability. Perrow (1984), mentioned above, spoke of 
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the need to “decouple” systems to avoid crisis escalation—an insight with 
renewed relevance in an age of deeply ingrained creeping crises. Few poli-
ticians, or the industries that profit from these systems, are likely to jump 
at the opportunity to restrict them.
In the case of creeping crises, the legitimacy of public institutions and 
political leaders is cast into sharp relief. Today, people worry not if but 
when global warming, migration, remaining foreign fighters, disruptive 
technologies, market disequilibrium, or income inequality will cause a 
major crisis. As the nature of the creeping crisis is not widely agreed upon, 
the very act of branding it as a crisis (or not) will affect the reaction to that 
threat. It is easy to imagine how a botched meaning-making process may 
undermine the legitimacy of leaders, which will undermine the effectiveness 
of the response. This, in turn, may further undermine legitimacy, 
prompting a vicious circle.
1.5  outlIne of thIs Book
Our goal in this book is to explore and develop further the creeping crisis 
concept. The chapters delve into specific cases to evaluate the utility of the 
framework as well as illuminating the case in greater color and detail. As 
societies grapple with problems that resemble the creeping crisis, improving 
our understanding of their key dynamics also increases the changes of 
acting upon them effectively.
Chapter 2, by Alina Engström, studies the scourge of antimicrobial 
resistance. She finds that the long incubation of this crisis typifies the time 
and space dimension of the creeping crisis notion. Attention peaks 
occasionally, but not always in the immediate aftermath of precursor 
events. Responses to the problem are hampered by a lack of ownership. 
Chapter 3 explores the “WannaCry” cyber crisis. Maria Foteini Prevezianou 
confirms the difficulty of detecting this kind of event, even when the 
signals are clear. The question arises from this chapter of whether 
WannaCry was a creeping crisis in itself, or a sign of a wider crisis to come. 
Chapter 4 takes up the issue of remaining foreign fighters—individuals 
who left their home countries to travel to war zones, and who are now 
barred from returning. Yrsa Landström shows how these fighters sit in 
refugee camps in which a broader humanitarian crisis—or even a radical-
ization process—can be incubated. By not bringing the foreign fighters 
home, governments can sustain the threat of increasing radicalization and 
terrorist attacks.
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In Chap. 5, Swapnil Vashishtha and Mark Rhinard study the phenom-
enon of Big Data. Here, the creeping crisis perspective starkly reveals the 
accumulating nature of the problem, the occasional precursor events, and 
the acceptance by some actors that a major crisis is on the horizon. Still, 
the authors show that societal dependence and vested interests hamper 
what would be a costly intervention. Chapter 6 contains the case of the 
European border crisis of 2015. Yrsa Landström and Magnus Ekengren 
consider the movement of migrants across the continent as hardly a sur-
prise. Many previous indicators suggested an impending humanitarian 
catastrophe. Focused on the Sweden’s response, the authors show the 
government delayed reacting largely because of ideological blinders that 
impaired debate about when to prepare.
Chapter 7 is comparative. Alina Engström, Marte Luesink, and Arjen 
Boin compare Dutch and Swedish responses to the coronavirus outbreak, 
finding key similarities but also differences that help to explain the delayed 
response. Chapter 8, by Elin Jakobsson turns to the question of climate 
change-induced migration. This simmering problem has long held the 
promise of a full outbreak, but only precursor events attract attention. 
Those events are treated as disasters, partially addressed, and then 
abandoned—allowing the problem to continue growing. Chapter 9 offers 
the last case. Alexander Verdoes and Arjen Boin examine the emergence of 
earthquakes in parts of the Netherlands, which are clear signs of how gas 
fields are exploited. Authorities ignored the signals, thus sustaining the 
problem, and the problem has now led to a major loss in the legitimacy of 
public institutions.
Our conclusion summarizes the key findings of the book and sets a 
research agenda for the further study of creeping crisis.
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CHAPTER 2
Antimicrobial Resistance as a Creeping Crisis
Alina Engström
Abstract Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) displays many of the charac-
teristics of a creeping crisis. It lacks clearly definable temporal and spa-
tial boundaries. It develops in the natural world when and where 
conditions are conducive. It traverses sectors and borders in the natural, 
human, and built environments. It causes individual and societal harm 
when it escalates toward outbreaks in a random fashion. Outbreaks can 
be minor or major, burn fast or slow, be simple or hard to contain. 
Experts insist we are heading toward a “post-antibiotic age” and even 
deadlier “superbugs” if we do not act. Yet warnings and crisis framings 
do not appear sufficient to prompt a response. Public attention and 
governmental action have lagged. Occasional outbreaks invite attention 
and concern, only for the issue to fade again from the public view. 
International organizations shine more sustained light on the problem, 
but national governments are slow to respond. This chapter argues that 
our dependency on antimicrobial drugs is a blessing and a curse: curing 
us in the short term but building the conditions for a massive, incurable 
outbreak in the future.
A. Engström (*) 
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: alina.engstrom@ui.se
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2.1  IntroductIon
During a trip to India, a Norwegian woman named Karin suffered an acci-
dent and required hospitalization. She underwent surgery and received 
prophylactic antibiotic treatment. Upon arrival in Norway, it was discov-
ered she had contracted the bacteria Klebsiella pneumoniae—a bacteria 
made more deadly by the fact that over the past decade it had become 
resistant to most antibiotics. After multiple tries, a last-ditch effort was 
made with one particular, rare antibiotic that killed the bacteria (European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control [ECDC], n.d.).
This is just one story, of one patient, who suffered the effects of antimi-
crobial resistance (AMR) to antibiotics. In India, 58,000 babies died 
within their first year from an infection with resistant bacteria normally 
passed on by their mothers (Laxminarayan et al., 2013). Worldwide, AMR 
causes 700,000 deaths per year. The number is expected to rise to 10 mil-
lion by 2050 if left unaddressed (O’Neill, 2016). Economic costs are 
expected to be as high as the 2008–2009 economic crisis (World Health 
Organization [WHO], 2019a). On the current trajectory, we are moving 
toward a future where minor infections can no longer be cured, and com-
mon medical procedures will become more dangerous. The coming AMR 
crisis will make the Covid-19 pandemic look tame by comparison (Chanel 
& Doherty, 2020).
In the natural world, microbials and their antithesis, antimicrobials, 
have competed for dominance since the beginning of time, evolving and 
fighting within the bodies of living organisms. It was the human invention 
of antibiotics that caused this normal process to tip out of balance (Levy, 
1997). Extra powerful antibiotics were introduced, curing minor infec-
tions that previously killed us. We quickly became dependent on them. 
Antibiotics were cheap, therapies were short, and we soon began overus-
ing them.
Bacteria did not give up the fight. Natural selection led to new strains 
capable of overcoming our anti-bacterial treatment. These new strains of 
bacteria are called superbugs—resistant to antibiotics and most attempts 
to wipe them out. These superbugs evolve and incubate in time and space, 
affecting countries differently at different times. Due to uneven responses 
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to root causes, resistance levels are higher in low- and middle-income 
countries than in high-income countries (Klein, Tseng, Pant, & 
Laxminarayan, 2019). The interconnectedness of systems and several 
modern practices such as international travel and migration allow for the 
problem to arrive anywhere at any time.
The threat potential of AMR was built up during a long incubation 
period. Its accumulation is facilitated through ongoing, interacting pro-
cesses related to natural selection, globalization, environmental degrada-
tion, and scientific advancement. The problem is widely acknowledged as 
growing and getting worse. Experts have been warning about the slow 
and steady threat accumulating for years, yet the response has been insuf-
ficient. The World Health Organization (WHO) and the Interagency 
Coordination Group on Antimicrobial Resistance (IACG) have framed 
the rising resistance levels as a “global crisis” that threatens a century of 
progress in health (IACG, 2019, p. 1; WHO, 2019b). Some countries 
have put AMR on top of their national agenda and even addressed it. Most 
countries have not.
Occasional outbreaks of “superbugs” serve as precursor events, signal-
ing the presence of the deeper problem while attention occasionally shifts 
to combatting it. Nevertheless, crisis responses are disparate and uneven. 
National politicians, policymakers, practitioners, and individuals appear 
unaware of the extent of the problem (WHO, 2015). Media reporting 
about AMR rarely attributes blame or points to solutions (Capurro, 2020; 
Collins, Jaspal, & Nerlich, 2018). Questions of responsibility and owner-
ship are complex and difficult to pin down (Brown & Crawford, 2009). 
The threat keeps accumulating.
In short, AMR displays the characteristics of a creeping crisis outlined 
in the introduction to this volume. Perhaps more than any other chapter, 
this case casts a light on both the objective and subjective nature of the 
crisis: evolving in the natural world, and only occasionally constructed as a 
threat. It also highlights the non-linear aspects of crisis development, 
moving seemingly forward and backward in development, and randomly 
appearing in “flare-ups” or precursor events. Another key insight revealed 
here is the lack of ownership: the natural origins of this problem, its global 
character, and its multiple manifestations mean few authorities have the 
desire or competence to respond with full force. The world has become 
dependent on antibiotics; strictly regulating their use and managing this 
creeping crisis requires significant sacrifices that societies appear unwilling, 
as yet, to undertake.
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This chapter is structured as follows. It first explains the origin and incu-
bation of the problem across time and space. It then examines the precursor 
events that signal a deeper, underlying concern before outlining the periodic 
attention shown to AMR, especially by the international community. It con-
cludes with a summary of the analysis and thoughts on why meaningful 
action has failed to materialize in response to this creeping crisis.
2.2  orIgIn and IncubatIon over tIme
The origin and incubation of the AMR problem highlights the complex 
interaction between the natural and human worlds. During the “golden 
age of antibiotic discovery” between 1940 and 1960, the discovery of new 
antibiotics kept pace with the emergence of resistant bacteria (Davies, 
2006, p. 287). The problem of resistance was not a major concern. But 
pharmaceutical companies soon began developing other drugs with higher 
profit margins (Bush et al., 2011). In the late 1980s, the world encoun-
tered what scientists called a “discovery void.” Between 1987 and 2011, 
no new classes of antibacterials were sucessfully discovered (Silver, 2011, 
p. 72–73). Meanwhile, existing bacteria continued to develop multidrug- 
resistant (MDR), pan drug-resistant (PDR), and extensively drug-resistant 
(XDR) genes resistant to multiple or all available antimicrobials being pre-
scribed and over-prescribed (Magiorakos et  al., 2012). Resistance has 
accumulated, and most bacteria now show resistance toward one or mul-
tiple antibiotics. Several bacteria—superbugs—already show concerning 
resistance levels (Davies & Davies, 2010, p. 419–420; O’Neill, 2016).
Although the root cause of the problem is a natural phenomenon, it is 
the  different, interacting conditions in various natural and societal sys-
tems, such as health systems, that provoke the incubation and threat accu-
mulation caused by misuse. Misuse contributes to bacterial mutation, a 
complex process whereby new strains multiply and thrive. A lack of effec-
tive regulation propels the problem (Lomazzi, Moore, Johnson, 
Balasegaram, & Borisch, 2019). A lack of regulatory governance hinders 
responsible production, distribution, and usage of microbials across differ-
ent sectors, including the health care system, food production, and phar-
maceutical dispensing systems (World Bank, 2019).
Moreover, the threat builds in communities and sectors where there is 
a lack of knowledge or norms to guide correct use. Individuals as patients, 
health-care practitioners as prescribers, and farmers as suppliers all con-
tribute to the problem. For example, in the health-care sector, various 
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conditions facilitate the stepwise build-up of resistance: imperfect infor-
mation; inadequate diagnostics; weak laboratory capacity; inappropriate 
prescribing (Ventola, 2015); the use of antimicrobials as “just-in-case” 
treatment; the prescription of “broad-spectrum” antimicrobials (National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease [NIAID], 2011); inadequate 
programs for infection prevention and control; poor access to health ser-
vices (Littmann & Simonsen, 2019); and, poor-quality medicines.
In the agricultural and livestock sector, market demands further con-
tribute to misuse. As consumers demand cheap meat, farmers reduce pro-
duction costs by implementing short-cut practices. Antibiotics are used as 
growth promoters (Spellberg, Bartlett, & Gilbert, 2013) and to prevent 
treatment of infections in livestock (Chattopadhyay, 2014). Citizens’ lack 
of knowledge and their unwillingness to change behavior contribute to 
the misuse of antimicrobials in the agricultural sector. The threat agent, in 
turn, continues incubating in the agricultural sector. The availability of 
few new antibiotics and regulatory barriers for new antibiotic approvals 
(Ventola, 2015) add to this complex and interactive cycle, which allows 
the crisis to grow and spread across economic sectors and, as we will see 
below, geographical locations.
After an initial accumulation of the problem, and the creation of resis-
tant bacteria, several conditions can individually or collectively facilitate its 
onward transmission. Bacteria spread if conditions in society, hospitals, the 
agricultural sector, or in the environment are beneficial for transmission 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
2018). Such conditions include poor sanitation, inadequate access to 
health services, dirty water, poor infection control, and lack of vaccination 
(World Bank, 2019). The uptake and spread can also develop through the 
food chain, wildlife, water distribution infrastructure, as well as through 
food imports, migration, and trade (Harbarth et al., 2015). Bacteria can 
travel to hospital settings through contact between healthcare staff and 
patients, and through contaminated surfaces and medical equipment 
(Anderson et al., 2019).
These conditions represent a fertile environment for the threat agent to 
first incubate and then unfold over space. External trends beyond the sys-
tem of antimicrobials such as population growth, migration, travel, and 
urbanization (World Bank, 2019) offer several possibilities for transbound-
ary movement and transmission to seemingly unrelated contexts and sec-
tors. Resistant bacteria can therefore turn up anywhere, at any time. This 
speaks to the random flare-ups in time and space in creeping crisis, an issue 
toward which we now turn.
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2.3  random outbreaks and PerIodIc attentIon
AMR is characterized by fairly random “precursor events” that, as a creep-
ing crisis perspective suggests, signal the extent of the problem, and which 
are sometimes—but not always—followed by increased public attention. 
The prevalence of precursor events highlights the intertwined dynamics of 
actual events and attention, further demonstrating the combined objective 
and subjective notions of a creeping crisis. Objectively, the threat morphs 
in different systems, breaking out occasionally across time and space. 
Subjectively, a precursor event is identified as a crisis in some situations, 
sometimes framed as indications of a future crisis, and sometimes not 
treated as a crisis at all.
2.3.1  Precursor Events
A clear feature of the AMR problem is that we live with the threat. In 
2017, nine of the world’s most dangerous superbugs were found in 
London’s transport network; 12.8 million people ride along with these 
invisible bacteria everyday (Keegan, 2018). The public hospitals in Hong 
Kong report one new superbug infection every 18 minutes (Keegan, 
2018). These regular, ongoing events demonstrate that creeping crises do 
not always escalate toward tipping points. AMR occasionally (and increas-
ingly often) causes individual and societal harm in a random fashion.
Many precursor events remain hidden from public view (Belluz, 2019). 
Outbreaks differ in scope and characteristics. They can be minor or major, 
burn fast or slow, and be moderately or hard to contain. All have in com-
mon that they have the potential to cause harm. The harm caused can 
occur in two ways: (1) when the infected microbial is resistant from the 
start; and (2) when resistance develops during treatment (MacIntyre & 
Bui, 2017, p. 3). This section will outline a few precursor events and illu-
minate how random outbreaks can be as they tip over in rapid escalation.
One way to define a tipping point in the development of AMR as a 
creeping crisis is the sudden community- or hospital-based outbreaks of 
resistant infectious diseases. It is difficult to distinguish between minor 
and major precursor events in this creeping crisis. Minor events may be 
outbreaks that are limited in space. Major outbreaks might be more 
epidemic- like, evolving across space.1 It is, however, problematic to 
1 A distinction can be made between an outbreak, an endemic, an epidemic, and a pan-
demic. Outbreaks can turn into epidemics, if not quickly controlled. AMR is an endemic 
condition (MacIntyre & Bui, 2017, p. 3).
 A. ENGSTRÖM
25
distinguish the two since it is not always clear if a superbug has evolved 
over space and tipped over in an outbreak.
In 2007, a gene resistant to the “last-resort” antibiotic carbapenems 
was first detected in a patient in India. It turned up in surface waters in 
urban India in 2010. Less than three years later, it had migrated to other 
parts of the world. It even ended up in the High Arctic, an area where 
humans rarely reside (Graham, 2019). In 2019, the WHO was informed 
about several cases of infections caused by the  antibiotic-resistant 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa in US hospitals. The majority of patients were 
hospitalized due to complications associated with infections that they had 
obtained following invasive procedures in Tijuana, Mexico (WHO, 
2019c). These cases illuminate how easy resistant bacteria can migrate 
across sectoral and geographical boundaries, although not necessarily tip-
ping over in a minor or major precursor event.
Major precursor events cause broader harm at societal and individual 
level. New York City suffered a widespread outbreak in the early 2000s. It 
was the resistant Enterobacteriaceae Klebsiella pneumoniae that initially 
appeared as sporadic outbreaks throughout the city. It soon spread 
throughout the US and eventually migrated beyond the US. In 2005, one 
case turned up in France (in a patient who had previously been hospital-
ized in NYC) (Bratu et al., 2005).
The first major outbreak of Klebsiella outside the US was in Israel 2006 
(Bratu et  al., 2005; Arnold et  al., 2011), where it spread like wildfire 
through the health care system. Israel’s Ministry of Health had no mecha-
nism in place to detect the threat and to intervene. However, a group of 
infection prevention and control experts launched regular meetings where 
they shared data  and discussed responses. Experts were mobilized and 
participated in situation assessment and response measures. One of the 
specialists was Dr. Mitchell Schwaber who later lent his expertise to a 
WHO-funded committee appointed to suggest global guidelines on how 
to combat Carbapenem-resistant bacteria, such as Klebsiella pneumoniae 
(WHO, 2017).
In 2016, Pakistan experienced an outbreak of Typhoid fever. Between 
2016 and 2018, 8188 typhoid fever cases were reported; 5274 of these 
were extensively drug resistant (XDR). In 2018, the XDR typhoid fever 
had transmitted internationally through persons that had traveled to 
Pakistan. Six cases turned up in other countries—one in the UK and five 
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in the US (WHO, 2018). Both the XDR Typhoid fever and Klebsiella out-
breaks demonstrate that precursor events may be connected. It also shows 
that they do not necessarily result in further escalation. They may well turn 
up as individual random cases. This randomness allows for the continuing 
creeping of the crisis.
2.3.2  Periodic Attention
Precursor events such as those outlined above can generate periodic atten-
tion from politicians, media, and experts, albeit in unpredictable ways. It 
is attention that determines whether a threat remains creeping or is ele-
vated to a crisis construction.
 Politicians, Policymakers and the Public
The most regular attention given to AMR, irrespective of actual precursor 
events, comes from international organizations and experts (an inter-
twined relationship, as discussed further below). Regarding policymakers, 
for instance, the WHO and the United Nations (UN) frame AMR as a 
major threat to public health (WHO, 2020; UN, 2016b) and the World 
Bank frames it as a threat to our economic future (Jonas, Irwin, Berthe, Le 
Gall, & Marquez, 2017). The WHO describes the increasing resistance 
level as a “global crisis that threatens the future of our most precious 
drugs: antibiotics” (WHO, 2019b). The UN, international agencies, and 
experts recently called for an ambitious, urgent, and coordinated action to 
avert a full-blown crisis (IACG, 2019).
Scientists warn this is the greatest danger humanity has faced in recent 
times. England’s chief medical officer has warned about an “antibiotic 
apocalypse” (McKie, 2017). The British Society for Antibiotic 
Chemotherapy argues that AMR is the “other” pandemic lurking behind 
Covid-19 that needs to be addressed with similar urgency (British Society 
for Antimicrobial Chemotherapy [BSAC], 2020). Back in 2014, the for-
mer UK Prime Minister David Cameron warned, “If we fail to act, we are 
looking at an almost unthinkable scenario where antibiotics no longer 
work and we are cast back into the dark ages of medicine” (AMR Review, 
n.d.). Subsequently, he commissioned a Review on Antimicrobial 
Resistance. The economist Jim O’Neill was asked to analyze the global 
problem and to propose actions to tackle the issue internationally. The 
scholarly literature on AMR has doubled the last decade thanks to increased 
funding. Funders have specifically called for interdisciplinarity and 
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recognition of the value of joint perspectives since the problem of AMR 
spans across sectors and disciplines (Chandler, 2020).
The first response to AMR on the international level was in 1998 when 
the WHO published its resolution on antimicrobial resistance (WHO, 
1998; Wernli et al., 2017). Ever since, attempts have been made to address 
the AMR problem on a global level. International attention culminated in 
2015 when the 68th World Health Assembly agreed on a Global Action 
Plan on AMR. Since then, the highest political levels of the international 
community seemed to have accepted the gravity of the problem. It was 
put on the G7 agenda in 2015 and on the G20 agenda in 2017.2 In 2016, 
the UN high-level meeting on AMR resulted in a political declaration on 
AMR (Resolution A/RES/71/3) (UN, 2016a). In 2017, the UN 
Secretary General established an Inter-Agency Coordination Group 
(IACG) on AMR (IACG, 2018). To date, five major documents from key 
UN organizations have been published, warning of the importance of act-
ing on AMR.3
Not long after the WHO’s initial attention, the EU began addressing 
AMR and healthcare-associated infections by recognizing them as public 
health crisis in need of management (Commission Decision 2000/96/
EC, 1999; European Parliament and Council Decision 2119/98/EC, 
1998). The European Commission established the European Antimicrobial 
Resistance Surveillance System (EARSS) in 1998.4 In 2001, it published 
the Community Strategy against AMR (European Commission, 2001). 
Ever since, the European Commission and its agencies have been working 
closely with member states to address the issue. One main activity has 
been surveillance. Awareness campaigns have been implemented, Action 
Plans have been compiled, and a “One Health Network and Action” plan 
was presented (European Commission, n.d.), to mention a few examples. 
2 In 2015, the G7 published a report where all countries committed to develop National 
Action Plans (NAPs) (Federal Ministry of Health, 2015). In 2017, AMR was put on the 
agenda of the G20 meeting. Members agreed to lead by example in developing and imple-
menting NAPs by the end of 2018 (G20, 2017).
3 The documents were produced by WHO; World Bank; Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO); IACG; World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). These docu-
ments are all non-academic papers articulating recommendations for interventions to be 
implemented.
4 The network collects and reports data on resistance of several bacterial pathogens across 
European countries. The first decade after its establishment, this network was run by the 
Dutch Institute of Public Health and the Environment (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid 
en Milieu [RIVM]). Today, it is coordinated by the ECDC under the name EARS-Net.
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Several member states have used their Presidency of the Council of the EU 
as a platform to bring attention to the problem. Some countries that 
focused attention on AMR during their chairmanship include Denmark, 
Sweden, Belgium, and the Czech Republic (Allerberger, Gareis, Jindrák, 
& Struelens, 2009).
The EU and WHO have launched various antibiotic awareness cam-
paigns over the last two decades. With little success, however; the wider 
public is still unaware of the problem in most regions of the world (WHO, 
2015). The belief that antibiotics are effective to treat viral infections is 
still widespread.
 Sporadic Media Attention
Despite warnings from scientists and the international community, the 
media and national governments have given this creeping crisis only peri-
odic attention. In the early 1990s, the media echoed concern  from the 
medical literature when reporting about the methicillin resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). Media attention to AMR shifted notably in 
1997, when new, dramatic language emerged in media narratives. Frequent 
reference was made to AMR and “killer superbugs” (Capurro, 2020, 
p.  3). Apocalyptic post-antibiotic scenarios were described (Brown & 
Crawford, 2009) with headlines like “Deadly germs, lost cures” (Richtel 
& Jacobs, 2019), “Attack of the Superbugs: July 2041” (The Economist, 
2019), and  “What Superbug Hunters Know That We Don’t” 
(McCarthy, 2019a).
This type of rhetoric has ever since been prevalent in the media cover-
age on AMR. The problem is typically presented as a conflict between 
nature and medical progress. Articles have increasingly focused on the abil-
ity of bacteria  to develop human-like characteristics with the ability to 
outsmart the scientific community (Washer & Joffe, 2006). Superbugs 
have also been presented as impossible to control as they move across spa-
tial and geographical  boundaries (Brown & Crawford, 2009). Indeed, 
much media coverage treats AMR as a force majeur—emerging and evolv-
ing in nature, propelled through lifestyle choices, and on a trajectory that 
is difficult, if not impossible, to change.
A recent study found that North American newspapers do not present 
an explanation of the biological process leading to AMR (Capurro, 2020, 
p. 9). The underlying causes of the problem are not explained to the wider 
public, although individuals are partly responsible (DeSilva, Muskavitch, 
& Roche, 2004; Capurro, 2020; Collins et al., 2018). Equally absent is 
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coverage of the actors responsible for managing the threat. Governments 
and the pharmaceutical industry are identified as the main actors; other 
actors are mostly ignored in the reporting. AMR is often portrayed as 
caused by a few industries, despite the wider complexities involved, and 
blame placed on modern societal practices such as globalized economies, 
farming, environmental degradation, insufficient water management, and 
deficient health care systems. In the UK (Collins et al., 2018), media cov-
erage is instilled with attributions of blame and conflict over responsibility 
(e.g., doctors, patients, or industry). In contrast to Capurro’s (2020) find-
ings, however, the responsibilities of the pharmaceutical industry and the 
agricultural sector were found to be rather marginalized in the UK media 
coverage of AMR in comparison to the North American newspapers.
Reporting clearly differs between countries. Bie, Tang and Treise 
(2016) found that reporting about the new superbug NDM-1 (discovered 
in India in 2008 and eventually emerging in the UK and other countries) 
differed considerably between the UK, the US and India. The UK and US 
media associated the issue with fear and dread, and used more emotionally 
loaded words, when compared to India.
In sum, AMR garners regular warnings of international organizations, 
experts, and the media, although these warnings only occasionally coin-
cide with actual outbreaks—thus speaking to the lack of synchronicity 
between outbreaks and attention. Equally intriguing, events and attention 
lead to only uneven and insufficient responses to the crisis.
2.4  conclusIon
This chapter describes a vivid case of a creeping crisis evolving across built 
and natural environments. The threat potential is still accumulating over 
time and space. It sometimes “tips” into outbreaks that garner occasional 
attention but rarely elicit a full-scale crisis response. The impending crisis 
is well known to the international community. Repeated efforts have been 
made to stoke a response, including the adoption of multilateral agree-
ments in the WHO promising action (WHO, 2015). Meaningful responses 
at national levels, however, are rare—and not only in less developed coun-
tries (Bonk, 2015). Richer nations in the world are also resistant to clamp-
ing down on the root causes of this deepening problem.
The chapter highlights the objective and subjective perspectives that 
together help to understand creeping crises. Objectively, AMR reminds us 
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that creeping crises may emerge across systems due to the complex rela-
tions between the human and natural worlds. We recognize that human, 
animal, food, and environmental features are interconnected and propel 
the creeping crises. Subjectively, the case confirms that, for a problem to 
become a crisis, political elites, media, and public need to share a common 
belief that is indeed a “crisis.” This has not been the case with 
AMR. Precursor events bring momentary attention by local leaders but as 
soon as an outbreak is contained, the attention fades away. Crisis framings 
do not seem sufficient to prompt a response.
This particular creeping crisis appears to resist early detection. 
Outbreaks, or in the language of this volume, precursor events, occur 
occasionally, seemingly spontaneously, in various forms (e.g.  individual 
incidents or epidemic-like spreads). Due to the complex relations between 
the human and natural worlds, outbreaks can materialize anywhere at any 
time, regardless of its origins. The enabling conditions by which AMR 
thrives are still developing in places where the response has been insuffi-
cient. It may therefore snowball because of  distant drivers, but we can 
hardly see when and where this snowball will begin its journey. Effective 
management of this crisis will require renewed thinking about how to 
detect tipping points in its development.
Finally, the case of AMR highlights the difficulties of attributing crisis 
ownership. The problem requires a wide array of actors, at micro- and 
macro-levels of society, to respond: individuals, industries, professions, 
and governments. A focus on precursor events, rather than stopping the 
march toward a massive crisis down the road, leads observers to point to 
specific “owners” in specific events. Efforts to attribute blame, though, 
ignore deeper questions about whom—and how—we must address root 
causes that appear quite far from the immediate problem. Few actors are 
willing to step up to act. Under such conditions, sweeping crisis responses 
are unlikely.
AMR thus bears the key characteristics of a creeping crisis, with all the 
challenges and paradoxes that our theoretical approach helps to uncover. 
The threat is diffuse and random. Responses are hampered by ownership 
complexities and societal dependencies, since everyone needs antibiotics 
even though they have the potential to kill us. As one author warns, “no 
magic bullets will make the problem vanish. It will be with us forever” 
(McCarthy, 2019b). This study raises the concerning question, then, of 
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Abstract This chapter deepens our understanding of cyber crises with the 
help of the creeping crisis concept. The chapter shows that although 
emerging  technologies make malicious activities in cyberspace more 
sophisticated, vulnerabilities enabling such threats have been inherent in 
cyber assets for a very long time in the form of creeping crises. The ques-
tion is: was WannaCry the acute crisis or just a precursor event to a bigger 
explosion? It is argued that the  WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017 
should be considered a wake-up call. The chapter demonstrates how the 
cyber threat was lurking in the background, gradually evolving in time and 
space in a non-linear fashion and receiving varying levels of attention.
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“Oops, your files have been encrypted!”. In May 2017, a large number of 
users booted their computers only to find this message on their screens. 
The message was accompanied by a set deadline of three days: the user had 
to pay 300 USD ransom in the Bitcoin cryptocurrency to have their files 
decrypted. If users did not meet the deadline, the ransom would double; 
if the payment was not made within seven days, the decrypted files would 
be deleted (Symantec, 2017a).
These users had fallen victim to a ransomware “cryptoworm” now 
known as WannaCry, which allows hackers to encrypt user data. The worm 
replicated itself within networks without user interaction (Europol, n.d.). 
This “distributed denial-of-service” attack affected multiple systems across 
the world. Hospitals and clinics in Britain were forced to turn away patients 
due to a lack of access to patient information. Red pop-up windows cov-
ered announcement boards at Deutsche Bahn stations. The multinational 
shipping company FedEx experienced widespread service delays. The 
Russian interior ministry, railways, banks and phone operators all found 
themselves battling ransom demands (BBC, 2017). These are just a few of 
the major implications of the WannaCry attack.
No matter how many security systems  we install in our homes, our 
banks and our businesses, there will always be the risk of criminal activity. 
Cyberspace is not an exception to the rule. As in the physical world, cyber-
space can never be entirely secure. This is a key point in understanding 
how the situation got out of control during the 2017 WannaCry attack. 
Software contains bugs and errors that can have serious security implica-
tions, since cyber criminals can exploit these bugs to gain unauthorized 
access to, and control over, a computer. As Middleton (2017) argues, 
“[…] we need to keep doing the same things we have been doing for 
many years in the realm of physical security. You don’t want to let your 
guard down there” (p. x). Standing still, we might say, is falling behind in 
the pursuit of cyber security.
This chapter demonstrates our shallow understanding of cyber crises. 
With WannaCry as an indicative example, the chapter shows how cyber 
crises are “hiding in plain sight”, to quote the title of this volume. It 
makes use of the “creeping crisis” concept introduced in the first chapter, 
a concept that helps to reveal dimensions of cyber crises that are often 
overlooked or misinterpreted. Most analyses on the matter focus on cyber 
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crises’ unprecedented speed, unpredictability, and delimitation in time.1 
Drawing from the creeping crisis conceptual framework, the chapter 
argues that, despite their seemingly speedy and temporally delimited 
nature, cyber crises do not have a clear beginning or ending and may keep 
simmering long after the “hot phase” of the “crisis” is over (Boin, 
Ekengren, & Rhinard, 2020, p. 5). In contrast to conventional wisdom, 
cases like WannaCry are not exceptional events delimited in time and 
space, but rather permanent global threats that manifest themselves as 
seemingly acute crises (cf. George, 1991). Due to their highly complex 
nature, they receive varying levels of attention from different actors. Above 
all, these events demonstrate the need for a better understanding of the 
long-term processes that give rise to cyber crises.
3.2  Precursor events
Major cyber-attacks are often preceded by a chain of events and disturbances 
which, from a creeping crisis perspective, can be seen as precursor events 
and indicators of a deeper problem. One reason these precursor events 
occur is rather straightforward. In order to prevent software bugs and 
errors from posing a serious threat to our computers and networks, 
software vendors release security patches to fix emerging problems. Those 
patches signal problems that, before the patch is installed, can be momen-
tarily exploited by hackers. To add to the problem, when state interests 
come into play, the situation becomes more complex.
For instance, a few years before the WannaCry attack in 2017, the US 
government is believed to have discovered a security vulnerability in 
Microsoft’s Windows operating system. The US National Security Agency 
(NSA) had two choices at the time: it could either keep the vulnerability a 
secret and use it for offensive purposes of national interest, or encourage 
Microsoft to issue a patch to fix the vulnerability quickly.2 According to 
the so-called NOBUS concept (“nobody but us”), the NSA estimates 
whether it is the sole actor aware of a certain vulnerability, or if other 
actors could have already found it (Peterson, 2013). By choosing to keep 
1 Cyber crises are most commonly examined from a strictly linear perspective with the use 
of traditional crisis phases such as a pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phase. See for instance 
Choras,́ Kozik, Flizikowski, Holubowicz, and Renk (2016, p. 146).
2 Parts of the empirical section on WannaCry presented here draw on my earlier work of 
conceptualizing cyber crises (Prevezianou, 2020).
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the vulnerability a secret, the NSA estimated that the benefits of exploiting 
the error, in order to weaponize it, would outweigh the broader security 
risk. This estimate would later prove inaccurate.
The hacking tool developed by the NSA (Nakashima & Timberg, 
2017) targets the Microsoft Windows operating system and infects vulner-
able computers remotely. The Agency had been using the tool for five 
years before alerting Microsoft of its existence (Burdova, 2020). Although 
Microsoft swiftly issued security updates for all Windows versions, 
(Microsoft, 2017), individual users, companies and public institutions 
failed to install the updates. As a result, the threat potential accumulated 
unbeknownst to users, politicians, and crisis managers everywhere. A vast 
number of users all over the world had left—and, as of today, continue to 
leave—the door opens to a threat with a potential to erupt at any point 
in time.
Demonstrating the complex temporal aspect of creeping crises, at an 
unknown point in time a malicious hacker group called the Shadow 
Brokers started taking advantage of the security vulnerability, too. The 
group first appeared in the summer of 2016 and began promoting 
itself  through social media, where it  claimed to have compromised the 
“Equation Group,” a sophisticated cyber-attack group allegedly linked to 
the NSA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity [ENISA], 2016). To 
prove their claim, they started disclosing some of the group’s hacking 
tools for free and later auctioned the rest to the highest bidder. In the 
midst of intense speculation regarding the true origin of the leaks, analysis 
conducted by security researchers suggests that the exposed data and tools 
were valid and even dated back to as far as 2013 (Suiche, 2016). The dis-
closed files revealed vulnerabilities in known vendors’ devices, including 
public agencies, which could be used by any malicious actor wishing to 
exploit them.
The Shadow Brokers continued to engage in a series of leaks during 
2016 and 2017. In April 2017, as part of their fifth effort to disclose vul-
nerabilities, they leaked several hacking tools and exploits, including the 
NSA’s EternalBlue. On May 12, 2017, using the EternalBlue tool, hack-
ers unleashed the WannaCry ransomware cryptoworm, which cracked vul-
nerable systems remotely through Internet scanning and replicated itself 
to spread from one vulnerable computer to the next (ENISA, 2017). The 
ransomware spread at a rate of 10,000 devices per hour, infecting over 
230,000 Windows PCs across 150 countries in a single day (Burdova, 2020).
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The WannaCry crisis exposed the multi-domain nature that is familiar 
to scholars of creeping crises. A cyber crisis can—and will—activate crises 
in multiple domains and affect a variety of actors, from individuals and 
private companies, to political institutions and critical infrastructure oper-
ators (Prevezianou, 2020). WannaCry demonstrates how cyberspace is 
used as a tool to simultaneously trigger crises across sectors and showcases 
how the negligence, or even inability, of policy-makers to map these sec-
toral interconnections and establish adequate crisis management mecha-
nisms can allow a potential threat to lurk in the background.
Policy-makers and regulators, largely divided over responsibility and 
goals, had a difficult time managing the crisis. Considering that the attack 
could have been prevented, or at least had a less significant impact, if indi-
vidual users and organizations had installed the security patches released 
by Microsoft two months prior to the attack, it is now evident that a severe 
lack of “cyber hygiene”, combined with a lack of a “shared responsibility” 
amongst individuals, the government and the private sector contributed 
to the accumulation of threat potential (Smith, 2017). Securing our sys-
tems needs to be a common effort. Practicing good cyber hygiene is the 
users’ responsibility, especially when the user is a national authority or 
organization. The interconnectedness of cyberspace, authorities working 
at cross purposes, and the lack of individuals’ cyber hygiene resulted in a 
dangerous combination that fueled the problem.
3.3  A tIPPIng PoInt
The onset of the WannaCry attack proved a tipping point that spilled over 
into multiple, additional crises.
3.3.1  Diffuse Effects
The spill-over was unprecedented. Many individual users and organizations 
across the globe were hit by the attack, including critical infrastructure 
operators, manufacturers, and service providers. Their systems were set to 
stop functioning—unless they paid the ransom. Even then, no one could 
guarantee that the systems could be recovered after the ransom was paid. 
A few significant examples of organizations hit by the attack were 
(BBC, 2017):
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• Britain’s National Health Service
• The Russian Ministry of Interior, several banks, and MegaFon, 
Russia’s second largest mobile phone operator
• German railways
• The Spanish phone operator Telefonica, power firm Iberdrola, and 
utility provider Gas Natural
• The French car manufacturer Renault, which was forced to halt 
production at many sites
• Chinese universities
• 600 Japanese companies
• Indonesian hospitals
• Andhra Pradesh Police in India
This disruption of services caused major economic losses, which were 
estimated to reach 8 billion USD (Barlyn, 2017). The impact was not just 
economic. The attack was a wake-up call, since it revealed how a crisis 
creeping in cyberspace can have a major spill-over effect in the “real world” 
and affect our daily lives in unexpected ways. A clear example was Britain’s 
National Health Service. Hospitals were unable to access patient data, 
thousands of operations and appointments were canceled, vital medical 
equipment had to be taken off-line and ambulances were diverted to 
other, unaffected hospitals (BBC, 2017).
The private sector led the response effort. Microsoft immediately 
released emergency security patches after the attack (Microsoft Security 
Response Center Team, 2017). Apart from users of in-support versions of 
Windows, who would be automatically protected provided that they had 
the “automatic updates” function enabled, Microsoft moved one step fur-
ther by issuing patches for out-of-support systems including Windows 
2003 and Windows XP (Misner, 2017). At the same time, international 
organizations, together with so-called computer emergency response 
teams (CERTs) and large cybersecurity companies, issued guidelines that 
users should follow in response to the attack, regardless of whether they 
had been hit or not. Cybersecurity experts advised users against paying the 
ransom and urged them to update their systems as soon as possible in 
order to ensure their protection (Baraniuk, 2017).
The attack’s expansion was halted in a surprising way. Marcus Hutchins, 
a British computer security researcher, also known by the pseudonym 
“Malware Tech,” accidentally discovered a “kill switch” by registering a 
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domain name that tracked the spread of the ransomwear and, in the end, 
halted it (Malware Tech, 2017). By slowing down its expansion, it allowed 
for the implementation of further protection measures. However, it could 
not reverse the damage that was already done.3
3.3.2  Limited Attention, Limited Response
The deeper problems signaled by the WannaCry attack were hardly new. 
Cybersecurity experts have been raising the alarm for a long time—unfor-
tunately without attracting the necessary level of attention from authori-
ties or individual users. Attention is a core factor in understanding the 
response to a creeping crisis: “if political elites, media and the public do 
not collectively share a sense of crisis, it is hard to speak of a crisis” (Boin 
et  al., 2020, p.  7). Without attention, remedial action is unlikely. 
Connecting this argument to WannaCry, it does not come as a surprise 
that a collectively shared sense of an emergent crisis was mostly absent. It 
alarmed experts, and some individuals sought to raise the alarm, but some-
how this major, emerging threat failed to attract  political and public 
attention.
For instance, about a month before the attack, private researchers 
announced they had identified computers compromised by the same hack-
ing methods used by the NSA. Experts from several security firms warned 
their clients who practiced poor security practices. The fact that these 
methods originated from an intelligence agency was a sign to the research-
ers that this hacking tool was more likely than others to prove highly effec-
tive. Matthew Hickey, co-founder of Hacker House in Britain, said his 
teams issued ever-heightened warnings of a “Microsoft apocalypse” (Dave, 
2017). “It’s highly likely what we saw were precursors to WannaCry,” said 
Govshteyn, Alert Logic’s co-founder, when referring to the NSA leak 
warnings (Dave, 2017).
National politicians displayed little awareness of the impending threat. 
The term crisis was avoided, and public authorities seemed to rely on the 
private sector to deal with the issue. In the case of the UK, the Department 
of Health was warned about the risk of cyber-attacks on the NHS a year 
earlier. The Secretary of State for Health did ask the UK National Data 
3 The investigations conducted traced the attack to the Lazarus Group, cyber affiliates of 
the North Korean government (Symantec, 2017b).
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Guardian and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) to undertake reviews 
of data security. These reports were published in July 2016 and warned 
the department that cyber-attacks could lead to patient information being 
lost or compromised and could jeopardize access to critical patient record 
systems. They recommended that all healthcare organizations provide evi-
dence that action was being taken to improve cybersecurity, including 
moving off older, legacy operating systems. Although the department and 
its arm’s-length bodies were working to improve cybersecurity in the 
NHS, it did not publish its formal response to the recommendations until 
July 2017 (National Audit Office, 2018, p. 5).
In March and April 2017, NHS Digital (the IT arm of the National 
Health Service), issued critical alerts warning organizations to patch their 
systems to prevent WannaCry. However, before May 12, 2017, the depart-
ment had no formal mechanism for assessing whether NHS organizations 
had complied with its advice and guidance. Prior to the attack, NHS 
Digital had conducted an on-site cybersecurity assessment for 88 out of 
236 NHS trusts (local governance regions), and none had passed. But 
NHS Digital could not mandate a local body to take remedial action even 
if it had concerns about its vulnerability (National Audit Office, 2018, p. 6).
Many individual users remained unaware of the severity of the problem. 
There are still many users who have not patched their systems against the 
EternalBlue vulnerability. Even after the crisis, more than two years fol-
lowing the global outbreak, the WannaCry ransomware was still spreading 
and sometimes still successful at infecting users. Some people still paid the 
ransom in a futile effort to retrieve their encrypted data (Mackenzie, 
2019). Not only did this put them at risk of falling victim to WannaCry, 
but they are also at risk of other attacks which have emerged since 
EternalBlue wreaked havoc. For instance, according to the UK National 
Audit Office:
WannaCry was the largest cyber-attack to affect the NHS, although 
individual trusts had been attacked before 12 May 2017. For example, two 
of the trusts infected by WannaCry had been infected by previous cyber- 
attacks. One of England’s biggest trusts, Barts Health NHS Trust, had been 
infected before, and Northern Lincolnshire and Google NHS Foundation 
Trust had been subject to a ransomware attack in October 2018, leading to 
the cancellation of 2800 appointments. (National Audit Office, 2018, p. 5)
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This statement showcases the severity of the problem. The precursor 
events were insufficiently addressed, and little political attention turned 
toward the problem; all which in turn  led to further accumulation of 
threat potential. This is not the only example. In May 2019, two years 
after WannaCry, thousands of computers in the US city of Baltimore’s city 
government were frozen after their files became digitally scrambled by 
hackers with the help of the EternalBlue fault (BBC, 2019). This led to 
local residents being unable to pay utility bills, parking tickets and taxes, 
while at the same time the staff could not send or receive emails.
Elsewhere in the world, the situation was similar. In Russia, where 
WannaCry affected the country’s banking system, the central bank claimed 
to have sent recommendations to Russian banks to update their Windows 
software only a month before the actual attack and few took heed even 
then (Winning and Stubbs, 2017). Consequently, there seems to be a pat-
tern of authorities not addressing the matter sufficiently and not taking 
the necessary action, even though experts and Microsoft had stressed the 
urgent need to keep our systems updated in order to prevent not only that 
particular attack, but also future attacks that could come from the same 
systemic weakness (Pope, 2019).
Governments failed to elevate the issue to the crisis level (by not taking 
measures and addressing it with the same intensity as the private sector), 
while the private sector was leading the management efforts and security 
experts were warning—and continue to warn—of a massive cyber crisis if 
the focus remains on managing manifestations instead of addressing the 
root of the problem and understanding the long-term threat accumula-
tion. This varying sense of urgency among different actors is further deep-
ened by a lack of ownership. Creeping crises can be addressed successfully 
only through cross-sectoral and cross-border cooperation, which is hin-
dered by uncertainty, shifting national interests and varying degrees of 
political will (cf. Blondin & Boin, 2020).
3.4  From creePIng crIsIs to crIsIs: A dIscussIon
The fact that a computer worm managed to spread all over the world 
within a few hours, with limited resources, and cause such a major 
disruption is highly alarming. This is especially true if we consider the 
devastating impact the attack could have if the hackers were to target more 
critical societal functions. This chapter clarifies the need to understand this 
highly interconnected threat landscape.
3 WANNACRY AS A CREEPING CRISIS 
46
The WannaCry ransomware attack was a wake-up call, since it revealed 
the devastating potential of cyber threats. EternalBlue, the bug that 
opened the door to WannaCry, still fuels an endless infection cycle and its 
legacy lives on. Soon after the WannaCry ransomware campaign, a new 
type of malware, Petya and its variant NotPetya spread through the same 
vulnerability, although this time the malware was much more sophisti-
cated and deliberately malicious in character, as it entered the network 
through unpatched Windows-operated machines, stole passwords, gained 
administrator access and spread itself over the entire network (Hern, 
2017). These ransomware attacks, like those before them, spread across 
the world (Greenberg, 2018).
Cases like WannaCry are great examples of a new type of crisis that 
develops in a dynamic threat environment and, despite widespread impact 
at a societal and political level, does not attract the same level of attention 
among different stakeholders as we might expect using a traditional crisis 
perspective.
The case also generates a tricky question for the creeping crisis research 
agenda, which distinguishes between precursor events and future, major 
crises. Was WannaCry a creeping crisis that developed into an acute full- 
blown crisis when the cryptoworm spread itself across the globe? Or was 
it a mere manifestation of a creeping crisis in cyberspace, whose acute 
phase is yet to be revealed? This chapter argues that, despite the fact that 
WannaCry constituted a tipping point in the development of a creeping 
crisis into a major crisis, the ransomware explosion in 2017 remains a 
symptom of an underlying and much more serious problem that may take 
us all by surprise in the future.
This is not to say that we should expect a cyber doomsday—although 
such scenarios are often posed by experts—or even examine other vulner-
abilities that could be exploited by cyber criminals. This is a creeping crisis 
that is still developing in full view. Manifestations are numerous and 
sometimes resemble “big bangs.” Yet decision-makers seem to be taken by 
surprise every time, while experts constantly raise the alarm and warn of a 
more devastating impact. Individual users are mere spectators in this 
vicious circle, but they have much to lose. There is a potential for a full- 
blown cyber crisis that has not yet been witnessed.
After the WannaCry attack, Brad Smith, the President of Microsoft, 
demonstrated the severity of the issue from a national security 
perspective:
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[…] this attack provides yet another example of why the stockpiling of 
vulnerabilities by governments is such a problem. This is an emerging 
pattern in 2017. We have seen vulnerabilities stored by the CIA show up on 
WikiLeaks, and now this vulnerability stolen from the NSA has affected 
customers around the world. Repeatedly, exploits in the hands of govern-
ments have leaked into the public domain and caused widespread damage. 
An equivalent scenario with conventional weapons would be the U.S. mili-
tary having some of its Tomahawk missiles stolen. And this most recent 
attack represents a completely unintended but disconcerting link between 
the two most serious forms of cybersecurity threats in the world today – 
nation-state action and organized criminal action. (Smith, 2017, p. 1)
There is more to cyber crises than traditional crisis approaches allow us 
to see. A focus on how “sudden” or “fast” a cyber incident is will result in 
a rather shallow understanding of the situation, which, in turn, leads to 
bad decision-making. As demonstrated by WannaCry, the cyber threat 
lurks in the background and develops across temporal and spatial bound-
aries, suddenly manifesting itself through tipping points. It receives vary-
ing levels of attention, which leads to a lack of a collectively shared sense 
of an ongoing crisis. This in turn leads to further accumulation of threat 
potential due to an insufficient response. The vicious circle goes on and 
on. Effective responses, supported by insightful research, need to acknowl-
edge that in an interconnected world we cannot manage crises without 
mapping the interconnectedness of critical systems, without understand-
ing how different actors and different conditions interact and without 
understanding what consequences this interaction generates. The need to 
go beyond the traditional temporal crisis perspectives and look at the 
broader, systemic picture is more pressing than ever. The creeping crisis 
perspective takes some useful steps in this direction.
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Abstract The Syrian conflict gave rise to a large mobilization of Islamist 
foreign fighters. In recent years, many of these foreign fighters have 
asked to be repatriated from overcrowded refugee camps in northern 
Syria, camps known as hotbeds for radicalization. While researchers and 
humanitarian organizations largely agree that repatriation can prevent 
further radicalization and transnational threats, political leaders refuse to 
act. As the dire humanitarian situation in the camps and a denial of 
responsibility at home intensify, the situation is becoming more acute. 
This chapter explores the issue of remaining foreign fighters in Syria and 
the evolving threat situation as an example of a creeping crisis. The chap-
ter focuses specifically on the Swedish handling of these foreign fighters. 
At least three hundred Swedish citizens traveled to Syria in 2012. In 
recent years, many of these have asked to be repatriated. Similar to its 
European counterparts, the Swedish government has refused to meet 
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these foreign fighters’ requests, potentially generating a broader global 
threat. The Swedish response is the focus of this chapter and illuminates 
one of the key aspects of a creeping crisis.
Keywords Creeping crisis • Terrorism • Foreign fighters • Swedish 
government • Radicalization
4.1  IntroductIon
Osama bin Laden, stripped of his Saudi passport, is Exhibit A of the potential 
risk of assuming that problematic citizens barred from return will remain 
someone else’s problem. (Malet & Hayes, 2020, p. 1624)
Foreign fighters, also known as transnational insurgents or noncitizens 
who join insurgencies in civil conflicts, are not a new phenomenon (Malet, 
2013, p. 9). Indeed, foreign fighters have participated in “nearly 100 civil 
wars over the past 250 years” (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019, 
p. 3). However, it was not until the Syrian conflict began in 2011 that 
political leaders and policymakers paid serious attention to them. The 
Syrian conflict has attracted one of the largest mobilizations of Islamist 
foreign fighters to date, with a substantial number arriving from Europe. 
Many European foreign fighters have requested to be repatriated from 
overcrowded custodial and refugee camps in northern Syria, camps known 
as hotbeds for radicalization (European Parliamentary Research Service, 
2018; Pokalova, 2020).
Their participation in terrorist groups has caused widespread fear in 
their respective home countries, ostensibly because of the risk of terrorist 
attacks once they return. Politicians in many countries, therefore, have 
barred them from returning home. Such measures are put in place as a 
perceived response to a security threat, but experts warn the issue is more 
complicated than that. Malet and Hayes (2020, p. 1628) argue that while 
barring remaining foreign fighters “from re-entry may remove immediate 
potential domestic threats, the approach carries the risk of creating trans-
national threats when stateless individuals turn to extremist networks and 
failed states for refuge” (see also Alimi, Demetriou, & Bosi, 2015; Bjørgo, 
2016; Brandon, 2009; Crenshaw, 1981; Della Porta, 2018; Horgan & 
Bjorgo, 2009; Horgan, 2014; Toros, 2008; Malet, 2013; Neumann, 
2010; Weisburd et al., 2017). Such warnings, however, have not deterred 
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European political leaders and policymakers from refusing to repatriate 
remaining foreign fighters in Syria, for instance.
This chapter explores the perceived threat of remaining foreign fighters 
in Syria as an example of a “creeping crisis,” defined in the introductory 
chapter of this volume. The chapter focuses specifically on the Swedish 
handling of these foreign fighters. At least three hundred Swedish citizens 
traveled to Syria in 2012. In recent years, many of these have asked to 
come home. Similar to other European countries, the Swedish govern-
ment has refused to meet these requests. Although precursor events, in 
the form of terrorist activity at home and in the camps, have caught the 
attention of governmental actors, effective action to counter the risks and 
threats associated with leaving these foreign fighters in Syria is largely absent.
To fully understand the dynamics of this case, in which foreign fighters 
are stuck in dire humanitarian camps in Syria and governments deny 
responsibility for these individuals, the creeping crisis concept is useful. 
The concept captures the “slow-burning” dimension of this situation, and 
highlights one aspect in particular: governing elites have generated not 
only an insufficient response but a counterproductive one. By responding 
to one perceived crisis in a particular way, they generate the contours of 
another. These response dynamics are thus the focus of this chapter and 
illuminate a key aspect of a creeping crisis: how a sufficient response 
depends on a consensus on how precursor events and effective measures 
are to be interpreted. The creeping crisis of remaining foreign fighters is in 
plain sight, but policymakers do little to resolve it and thereby plant the 
seed for an arguably more serious crisis later.
The chapter is divided into four sections. It starts by introducing the 
evolution of the problem over time and space as well as precursor events, 
recapitulating the situation, and outlining previous research. It then dis-
cusses the varying degrees of attention and action, analyzing Swedish 
political and societal responses before critically discussing it in light of 
other countries’ actions. The final section reflects on the findings, explores 
possible reasons for the counterproductive response, and sets out future 
research questions.
4.2  the evolutIon of the Problem
In the Spring of 2011, uprisings against authoritarian regimes were 
spreading in the Middle East. These uprisings, collectively known as the 
Arab Spring, involved anti-government and pro-democracy protests and 
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armed clashes. This was also the case in Syria, where protesters challenged 
the regime of Bashar al-Assad. When security forces opened fire in Syria, 
more people joined the protests and violence escalated quickly (Pokalova, 
2020, p.  39). Soon after, individuals sympathetic to the various causes 
began traveling to Syria to join all sides of the conflict: pro-Assad forces, 
opposition forces, as well as groups with sectarian Islamist overtones. 
Since 2012, at least three hundred of these “foreign fighters” have left 
Sweden for Syria (Swedish Security Service, 2017).
Over time, Islamist groups, especially Daesh,1 attracted the majority of 
foreign fighters. Over a few years, the numbers reached up to forty thou-
sand, one of the biggest mobilizations of Islamist foreign fighters to date 
(Pokalova, 2020, p. 40). In 2013, and again in the beginning of 2015, the 
numbers skyrocketed following Daesh’s declaration of a “Caliphate” (UN 
Secretary-General, 2015). Although it appears that foreign fighters travel 
with the sole purpose of fighting in battle, this was not the case in Syria. A 
large number came with families and friends to stay and live in the conflict 
zones (Pokalova, 2020, p. 52).
European officials forecasted the return of many foreign fighters from 
Syria after 2012. These statements were later revised when this influx did 
not seem to occur (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2018, 
p. 31). One notable reason for this was the capture of Daesh fighters in 
northern Syria by Kurdish-led militias, which was made possible with US 
military support. That support ended in December 2018 when US 
President Trump declared that two thousand US troops would be extri-
cated from Syria (Chulov, Borger, & Roth, 2018). With the US with-
drawal, Turkey began to intervene militarily across the border and, more 
specifically, into Kurdish-held areas. Kurdish militias experienced difficul-
ties holding foreign fighters with the little resources they had, complicated 
by the Turkish military forcing them to leave (Savage, 2019; UN Security 
Council Committee, 2020, p. 25).
As the Syrian conflict evolved, many foreign fighters started calling for 
help from European authorities to be brought back home. Due to the ter-
rible conditions in refugee and custodial camps held by Kurdish militias, 
Swedish foreign fighters called on Swedish authorities to be repatriated. 
These included Swedes held in the overcrowded camp in al-Hawl, a camp 
known for holding many Daesh women and children. It has been estimated 
that over two-thirds of the seventy thousand in the al-Hawl camp are 
1 Also known as ISIL, IS or the Islamic State.
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children (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2019). Female 
combatants and child indoctrination are characteristic of Daesh. There 
have been reports about women imposing Daesh rules inside prisons and 
conducting executions of prisoners inside camps. Other reports warned 
about the rise of new generations inculcated with Daesh ideologies, 
describing how children participated in military training. These processes 
point to an evolving threat situation where al-Hawl and other camps in 
northern Syria have become a hotbed for (further) radicalization (European 
Parliamentary Research Service, 2018; Cafarella, 2018; Benotman & 
Malik, 2016).
Meanwhile, in Syria and Iraq, Daesh affiliates continued to mount 
“increasingly bold insurgent attacks, calling and planning for the breakout 
of ISIL fighters in detention facilities and exploiting weaknesses in the 
security environment of both countries” (UN Security Council Committee, 
2020, p. 3). Reports describe money transfers to Daesh, too (UN Security 
Council Committee, 2020, pp. 17–18; Baas, 2020). Many of these trans-
fers not only go to Daesh in Syria and Iraq, but to widows and orphans of 
deceased fighters. This money strengthens the organization, helps to 
ensure loyalty, and builds support for generations to come (UN Security 
Council Committee, 2020, pp. 17–18).
4.2.1  Precursor Events
The threat at the heart of this creeping crisis is complex and well known. 
Child indoctrination, further radicalization in custodial and refugee camps, 
money transfers and recruits of new affiliates: remaining foreign fighters 
are a serious security problem facing the world.
Political leaders have taken a particular stance on the problem. Measures 
were introduced based on the assumption that foreign fighters “would be 
skilled terrorists and that roughly ten percent of them would commit 
domestic attacks” (Malet & Hayes, 2020, p. 1621). In 2014, a French 
foreign fighter killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. The 
attacker, Mehdi Nemmouche, had recently returned from Syria where he 
spent one year fighting for Daesh (Lister, 2015, p. 2). In November 2015, 
several attacks took place in Paris, leaving one hundred thirty people dead 
and hundreds wounded. The individuals arrested were connected to net-
works including Daesh foreign fighters (BBC, 2016; Entenmann, Van der 
Heide, Weggemans, & Dorsey, 2015, p. 4). Only a few months later, in 
March 2016, Brussels experienced three suicide bombings. Casualties 
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included thirty-two dead and more than seven hundred wounded. The 
attackers were foreign fighters or engaged in networks with foreign fight-
ers (Lasoen, 2017, pp. 940–941). These attacks were used as the basis for 
harsh penalties against potential terrorists (Malet & Hayes, 2020, p. 1621). 
Such penalties included, not least, a refusal to repatriate foreign fighters in 
Kurdish-held camps in Syria.
Historically, responses to foreign fighters have varied from repressive to 
more humane. Researchers across disciplines studied different approaches 
and their outcomes. There appears to be a scholarly consensus on the 
counterproductive effects of repressive measures (e.g., Alimi et al., 2015; 
Bjørgo, 2016; Brandon, 2009; Crenshaw, 1981; Della Porta, 2018; 
Horgan & Bjorgo, 2009; Horgan, 2014; Toros, 2008; Malet, 2013; 
Neumann, 2010; Weisburd et al., 2017). Preventing foreign fighters from 
returning home displaces the problem to another (less equipped) country 
and turns foreign fighters into stateless people and/or generates a transna-
tional threat (Dechesne, 2011; Malet & Hayes, 2020; Lister, 2015). In 
addition, scholars have noted that social settings where extremist thought 
and behavior are present tend to increase the potential for radicalization 
(Alimi & Demetriou, 2018, pp. 559–560). Indeed, radicalization by its 
very nature is a “process whereby individuals or groups come to embrace 
violence as a legitimate means to achieve political, ideological or religious 
goals” (Bjørgo, 2016, p. 27).
For this reason, countering and preventing this threat is “to a great 
degree a normative battle on whether the use of violence is legitimate or 
not” (Bjørgo, 2016, p. 27). Much of the research points not only to the 
counterproductive effects of repressive measures but to the longer-term 
benefits of humane “soft” responses. Toros demonstrates how a humane 
approach “may offer a path of empowerment for the norm of nonviolent 
political contestation” (Toros, 2008, p. 423), Marsden concludes in her 
work on reintegration of extremists that for countermeasures to work 
“society must allow, and ideally actively support, the individual’s reinte-
gration” (Marsden, 2017, p. 11).
In short, repressive measures, including a refusal to repatriate remaining 
foreign fighters, may appear politically attractive in the short term but 
tend to push these individuals to engage in (additional) violence (Malet & 
Hayes, 2020, p.  1624). Nevertheless, political leaders, including the 
Swedish government, continue to prevent foreign fighters from returning 
to their home countries.
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4.3  A vAryIng degree of AttentIon And ActIon
The problem of remaining foreign fighters has not gone unnoticed. The 
Swedish government, its agencies, media, civil society, and international 
institutions have raised the issue in various ways but with no overarching 
consensus as to what is at stake.
4.3.1  The Swedish Government
Since 2016, the Swedish government has introduced new laws to counter 
the issue of remaining foreign fighters, including laws against traveling 
with the intention to fight in a conflict zone, against the financing of ter-
rorism activities, and to prevent individuals from associating with a terror-
ist organization (Swedish Parliament, 2017; Swedish Parliament, 2020). 
In early 2019, Swedish ministers argued that an international tribunal in 
Syria, to dole out “harsher punishments,” should be established (Damberg 
& Johansson, 2019; SVT, 2019a). They refused to repatriate Swedish for-
eign fighters from Syrian camps, including their children, stating that “the 
family has the responsibility for their children [not us]” (Damberg & 
Johansson, 2019).
In April 2019, the Swedish government announced that rather than 
bringing these individuals back to Sweden, it had earmarked two million 
Swedish crowns to support refugee camps in Syria (SVT, 2019b). This 
shift of responsibility was noted by Save the Children (2019), when it 
published a letter to the Swedish Prime Minister criticizing the Swedish 
handling of remaining foreign fighters’ children. That same day, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that “there should be no doubt 
that the government is doing what we can for these children and, if pos-
sible, they should be brought back home” (Wallström, 2019). Yet in 
October 2019, the Swedish Prime Minister demonstrated the govern-
ment’s continued resentment toward repatriation, stating that “I can only 
feel disgusted [of the remaining foreign fighters]” and “those who went 
there, they should pay the price [stå sitt kast]” (Orrenius, 2019a). As of 
October 2020, the Swedish stance on adult foreign fighters had not 
changed.
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4.3.2  Swedish Media
Media has an important role in legitimizing state action via its reporting 
on terrorism, signaling approval of some actions and “othering” individu-
als associated with terrorism (Mueller, 2005). In this case, Swedish media, 
especially publicly funded media, have taken on a delegitimizing role, pro-
ducing critical pieces toward the government’s measures and giving a 
voice to remaining foreign fighters. Interestingly, Swedish media tend to 
describe remaining foreign fighters, especially women and children, as vic-
tims, in contrast to government statements. For instance, several Swedish 
media outlets have closely followed the grandfather of a foreign fighter 
and his journey to retrieve his grandchildren from Syria, with headlines 
such as “Grandfather to Skråmo’s children: I started to cry” (Sveriges 
Radio, 2019b) and “Patricio Galvez’s seven grandchildren found in 
Syria—this is the picture of the reunion” (SVT, 2019c).
4.3.3  Civil Society
Representatives of civil society, in Sweden as well as abroad, have pushed 
the Swedish government to repatriate remaining foreign fighters, espe-
cially women and children. In 2019, a Kurdish delegation visited the 
Swedish government to urge the return of Swedish citizens from northern 
Syria (Save the Children, 2019). Humanitarian organizations, such as Save 
the Children, Doctors without Borders and The Red Cross, have provided 
alarming accounts of the dire humanitarian situation in northern Syria. 
They criticized the lack of responsibility displayed by European countries, 
highlighting the Swedish approach. Save the Children and The Red Cross 
have, for instance, described the Swedish approach as “completely unsus-
tainable” (Göteborgs-Posten, 2020) and castigated the Swedish govern-
ment for acting against the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(Sveriges Radio, 2019a). The Director-General of the International 
Committee of The Red Cross chastised the Swedish government, stating: 
“you cannot continue to refrain from making decisions about your citi-
zens” (Orrenius, 2020). Doctors without Borders emphasized that 
“everyone has the right to medical and humanitarian support, regardless 
of background, nationality, status or where they come from” (Doctors 
without Borders, 2019).
Some governmental agencies joined the chorus. For instance, the 
Swedish National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism argued that the 
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Swedish government needs to take more responsibility on the matter 
(Sveriges Radio, 2015; Carlstedt, 2017). In 2019, the Swedish Security 
Service reported on Syrian camps nurturing “new generations of terror-
ists” and the Head of Analysis, Ahn-Za Hagström, suggested her disap-
proval of the Swedish approach, pointing out that “it is important to think 
carefully about how the measures that we as a society choose to address 
the threat in the long-term, for the next generation” and “we do things 
now that may seem good for the moment, but which may be threatening 
in the long-term” (Ahn-Za Hagström cited in Orrenius, 2019b).
4.3.4  International Institutions and Other 
Countries’ Responses
Since 2014, international institutions have expressed their concern over 
remaining foreign fighters and emphasized their supportive role by pro-
viding resolutions and guidelines to member states. Some, like the 
International Centre for Counter Terrorism, in The Hague, have called 
for humane, soft approaches (Entenmann et al., 2015; Eurojust, 2015). 
Although the transnational nature of the problem is repeatedly discussed 
among these actors, multilateral institutions and agencies have simultane-
ously stated that the primary responsibility lies with member states (UN 
Security Council, Resolution 2178, 2014, p. 4; Entenmann et al., 2015, 
p. 5; Eurojust, 2015). There are some voices, such as the EU Counter- 
Terrorism Coordinator, who have urged European institutions to take on 
a bigger role (Washington Institute, 2015).
Similar to its Swedish neighbors, Danish government officials deny they 
are responsible for remaining foreign fighters with Danish citizenship in 
Syria. The Danish Minister for Immigration argued against repatriation on 
the basis that these individuals have gone to fight against democracy, free-
dom and “everything else that Denmark stands for” (The Local, 2019). 
Moreover, the Minister stated that these foreign fighters and their children 
“do not belong in Denmark” and “have turned their back on Denmark, 
so there is no reason for their children to be citizens” (The Local, 2019). 
In 2019, Denmark introduced two new laws making it possible for the 
government to revoke passports without court procedures and revoke citi-
zenship from children born “in areas where it is illegal to travel” (The 
Local, 2019).
Similarly, in 2015, Australia introduced a new law giving the Australian 
government the right to revoke Australian citizenship from “people who 
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hold a second nationality if they are found to have been members of a ter-
rorist group or engaged in terrorism-related activity” (Williams, 2017). In 
2017, this law was put into practice for the first time when a foreign fighter 
still in Syria was stripped off his Australian citizenship. That same year, the 
UK government took away citizenship from 104 UK foreign fighters 
(with dual nationality), on the grounds that it would be “conducive to the 
public good” (Williams, 2017). In 2019, the US President told the State 
Department to ban the return of a US citizen who had left for Syria. 
Ironically, the President made this statement only a few days after he called 
on European leaders to bring back foreign fighters from Syria 
(Hincks, 2019).
The creeping crisis of remaining foreign fighters affects more than a few 
countries. Some governments have been forced to change their stance on 
repatriation, often due to legal constraints. For instance, in July 2019, a 
court ruling ordered German authorities to repatriate a German woman 
and her three children from northern Syria. A spokesperson for the 
German foreign ministry explained soon after the ruling that the govern-
ment was “studying the ruling and may appeal at a higher court” (Al 
Jazeera, 2019).
Similarly, French authorities faced a lawsuit at the European Court of 
Human Rights over its refusal to repatriate children from Syria. The law-
yer of this lawsuit, representing the French grandparents of a daughter and 
her two children detained in Syria, argued in a television interview in 2019 
that, “this approach aims to push the state to assume its responsibilities 
because we are confronting inaction; more precisely, an irresponsible and 
particularly inhumane inertia” (France 24, 2019a). A month after the law-
suit was announced, French authorities repatriated twelve French orphans 
from Syria (France 24, 2019b).
Some governments have successfully appealed lawsuits. In the 
Netherlands, the lawyers of twenty-three women with Dutch citizenship 
detained in Syria had argued in front of the court in The Hague to “force 
[obligation of result] the state to repatriate them and their 56 children” 
(France 24, 2019b). The Dutch government immediately appealed the 
verdict, arguing that the court had failed to account for “national security 
interests and diplomatic considerations” (France 24, 2019b). Soon after, 
the Court of Appeal overturned the ruling and concluded that Dutch 




At the time of writing, in November 2020, only a few European 
countries had repatriated their citizens without lawsuits or severe criticism 
involved. The Norwegian government is one example where the govern-
ment, despite facing a political crisis (with the right-wing populist party 
threatening to leave the Norwegian government coalition, which they 
later did), decided to repatriate a foreign fighter and her two sick children 
(Holmgren, 2020a, 2020b).
4.4  conclusIon
How does the creeping crisis of remaining fighters continue, unabated? A 
key factor is the unwillingness of political decision-makers to deal with the 
problem. This chapter has documented a deep divide between civil society 
and political decision-makers with regard to their approach toward remain-
ing foreign fighters. In short, representatives of civil society tend to argue 
for repatriation while political leaders tend to deny responsibility and push 
for harsher measures.
What explains the divide between the official approach and the expert- 
led insight that this approach is likely counterproductive? One factor is the 
perceived relation with terrorism, a famously sensitive topic which tends 
to elicit fear and repressive measures (McConaghy, 2017). Political leaders 
tend to use firm measures as these are thought to demonstrate their ability 
to act in a rapid, resolute, and executive manner. Some parts of the Swedish 
media (along with some governments, such as Norway) argue for a more 
humane response. They propose a reaction that is informed by consider-
ation of the foreign fighter as victims, what some call the victimization of 
foreign fighters (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2011). By framing foreign fighters as 
victims, individual agency is downplayed and, as a result, the threat they 
pose. Yet most governments continue to resist that framing, refusing to 
act. As long as governments respond to the crisis of remaining foreign 
fighters as a threat at “home,” they are likely to exacerbate the future, 
cross-border dimensions of the problem.
Indeed, this chapter illuminates one of the key aspects of a creeping 
crisis: how insufficient responses by authorities results in a continued and, 
in the case of counterproductive measures, acceleration of the threat and a 
greater risk of an acute crisis. The creeping crisis concept offers a heuristic 
to help deconstruct, analytically, the dynamics of this problem and some 
of this more troublesome (from a normative perspective) components. 
This chapter represents just a first set of answers and hypotheses that need 
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to be tested in more systematic empirical ways. Future work should pro-
vide an in-depth analysis of feedback loops between threat evolution, 
attention, and response, and should examine what role short-term think-
ing might have for the evolving and increasing threat of radicalization. 
There is also a need for more thorough study of the transnational dimen-
sion of the phenomenon and associated questions of crisis ownership and 
responsibility. Future analysis of the issue of remaining foreign fighters can 
contribute much not only to our understanding of this particular global 
problem, but also to the utility and development of the creeping crisis 
concept itself.
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With increasing frequency, experts warn about the accumulation of “Big 
Data.” Some scholars call the exponential growth, storage, and manipula-
tion of individuals’ most intimate details in the hands of private actors a 
wicked policy problem (Gruetzemacher, 2018; O’Neill, 2016). Others 
refer to an impending crisis (Krebs, 2016) or to the intractable vulnerabil-
ity of modern society (Zuboff, 2020).
The phenomenon of Big Data took root decades ago. Technological 
advances combined with widespread use of the Internet to create a new 
threat. Early warnings by lone experts and individual politicians, in the 
1990s, were cast aside as scaremongering. As the problem grew, attention 
grew—but only sporadically. The scale of the problem expanded from one 
of moral concern (losing control over one’s own identity) to financial vul-
nerability (undermining one’s economic stability) to a geopolitical issue 
(opening new vectors for attack). Actual events outlined below drew peri-
odic outrage, following revelations about the size of the problem (e.g. the 
Snowden incident), the ease at which data can be stolen (e.g. regular data 
breaches), and how data can be used as a weapon (e.g. accusations made 
against Russia and China). Few politicians today dispute the underlying 
problem and the potential for a much larger crisis ahead. Some regulatory 
action has been taken. But sustained attention, and any comprehensive 
management of the issue, is hard to come by. According to some, we are 
“standing on the edge of a precipice” (Buck, 2011).
Big Data thus reflects the archetypal creeping crisis defined in the 
introduction to this book. It emerged incrementally over time, accelerated 
because of interacting developments, reveals itself through precursor 
events, and fails to sustain political attention or proper crisis management. 
What this chapter showcases about Big Data, as a creeping crisis, is two-
fold: (a) the evolution of the problem over time, in such a way as to 
“creep” into societies’ basic functioning without widespread notice; and, 
(b) how our dependence on the conditions that enable Big Data prevents 
a concerted response. The chapter highlights the question of how much 
recognized damage capacity is “enough” to prompt a response, and sug-
gests we may be doomed to live with some creeping crises.
To illustrate these points, the chapter begins by outlining what is at 
stake: by what measure can Big Data be described, objectively or subjec-
tively, as a threat? We then show its origin and serendipitous emergence 
over time, before tracking public attention to the problem. Attention is 
 S. VASHISHTHA AND M. RHINARD
71
linked to a number of precursor events that revealed the depth of the 
creeping crisis. We conclude by discussing what has been done, what needs 
to be done, and why a comprehensive response is likely to be difficult.
5.2  defInIng the threat: What Is at stake?
With every click of a mouse, every field entered in a website, every query 
on a search engine, and every application for a loan or job, companies and 
governments collect enormous amounts of our personal information. We 
hand over this information both voluntarily and involuntarily. Even where 
voluntary, banks and governments take our personal details as a condition 
of service. It is not optional. From those mountains of personal informa-
tion, it is now simple to deduce where we walk, the way we vote, how we 
travel, what we buy, our illnesses and maladies, and even to predict our 
next moves; whether we plan on divorcing, getting pregnant, or switching 
political parties—even before our closest loved ones know it (Duhigg, 
2012). We no longer hold sovereignty over our most intimate and per-
sonal information.
The collection of citizens’ information is a long tradition, dating back 
almost a century. Similarly, the digital storage of information is nothing 
new (Hacking, 2015). The difference today is three-fold. First, the amount 
of data that can be collected has skyrocketed. Census taking in the 1700s 
collected information through personal interviews and was hand-written 
into obscure logbooks. Today, thousands of “data bits” about our per-
sonal circumstances are transferred every hour, owing to technological 
developments, efficiency goals, and profit motives. Second, the processing 
of that data has grown more sophisticated. Data that once stood in dusty 
folders, or rarely examined databases, is now recombined with thousands 
of other data points, and run through algorithms, to produce our profiles 
and to deduce our behavior. Third, these results are now commoditized. 
Governments—such as police departments—have quickly come to under-
stand how data-driven analysis can promote policy change. Companies sell 
this data, without individuals’ consent, to other companies for vast 
amounts of money. Companies like Google, Microsoft, and Facebook 
now derive most of their profits not from services, but from selling our 
data to secondary markets. This has been called the third industrial revolu-
tion (Zuboff, 2019).
The vast accumulation of personal data plays into the hands of those 
who wish us harm. Such harms range from irritating to deadly. Private 
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firms’ use of mass data to shape our behavior and form opinions of us can 
lead to failed job applications and rejected insurance claims. Rogue agents 
in our own governments can exploit private data—illegally—to track sus-
pected criminals or profile future suspects. And foreign governments can 
hack the data on an entire population to attack societal weak spots, black-
mail leaders, or shut down health systems. More broadly, the surreptitious 
collection and use of data undermines individuals’ sense of control and 
personal privacy (O’Neill, 2016). Trust in government—already at risk in 
an era of creeping crises—could decline as citizens question why their 
leaders failed to act.
Citizens and experts express concern. A long list of precursor events 
signals the deeper problem of Big Data and has led to protests and out-
rage: The shock following Edward Snowden’s revelations of how the US 
government used private data to spy on households; The public anger 
after the illegal manipulation of Facebook by Russian agencies to target 
key constituencies during the 2016 US Presidential election; Outrage—
and lawsuits—following high-profile hacks on Equifax, Target, and Sony 
(after which private data was sold to criminal networks); And the forced 
resignation of ministers in Sweden following the improper handling of 
private data in the field of transportation. Experts warn that the next step 
could be catastrophic: a hostile attack on Western society based on the 
illegal mining of insights from Big Data. How did we end up here?
5.3  orIgIn and development
The origins of Big Data span back to the 1970s, when micro-processing 
advances and an obsession with technological efficiency combined with 
the widespread adoption of the personal computer. Early data-processing 
machines were built to speed numerical tabulations (Ceruzzi, 2010) and 
by the 1970s and 1980s, the race was on to shrink their core components. 
Simultaneously, engineers envisioned shrinking the core part of the inter-
nal calculation machinery: the microprocessor. The advent of micropro-
cessors was nothing less than a revolution (Abbate, 1999). By the 1980s, 
tiny—yet increasingly powerful—microprocessors were making their way 
into consumer products such as cameras and automobiles.
The rise of micro processing intersected with the advent of personal 
computing. The first micro-computer using advances in micro processing 
was introduced in 1975—the Altair 8800 (Mims, 1985). Computer 
advances remained within the realm of hobbyists and industrialists until 
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IBM introduced its new, user-friendly, and affordable PC in the 1980s 
with the help of Microsoft and its software. Shifting from highly technical, 
confusing systems with limited functions to a system in which software 
allowed the average individual to operate it, IBM created the PC for the 
consumer market (Bride, 2011). The rise of the personal computer sym-
bolized a new era in the digitalization of the human experience. But that 
was just the start.
The accelerating development of this creeping crisis—the transition 
between gradual development and sudden escalation—occurred because 
of several interacting, enabling conditions (for a summary of these, see 
Fig. 5.1).
One condition was the development of the Web 2.0 during the 1990s, 
characterized by a shift from static web pages to interactive, user- generated 
content. This shift offered a more user-friendly and interactive platform 
for use of the web, which could be used by a wider range of the population 
(O’Reilly, 2007). In turn, this enabled a move away from desktop-based 
software toward “cloud computing,” which further spread the reach of 
software and applications. Cloud computing multiplied the computing 
power available to individuals and propelled the movement of everyday 
tasks—from banking to communicating to shopping—to the Internet. At 
the same time, it represented a dramatically more efficient way to gener-
ate, collect, and store data (Wolcott, 2008).
Another condition was the ubiquitous use of smart phones. The rise of 
smart phones combined with the advent of Web 2.0, since the latter was 
compatible on every kind of device. It also served to shift most telephony 
functions (e.g. text messaging) onto the web. While IBM’s “Simon” per-
sonal device was officially the first smart phone, Apple’s initial Iphone in 
2007 marked a key point in history, after which smart phones became 
virtually ubiquitous (Andrew, 2018). The proliferation of smart phones 
Initial conditions Interacting conditions Result
 Advances in micro 
processing







 Data manipulation 
opportunities
Fig. 5.1 Initial and interacting conditions that propelled a creeping crisis
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put the Web 2.0 in everyone’s pockets, which allowed the average indi-
vidual to use new kinds of applications (maps, videos, social media), 
thereby generating more data and allowing this data to be collected and 
stored. The transfer from data from private citizens to third parties moved 
from a trickle to a rush.
Social media further intensified developments. The apparent 
convenience of interacting with friends and staying in touch with family 
and colleagues was based on the principle of data sharing. MySpace, 
Reddit, Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp all provided a platform for 
individuals to interact and share information, essentially turning private 
information public. Many of these, but not all, rose with the rise in smart 
phones, the convenience they offered and became more popular as more 
individuals joined (Ortiz-Ospina, 2019). These programs accumulated 
large amounts of unstructured data. In other words, the data generated 
can be put together to learn about one’s likes, dislikes, preferences, 
opinions and movements; which in turn can be used to create a personality 
profile.
Another facilitating condition emerged from the economic value found 
in personality profiles: the rise of e-commerce. E-commerce was intro-
duced in the 1990s, with platforms such as Amazon and eBay emerging 
long before smart phones and social media were introduced and became 
widely popular (DePillis & Sherman, 2018). However, with the introduc-
tion of social media and smart phones, e-commerce firms realized a mas-
sive change in how they could use the data being generated from social 
media and smart phones to target consumers with relevant advertising 
(Erevelles, Fukawa, & Swayne, 2016). Marketing strategies changed as 
more and more data became more easily available to third parties such as 
Amazon, who could not only use data generated and collected from their 
own platform but also from other platforms such as Facebook.
These various conditions interacted with one another to further the 
facilitation of data generation, collection, storage and interpretation—the 
foundation of Big Data.
The development of Big Data into a threat represents a kind of tipping 
point, arrived at after a long trajectory in seemingly distinct systems and 
shaped by multiple trends. While linear in most respects, this development 
jumped tracks as new technologies became available. Big Data, as other 
crises in this book, remained unnoticed by large swathes of the popula-
tion. Lack of attention amongst some “experts” might have an origin in 
self-interest. To blow the whistle on Big Data is to call into question the 
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current tenets of the modern, globalized economy and those who profit 
from it. Certainly, there is a problem of ownership (Boin & Lodge, 2019): 
no single actor in any government was responsible for responding—and 
powerful interests would no doubt resist such action. Consistent with the 
classic crisis incubation thesis (Perrow, 1984), Big Data “crept” onto the 
crisis scene rather quietly.
5.4  emergence of the threat
The interacting conditions discussed above gave rise to the threat agent 
behind this creeping crisis: the accumulation of data at a pace the world 
has never before seen. According to Hackenberger (2019, p. 291) “the 
world is currently creating as much data in two days as humankind has 
created in the previous 2000 years.” That data is largely (but not com-
pletely) private in nature and is attached to individuals’ personal character-
istics. Whereas data was once collected and stored in highly “structured” 
formats—meaning, for a limited purpose and with few ulterior uses—data 
today is highly unstructured. It is sucked into enormous databases along-
side huge amounts of other data, recombined into new forms of data, and 
used to find “hidden meaning” (Grable & Lyons, 2018).
This process of gathering data and analyzing the hidden meanings 
behind the presented data is called data mining and has spawned an entire 
profession of “data scientists” (Erevelles et al., 2016). Mining is done by 
insurance companies, banks, casinos, governments, and retail sellers of 
every kind to help analyze and find patterns out of vast amounts of data—
as well as to predict future behavioral patterns. Much of this has ostensibly 
positive uses—to improve customer services, to customize search results, 
to reengineer products, to predict customer needs, and to generally make 
life more efficient. Ford’s driver-command systems can be improved and 
customized centrally, through data aggregation that allows profiling of the 
customer’s most intimate behaviors (Erevelles et al., 2016). Ford uses spe-
cial software, such as sensors and remote app-management tools, to ana-
lyze the data being gathered. Similarly, Google can use Google Maps to 
assess whether or not a consumer actually visits a physical retail store after 
visiting the website online (Erevelles et al., 2016).
The threat agent behind this creeping crisis threatens core societal 
values concerning personal integrity, control, and privacy, along with the 
effective functioning of life-giving systems. The foreshadowing events, 
which we turn to below, reveal what is at threat, concretely demonstrating 
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physical harm (e.g. private data theft leading to stalking), financial harm 
(e.g. identity theft to access bank accounts), and emotional harm (e.g. loss 
of privacy and individual liberties). Many experts argue that these events 
are just the tip of the iceberg: that more dangerous situations loom 
beneath these examples, waiting to be exploited. Such situations will not 
only harm individuals, but also destabilize society more generally.
5.5  foreshadoWIng events and attentIon
Like a campfire casting sparks, creeping crises throw out foreshadowing 
events. Attention focuses on extinguishing those sparks while the central 
fire burns on. The analogy of “flare-ups” works in the case of Big Data, too.
For Big Data, precursor events occur with increasing frequency (see 
Fig.  5.2). By studying a subset of these events—Snowden revelations 
(2013), the Target Data Breach (2013), the Sony Studios Data Hack 
(2014), The Yahoo Data Breach (2016), the Cambridge Analytica Scandal 
(2016), the WannaCry Ransomware Attack (2017), the Equifax Data 
Breach (2017), and the Marriott Data Breach (2018)—we see common 
patterns in how these individual manifestations of the broader creeping 
crisis arose, were acted upon (or not), and then retreated from public 
attention.
Most of these events were made possible because of the massive 
accumulation of personal data today. Each was preceded by expert 
warnings of impending danger, specific either to the event or in abstract. 
And each involved leaders ignoring warning signs. For instance, each was 
preceded by security alerts, either by whistleblowers or by tenacious 
journalists. There were investigations revealing that executives of these 
firms were aware of deficient security systems and even chose to hide 
dangerous breaches that compromised individuals’ privacy and safety.
Considerable foot dragging surrounds these events. In 2015, the 
chairman of Marriott corporation was notified of malicious malware 
embedded in the IT systems of Starwood, which Marriott was on the eve 
of acquiring. Yet the problem was ignored, and the sale went through 
Fig. 5.2 Foreshadowing events
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(Shepardson, 2019). Equifax in 2017 was made aware, two months before 
it became public, of foreign hackers in their systems. Little was done to 
prevent the massive data theft that took place soon thereafter 
(Newman, 2017).
Many companies and governments failed to conduct simply upgrades—
“security patches”—to close loopholes and prevent easy breaches 
(Microsoft, 2017). A massive breach of the UK’s National Health System 
(NHS) was made possible by a delayed upgrade (National Audit Office, 
2018). In 2015, Mark Zuckerberg failed to formally file complaints against 
Cambridge Analytica, who had data on Facebook users it was not sup-
posed to have (Kozlowska, 2018). Hoping to avoid a scandal, Facebook 
merely asked Cambridge Analytica to delete the data—which never hap-
pened. In 2013 and again in 2014, Sony received warnings about a likely 
hack, which executives ignored until the break-in took place (Szoldra, 
2016). Target faced a similar situation in 2013 when  an intrusion had 
already occurred in their system, but it went unnoticed (Zetter, 2014).
Sporadic, expert attention gave way to major public attention after each 
incident. Governments came to realize that the magnitude and nature of 
these hacks were not confined to companies (even if these companies held 
immense amounts of public data) but also included threats to national secu-
rity. Governments in various parts of the world (North America, Europe, 
and Asia included) became particularly engaged with the national security 
implications became clear—such as when China was implicated in the 
Equifax case. There was a huge public uproar surrounding the Cambridge 
Analytica incident, leading to boycotts of Facebook and calls for greater 
regulation (Lang, 2018). A typical refusal of responsibility can be found in 
Target’s data breach in 2013, when Target executives failed to acknowledge 
their role in protecting consumer credit card data. Meanwhile, the blame 
was also put on credit card companies for not having up-to-date cards with 
EMV technology, widespread in Europe but not in the USA, which pre-
vents the re-sale of stolen card information from Target’s systems (Zetter, 
2014). Lawmakers were also blamed for poor regulations—including weak 
security standards for corporations and their security systems (Sasso, 2014). 
The public outrage in the Target case also spiked, with numerous lawsuits 
and social media campaigns to boycott Target. Yet confusion and contesta-
tion over who “owned” this precursor event led to delayed response.
Media coverage typically spikes when hacks are made public (sometimes 
made by journalists themselves). Consumers of Equifax turned to social 
media (Lieber, 2017), the public called for boycott of Facebook after the 
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Cambridge Analytica scandal (Lang, 2018), public anger spilled over into 
the streets and even to social media in the US and Europe after Snowden’s 
revelations, and lawsuits were filed in several cases including Target’s data 
breach (Zetter, 2014). The media, including The New York Times (US) 
and The Guardian (UK), repeatedly covered the progress of cases and 
documented the frustration amongst consumers on the receiving end.
These reactions by the public and media were followed by broader 
expert attention—a type of “we told you so” reaction. After the 2014 
Sony hack, security expert Brian Krebs urged the US to see this incident 
as “a wake-up call” (Krebs, 2014). Similarly, after Yahoo publicly 
announced their system breach in 2016, Krebs argued that he had noted 
these problems previously and “saw this coming” (Krebs, 2016). Chris 
Hughes, co-founder of Facebook, walked away from his former company 
to urge society to fight against the “asymmetrical power of firms” and 
demanded more accountability in regard to data usage (Bursztynsky, 
2019). A similar message comes from Chris Wylie, who exposed the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal. Wylie argues for stricter measures to be 
taken to prevent undetected or unnoticed data compromises (Wong, 2019).
A paradox exists when considering the crisis attention paid to Big Data. 
Consumers enjoy the daily conveniences associated with Big Data—track-
ing software, swift banking, purchasing suggestions. They tend to down-
play the risks at an everyday level (Griffore, 2018). But when those risks 
actually manifest themselves, in the form of abuse and breaches, outrage 
quickly follows. At those moments, which we delve into below, the prom-
ise and pitfalls of today’s reliance on Big Data becomes dramatically appar-
ent. Anger and shock are directed toward companies and citizens demand 
governmental action to stop this “unprecedented threat to human free-
dom” (Zuboff, 2020). Media attention follows, and action is promised. 
Yet these “precursor events” are just the symptoms of a much deeper 
underlying crisis creeping through time and space.
5.6  response
This is not to suggest a complete lack of action. In fact, there appears to 
be a pattern here. In the immediate aftermath of a precursor event, gov-
ernments demand action by placing blame on private firms. Penalties are 
handed out and courts deliver verdicts (sometimes years after an incident). 
Task forces are formed at national and international levels to investigate 
the “problem”. Indeed, our analysis of this creeping crisis reveals another 
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pattern: after initial outrage and anger at firms, the blame game shifts 
toward governments. Tough questions are asked why politicians had not 
been doing more, from the start.
The Cambridge Analytica scandal led to government hearings and 
investigations across the world. In 2018, the US began congressional 
hearings (Wichter, 2018) with a key group for US senators led by Senator 
Richard Blumenthal, calling for punishment and the need to restore trust 
(Confessore, 2018). In the UK, British lawmakers investigated what role 
Cambridge Analytica and Facebook might have played in the Brexit refer-
endum (Confessore, 2018), which was followed by Britain’s Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) imposing a fine of 500,000 GBP for  the 
Facebook data breach of millions of British users’ personal data (Reuters, 
2019). And in the EU, the European Parliament conducted hearings and 
a new momentum drove negotiations to complete the  General Data 
Protection Regulation (Kozlowska, 2018). Facebook attempted to make 
amends by imposing new standards on data harvesting. But these prom-
ises were viewed with skepticism because of previous resistance to change 
and the fact that Facebook’s main revenue stream comes from selling the 
private data they accrue (Zuboff, 2019). Lawmakers in the US state of 
California adopted sweeping new data privacy laws, to allow some degree 
of consumer control over data—even if this does not stop what companies 
are allowed to do with our private data.
When a scandal  surrounding Big Data is deemed to have national 
security or criminal implications, law enforcement gets involved. Target 
corporation was taken to task by government authorities, for instance. 
After nearly four years of hearings (Sasso, 2014), official resignations 
(Bronner, 2014; Harris, 2014) and constant consumer lawsuits (Zetter, 
2014), Target was fined 18.5 million USD in March 2017 (Hong, 2017) 
(despite the fact that the data was never retrieved). Following the Sony 
hack in 2014, the US FBI was one of the first to be informed of the 
breach and started an investigation (Laughland & Rushe, 2014). The 
same occurred after the Marriott data breach in 2018, where the FBI was 
informed about the breach before the public (Shepardson, 2019). 
Following Snowden’s revelations in 2013, the US National Security 
Administration began investigating  its own security systems in 2014 
(Tucker, 2016) while a host of international conferences considered reg-
ulatory implications (Travis, 2015).
As different national actors respond to and investigate precursor events, 
we witness international organizations increasing their involvement as 
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well. The EU worked together and implemented the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018 following the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal (Kozlowska, 2018). Similarly, international cybersecu-
rity organizations worked to issue guidelines for users after the WannaCry 
ransomware attack, arguing  that the threat had worldwide implications 
(Baraniuk, 2017). The UN and OECD publish regular warnings based on 
task forces and investigations.
To be sure, governments appear to act. But these are less regulatory 
(outside of California and the EU’s GDPR rules) and more punitive. In a 
very limited number of cases, we witness intervention despite declining 
public attention (an anomaly according to the creeping crisis framework). 
Although international lawmakers attempt to design collective solutions, 
national lawmakers appear to have a longer engagement. In investigating 
the Equifax breach, the US Justice Department in 2020 found Chinese 
hackers to be responsible, three years after the breach (Warzel, 2020). In 
investigating the Sony hack, the US filed complaints against North-Korean 
hacker Park Jin Hyok in 2018, four years after the breach (Bing & Lynch, 
2018). At the same time, he was also charged with  involvement in  the 
WannaCry ransomware attack.
Target agreed to pay 18.5 million USD in 2017 (Hong, 2017), Yahoo 
in 2019 had to agree to pay-out to US and Israeli citizens who were 
affected by their data breach (Martinez, 2019), Marriott in 2019 was 
fined over 100 million GBP over GDPR breach (Sweney, 2019) and 
Facebook had to pay multiple fines to Brazil, UK and the US. Thus, when 
public attention fades and government oversight dissolves, the courts are 
the only ones left to close these cases. Longer-term solutions are difficult 
to find, and governmental regulators remain behind the regulatory curve.
5.7  conclusIon
Big Data represents the quintessential creeping crisis: a long evolution of 
a potential threat propelled by intersecting conditions, a constant presence 
in society, periodic attention from experts and officials, and yet no sus-
tained action.
Three poignant aspects of this case help to enrich our understanding of 
creeping crises. First, the rise of Big Data as a threat took place because of 
a virtuous cycle of interacting developments. These developments relate to 
the rise of technology in the global economy. The accumulation of Big 
Data and the opportunities to manipulate it for good or ill were initially 
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considered as mere side-effects. Few noticed or cared about the early 
warnings of experts. Damage capacity seemed small; the risk was complex 
rather than clear. Big Data was thus allowed to arrive, unheralded, on the 
crisis scene. Unlike other cases in this book, the development was purely 
technological, rather than stemming from the human-ecology interface, 
such as climate-change related crisis.
Second, Big Data typifies the crisis-attention cycle seen in other chapters 
in this volume, including Covid-19 (see Chap. 7) and climate-induced 
migration (see Chap. 8). Precursor events start with a failure to act, despite 
warnings (which were only clear “warnings” in hindsight). Failure to act is 
followed by unauthorized access to large-scale databases, which, often 
after significant delays, are then publicly disclosed. This disclosure leads to 
a spike in media attention and public outrage, which, in turn, generates 
political attention. This outrage draws attention  to  privacy violations 
and major breaches in personal integrity (civil liberties). But as time passes, 
the sense of urgency fades and political attention shifts to other issues. 
Rather than large-scale, regulatory responses, the court system usually 
ends up holding the bag, imposing moderately sized fines. More recently, 
expert groups and media outlets have become more proactive, highlight-
ing the major risks at stake (data privacy reporting is now a priority issue 
for The New York Times, for instance). The international community (UN, 
EU, etc.) focuses on the crisis for a more sustained period but, with the 
exception of the EU, has little authority to act.
Third, a concerted crisis response fails to materialize. Why the lack of 
sustained action? What might be the tipping point at which “enough is 
enough,” or the number of precursor events becomes too hard to ignore? 
Several explanatory factors deserve further attention. One is dependence. 
Officials do not act upon this creeping crisis because essential societal 
functions are at stake. These functions—criminal analysis, energy distribu-
tion, and food supply networks, for instance—are data driven. The osten-
sible benefits of data-driven public policies (by governments) and 
marketable consumer profiles (by firms) are sold in rosy terms and opti-
mistic language. The technologies driven by, and driving, data accumula-
tion are used daily by individual citizens: from mapping apps to information 
searches. To abolish these technologies is difficult, and even to regulate 
them comes with serious trade-offs.
Another reason for a lack of interest, related to dependence, is vested 
interests. The companies that have shifted their business model toward the 
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mining of Big Data for commercial and security use as the primary purpose 
(Facebook, Alphabet, TikTok, etc.) carry huge economic weight in their 
respective countries. Their representatives sway politicians’ opinions away 
from acting to avoid a future crisis—the 2018 testimony of Mark 
Zuckerberg in the US Congress carried exactly that message.
More concretely, there is no shared definition of the problem (cf. 
Wildavsky, 1992). Not only do vested interests and societal dependencies 
lead to a continuous reframing of the risks of Big Data, but the multifac-
eted nature of the problem also makes a simple threat assessment difficult. 
Is this an economic problem, a security problem, a moral problem, or a 
personal problem? The various precursor events elicit a wide range of per-
spectives and opinions, despite the fact that the problem overall is grow-
ing. Perhaps only a “big one”—the eventual societal-wide crisis toward 
which we are creeping—will be enough to focus attention and command 
a sufficient response.
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Abstract In recent years, we have learned that forced global migration 
pose a serious threat to international peace and societal values. Despite the 
many warnings and refugee crises across the world, most national govern-
ments have insufficiently addressed this threat. In this chapter, we try to 
explain this lack of action. The chapter explores possible explanations such 
as the denial mindset of “it probably won’t happen here (and if it does, it 
won’t affect my family and community)”. The chapter focuses on the bor-
der management crisis in Sweden in 2015. The Swedish government did 
not address the situation as a crisis until the refugees, who had been on the 
Mediterranean Sea and traversing north over the continent for months, 
ended up in Malmö in the south of Sweden in September 2015. This pre-
dictable set of events caused chaos for the unprepared Swedish police and 
the border and migration authorities who had to handle the situation 
under conditions of urgency and apparent uncertainty.
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6.1  IntroductIon: A crIsIs WAItIng to HAppen
In 2020, in the wake of the Turkish military attacks in Northern Syria and 
the Turkish government’s announcement to open its borders with Bulgaria 
and Greece, warnings of a new migration crisis were alarming European 
governments. Waves of asylum seekers were forecasted to reach the bor-
ders of the European Union (EU). The international media predicted that 
this creeping crisis was about to materialize, again (Genç, 2020; The 
Guardian, 2019). The question was whether European countries would 
be better prepared this time. In 2015, the lack of a joint response had put 
thousands of refugees and more than half-a-century of achievements of a 
border-free EU at risk.
In 2012, Italy and Greece had tried to make the EU member states 
aware of the need to address the emerging problem, but failed. A ship-
wreck on October 3, 2013, when nearly 400 refugees died on the seas 
near the Italian island of Lampedusa, did not spur actions of mutual sup-
port by European countries not directly affected by the tragedy. It was 
followed by a second deadly shipwreck on October 11 close to the island. 
The photo of the Syrian boy Alan Kurdi, who drowned on September 2, 
2015 in the Mediterranean Sea, drew the world’s attention to the horrible 
consequences of the crisis but still did not trigger joint European rescue 
operations or a coordinated refugee reception.
Why did so many governments, despite the massive attention given to 
the refugee situation and the many precursor events, react so late during 
the migration crisis of 2015? Why did national authorities not address the 
transnational crisis when they could have realized that it would manifest 
itself at their own country’s borders in what may be called a translocal 
crisis (Ekengren, 2018)? For instance, the Swedish government did not 
take action until the refugees ended up in Malmö in the south of Sweden 
in early September 2015, causing chaos for the unprepared Swedish police 
and the border and migration authorities.
This leaves us with a puzzle. Why did Sweden not recognize an impend-
ing crisis, which clearly manifested itself? After all, the Swedes could see 
along with everybody else how a large group of refugees was walking the 
continent, making its way up north for a period of months. The failure to 
spot this creeping crisis would have great repercussions for the functioning 
of Swedish state and society.
This chapter highlights a paradox associated with this particular creeping 
crisis (the definition of which is contained in the introduction to this book). 
It shows a lack of national governmental action despite the often very high 
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degree of international and societal attention given to the emerging crisis. 
The chapter analyzes the border management crisis in Sweden in 2015 by 
recapitulating first how the crisis evolved over time and space, second how 
it was given attention by international organizations and domestic actors, 
and third how it for long was insufficiently addressed by Swedish authorities 
and suddenly turned into an acute crisis. The conclusion of the chapter 
presents three hypotheses for future research that can help deepen our 
understanding of why the authorities did not act at an earlier stage.
6.2  A BrIef HIstory of A HumAn drAmA
It is hard to establish when exactly the refugee crisis began in Europe. The 
number of asylum applicants has been on the rise in the EU ever since 2010. 
The Syrian civil war started in 2011. It has held Europe in its grip since 2012 
(Gallagher, 2015). A substantial surge of migrants attempted to enter the 
EU in 2015. The situation had at this point been mounting for many years. 
Southern and Southeastern member states, especially Greece and Italy had at 
times been swamped by refugees arriving by the thousands every day.
The dangerous voyage migrants undertook to cross the Mediterranean 
and enter the EU drew public awareness in 2013 when migrants died as 
their ship sank off the coast of the Italian island Lampedusa. Between 
2013 and 2014, the numbers of asylum applicants rose from approxi-
mately 431,000 to 627,000 (Eurostat, 2017). By the end of 2015, about 
1 million migrants had arrived by sea in southern and southeastern Europe, 
while 34,000 were estimated to have entered into the EU by land. In 
Greece alone, 821,000 migrants arrived in 2015, followed by Italy that 
received 150,000 migrants (United Nations Refugee Agency [UNHCR], 
2015c, 2017).
In 2013, the southern EU member states asked for Union solidarity, 
assistance, common policies, and regulations. The result was a split among 
the EU countries: many recognized a need for stronger EU coordination 
while others claimed the crisis fell under national responsibility and saw no 
role for common policies. The main EU policies, such as the scheme for 
relocation of refugees, soon met resistance and became a failure.1
1 The relocation policy stipulated that member states should transfer asylum seekers from 
Italy and Greece to reduce the pressure on these countries (European Commission, 2015, 
pp. 3–4). When implementing the policy, the Commission noted in its reports that the pace 
of relocating applicants was suffering due to low political will among member states 
(European Commission, 2016, p. 2).
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It was well known that many of the refugees traveled on directly to 
richer member states, particularly Germany, the UK, and Sweden. One 
reason for this was the abandonment of the Dublin regulation. Asylum 
practices in the EU were before the crisis governed by this regulation, 
which stipulated that an asylum seeker had to apply for asylum in the 
member state they first entered. Greece and Italy were therefore legally 
responsible for the vast majority of the asylum applicants that arrived dur-
ing the refugee crisis. Since both countries instead began to employ a 
wave-through policy, the result was a largely uncontrolled flow of migrants 
across the Union.
In response, member states adopted various national solutions. Several 
countries (and non-EU states on the migration routes) closed down their 
borders. Others attempted to host the newly arrived migrants, creating an 
uneven distribution of people in need. Germany, for example, welcomed 
approximately 1 million asylum applications in 2015, whereas Sweden 
received the highest number of applicants per capita (OECD, 2017, p. 2). 
But it was hardly enough.
The border management crisis became a humanitarian crisis. By the end 
of 2015, 3771 migrants were either confirmed to have died or gone miss-
ing at sea, and the number rose to 5096 in 2016 (UNHCR, 2017). As 
borders closed down, migrants who had reached the EU became stuck 
along the migration routes in less than adequate camps. When Macedonia 
closed its border to Greece, for example, a rising number of migrants 
became isolated within Greece. With a weak economy and an unemploy-
ment rate at 24% (European Parliament, 2016), Greece was badly equipped 
for dealing with the migrants, giving rise to a dire humanitarian situation.
6.3  A VIsIBle crIsIs: IncreAsIng AttentIon 
And moBIlIzAtIon on tHe ground
On July 1, 2015, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) warned 
of an 83% increase in refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean 
from January to June 2015. That meant 137,000 persons compared to 
75,000  in the same period 2014. The agency prognosticated that the 
numbers would continue to soar over the summer months (UNHCR, 
2015a, 2015e). UNHCR also drew attention to the limitations in the 
Greek capacity to receive these refugees and that an increasing number of 
migrants continued across the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and Serbia to and through Hungary (UNHCR, 2015a, 2015e). UNHCR 
concluded that:
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The majority of refugees and migrants coming to southern Europe do so 
with the intention of travelling onwards. The countries of northern and 
western Europe, particularly Sweden and Germany, are perceived as offering 
more effective protection, better support for asylum-seekers, a more wel-
coming environment, and easier prospects for integration … The situation 
remains critical and will require further support, including through joint 
efforts with the European Union, national governments and NGOs. 
(UNHCR, 2015b, p. 16)
Two internal imbalances have arisen. The first is an imbalance in arrivals, 
with Italy and Greece facing the large majority of all seaborne landings. The 
second is an imbalance in destination. In 2014, Germany and Sweden 
received 43 per cent of all asylum applications in the EU. This is not sustain-
able. (UNHCR, 2015b, p. 17)
On September 4, 2015, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António 
Guterres, warned the Europeans of a piecemeal approach and national 
“solutions”:
It is no surprise that, when a system is unbalanced and dysfunctional, every-
thing gets blocked when the pressure mounts. This is a defining moment for 
the European Union, and it now has no other choice but to mobilize full 
force around this crisis. The only way to solve this problem is for the Union 
and all member states to implement a common strategy, based on responsi-
bility, solidarity and trust. (UNHCR, 2015d)
In June 2015, Amnesty International complained about the failures of the 
international community to support the refugees and the host countries. 
The organization estimated that the total number of places offered to 
refugees from Syria was less than 90,000, only 2.2% of the refugees in the 
main host countries (Amnesty International, 2015, p.  5). It also drew 
attention to the closing of borders of the European states, leaving the 
refugees with only one option: the sea voyage across the Mediterranean 
(Amnesty International, 2015, p. 16).
In early September 2015, the Swedish Red Cross warned of a “refugee 
catastrophe” and underlined the need for more volunteers to help receive 
the large number of people who would soon arrive in Sweden (Swedish 
Red Cross, 2015).
The attention given to the deteriorating refugee situation by interna-
tional institutions and NGOs stood in sharp contrast to the assessments of 
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the Swedish authorities. On July 23, 2015, the Swedish Migration Agency 
predicted a decrease in asylum seekers arriving to Sweden based on the 
analysis that “a growing number of border controls in the EU have made 
it more difficult to come here” (Magnusson, 2015; Riksrevisionen, 2017, 
p. 2). The agency pointed out that the number of asylum seekers in the 
spring of 2015 had gone down compared to the same period the year 
before (Riksrevisionen, 2017, p. 2). It concluded that the changed distri-
bution of asylum seekers between the different European countries had 
made Sweden less attractive as a destination (Statens Offentliga Utredningar 
[SOU], 2017, p. 323).
At the time of the Agency’s July prognosis, the Swedish government 
was in its final phase of forming the state budget for 2016. In line with the 
prognosis, this budget proposal did not cover the costs of a potential mass 
migration of refugees (Magnusson, 2015; SOU, 2017, p. 324).
In the same time period, international and Swedish media reported 
about alarming numbers of refugees arriving by boat on the Greek islands 
and predicted that Sweden together with Germany and Italy would prob-
ably carry a big load (BBC Trending, 2015; BBC News, 2015; Loewe, 
2015; UNHCR, 2015b, p.  16; Horvatovic, 2015; SOU, 2017, p.  2). 
Representatives of the Migration Agency later recognized July 2015 as the 
month when it “turned and the number of Syrian asylum seekers began to 
increase significantly” (Magnusson, 2015). In the beginning of August, 
the German Agency for migration and refugees estimated the arrival of 
450,000 asylum seekers in Germany in the coming months, more than 
double from the year before. A few days later, the Agency warned German 
authorities that the prognosticated number was probably an 
underestimation.
The optimistic July prognosis of the Swedish Migration Agency resulted 
in the assumption within the Government Offices, Swedish agencies and 
the vast majority of municipalities that there was no need to prepare for 
the reception of more migrants than normally is the case. Some munici-
palities such as Mölndal, Göteborg, and Malmö, however, noticed an 
increase in the number of unaccompanied children during the summer of 
2015 and decided to be more attentive to this challenge (SOU, 2017, 
p. 324). Representatives of the Malmö municipality later revealed that: 
“We alerted the Migration Agency already before the holidays. Normally 
we receive around 40 unaccompanied children per week, but now (sum-
mer 2015) 40 per day arrived! And we had no idea of what would come” 
(Sjögren, 2016).
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Soon after the publication of the July prognosis, the Migration Agency 
received indications that the estimations made in the report were probably 
inaccurate. In mid-August, the Agency’s chief executive appealed to the 
Swedish public through various media channels to take responsibility for 
the increasing number of unaccompanied children. The indications of an 
increasing number of asylum seekers were forwarded to lower levels within 
the Government Offices but not passed on to the political level. The 
Swedish Migration Agency did not make a new analysis. The departments 
receiving the information did not actively assess or act on the information 
that was brought to their attention (SOU, 2017, p. 324).
On September 2, 2015, the Swedish Red Cross called upon the munici-
palities, the government, and the EU to take on an increased responsibility 
and not leave the NGOs and voluntary organizations alone with the 
humanitarian burden for the refugees (Carlstedt, 2015).
The voluntary help organization within the Malmö “Culture House” 
(Kulturhuset Kontrapunkt) saw the crisis coming. On September 7, some 
of its members watched on television how refugees walked on the high-
ways of Denmark toward the Swedish border. “We discussed the refugee 
crisis in the South of Europe the weekend before and knew that it would 
come also to us” (Sjögren, 2016). They immediately began to transform 
the Culture House into emergency housing for fleeing people. As one of 
the volunteers described it: “If we hadn’t done that, I am sure Malmö 
Central station would have been in big chaos already the first evening of 
their arrival… the citizens made it possible to manage the situation when 
the authorities were so unprepared” (Sjögren, 2016).
Throughout September, a growing number of Swedish citizens started 
to mobilize NGOs and civil rights organizations. These included the 
Refugees Welcome Movement, which started as a loose network of activists 
but quickly became central to welcoming refugees in Sweden, and espe-
cially in Malmö to which most refugees came when arriving to Sweden 
(Weinryb, 2015; Frigyes, 2018, p. 40). Refugees Welcome Housing Sweden 
also began operating in September 2015, as a reaction to the “inhumane 
way of welcoming individuals that seek asylum” (Refugees Welcome 
Housing Sweden, 2019), with the purpose of helping refugees to find 
housing among private Swedish citizens. The slogan among volunteers in 
the Refugees Welcome movement on one of its many Facebook pages was 
“This is not a migrant crisis. It is a crisis of resource exploitation. It is a 
crisis of war. It is a crisis of climate change. It’s a crisis of inequality” 
(Refugees Welcome, 2016).
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September was also the month when some Swedish newspapers started to 
shift focus on the refugees from describing them as victims to pointing out 
the costs of immigration for Swedish society (Frigyes, 2018, pp. 44–45).
6.4  tHe sWedIsH goVernment responds
Ever since 2012, Sweden had experienced a significant growth in the 
number of asylum claims and been among the top five states receiving 
asylum seekers.2 However, it was not until the end of September 2015, 
that the Swedish government used the term crisis to describe the growing 
inflow of refugees (Swedish Government, 2015a). Before this, the politi-
cal discourse of all main political parties, with the exception of the right- 
wing political party the Sweden Democrats, Sverigedemokraterna, 
emphasized the need to show openness, picturing the situation as an 
opportunity rather than as a risk or crisis.
In August 2014, the Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, deliv-
ered his annual “summer speech.” Reinfeldt described Sweden in terms of 
a “humanitarian superpower,” emphasizing that:
It is by standing up for our openness and for our ideas that we are doing our 
very best and generating a long-term [solution] to fight the kind of tenden-
cies of terrorism and sectarianism we now see in our world. What we see 
now will affect Europe as well as Sweden. Here I would like to address the 
entire Swedish people. I want to remind you that we are a nation that has 
stood up and showed openness before when people have endured difficult 
times. We now have people fleeing in numbers that are similar to the Balkan 
crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. Now I appeal to the Swedish people for 
patience, to open your hearts to people in stress who fear death threats and 
are fleeing, fleeing to Europe, fleeing to freedom, fleeing to better condi-
tions. Show that openness. Show that tolerance when it is said that “they are 
too many”, “it will be complicated”, “it will be difficult”. Show that toler-
ance and show that we have done it before. We have seen people come from 
stress, fleeing from oppression, who have arrived to our society, learned the 
Swedish language, found a job and are now helping to build a better and 
freer Sweden. (Moderaterna, 2014, authors’ translation, emphasis added)
2 Already in 2012, Sweden and Germany received, by far, the greatest number of asylum 
applications, among them many Syrian applicants. In 2014, Germany received Syrian asylum 
applications of a number of 41,100, which was over five times the number of 2012 and three-
fold the number of 2013. Swedish authorities received 30,750 Syrian asylum claims in 2014, 
a significant rise from the 16,540 claims made the year before (UNHCR, 2014, p.  13; 
Ostrand, 2015, pp. 257, 269).
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The prime minister’s speech has been remembered as the “open your 
hearts” speech. It shows that Swedish authorities were aware of the grow-
ing number of refugees arriving in Sweden but did not speak of the situa-
tion in terms of crisis. Instead, the center-right government parties, 
including the (left-green) parties that were later elected to govern Sweden, 
expressed a concern over the growing number of barriers created by other 
European governments and the risk of xenophobia and racism 
(Moderaterna, 2014; Swedish Government, 2014, 2015a). On August 
16, 2015, the new Social Democratic Prime Minister, Stefan Löfven, 
delivered his annual summer speech and described the mass migration of 
refugees in similar terms to Reinfeldt:
In the short term it is a great effort for Sweden. We should not pretend 
something else. But it is an effort we make because we want to help people 
get away from war and oppression. (Löfven, 2015)
Instead of using the term crisis, Löfven pictured the situation as a manage-
able struggle if everyone, including the European Union and Swedish 
municipalities, took responsibility. The prime minister emphasized 
Sweden’s humanitarian support to Syria (Löfven, 2015). It was this atti-
tude of openness that characterized the Swedish migration policy in the 
eyes of international observers, especially after the Swedish center-right 
political parties reached an agreement with the Green party on a more 
liberal migration policy (Bolin, Lidén, & Nyhlén, 2014, p. 329; Bolin, 
Hinnfors, & Strömbäck, 2016, pp. 200–201).
Shortly after the prime minister’s speech, on the morning of September 
2, a three-year-old Syrian boy called Alan Kurdi was found dead on a 
beach in Bodrum, a Turkish seaside resort. Under the hashtag 
#HumanityWashedAshore, a photography of the Syrian boy’s dead body 
was spread on social and mass media all over the world. The photo had an 
enormous impact on the public consciousness. The Swedish population 
seemed to be largely unaware of the situation until it saw the photo of the 
three-year-old Syrian boy.
On September 6, 2015, the prime minister Stefan Löfven declared that 
“my Europe does not build walls.” The prime minister urged the European 
Union to implement a refugee quota and expressed a special gratitude and 
pride for volunteers and individuals helping refugees (Swedish Government, 
2015a). On the same day, September 6, the Swedish Migration Agency 
upgraded its level of preparedness to a “state of readiness” (stabsläge), a 
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measure that in line with normal procedures is taken when it is concluded 
that Sweden faces a “threat of major incidents or disasters” (Riksrevisionen, 
2017, pp. 2–3). In short, the Agency declared that the refugee situation 
was a crisis that required crisis management action.
6.5  from creepIng crIsIs to crIsIs
The first time the government used the term crisis was when Prime 
Minister Löfven in a press release emphasized that: “The most important 
thing now is that all countries take their responsibility, that we establish 
orderly procedures [ordning och reda] for refugee welcoming, and that we 
fight the root causes of the international refugee crisis” (Swedish 
Government, 2015b). Before that day, the government had criticized 
opposition parties for their calls for “order” that, in its view, would only 
lead to the wrong priority of measures. The Social Democrats had for long 
argued that the focus instead should be put on “shelter and school for the 
children,” considering it “the most important issue” (Magnusson, 2015).
On September 9, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) on 
directives from the government released its first national situational report, 
stating that the situation was strained but the agencies were able to man-
age it (Riksrevisionen, 2017, p.  3). The Government Offices discussed 
possibilities to create public refugee housing. On September 15, 2015, the 
Swedish prime minister again associated the situation with the term crisis: 
“In times of crisis [the right to asylum] is the most essential principle to 
protect. A person fleeing war and oppression should receive protection in 
Sweden” (Swedish Government, 2015c).
At the end of September, the number of asylum seekers in Sweden 
exceeded the number of asylum seekers that had arrived during the Balkan 
wars. State agencies were able to manage the situation but needed to take 
preparatory measures in view of a potentially worsening situation. During 
this time, the Red Cross expressed deep concern for refugees who existed 
“outside the system” (Riksrevisionen, , 2017, p. 4). The Swedish Migration 
Agency reported that the number of unregistered individuals and unac-
companied children was enormous. On October 2, the municipality of 
Hässleholm announced that it could no longer guarantee meeting legal 
requirements in its handling of the children (Health and Social Care 
Inspectorate [IVA], 2015). In the following months, more than 70 
Swedish municipalities would announce similar messages (Riksrevisionen, 
2017, pp. 4–5).
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According to a survey by the opinion institute Ipsos in September 
2015, 44% of the Swedish population held the view that Sweden should 
welcome more refugees. In October, the number had dropped to 26% 
(Frigyes, 2018, p. 40). Soon after, the prime minister declared that the 
Swedish Migration Agency was instructed to set up temporary accommo-
dation in the form of tents: “It is an extraordinary situation [which 
requires] extraordinary efforts and measures” (Canoilas, 2015; Sveriges 
Radio, 2015). In mid-October, several municipalities reported being 
overwhelmed. They described huge challenges in securing the life and 
health of refugees and safeguarding the basic functions of society 
(Riksrevisionen, 2017, pp. 7–8).
During that same period, Swedish media reported that accommoda-
tions for refugees and unaccompanied children were set on fire. In the 
beginning of October, the political opposition parties started to call for 
the resurrection of border controls, but the Swedish prime minister 
refused, referring to the Swedish police’s assessment that it was not neces-
sary (Magnusson, 2015). However, this standpoint changed when the 
Swedish Migration Agency, on November 11, advocated border controls 
in a letter to the Ministry of Justice. According to the Swedish newspaper 
Sydsvenskan, the Agency later denied having made this request 
(Magnusson, 2015).
On November 12, the government introduced border controls at the 
internal border and added 11 billion SEK to the 2015 state budget for 
handling the refugee crisis (Magnusson, 2015; Riksrevisionen, 2017, 
p. 10). In the beginning of December, Save the Children International 
criticized the government by claiming: “[t]he coordination between dif-
ferent actors is better organized in Yemen than in Sweden. A UN 
Coordinator is needed in the South of Sweden to strengthen the work for 
child protection” (Magnusson, 2015).
The number of asylum seekers began to decrease in mid-December. 
While MSB was still reporting about the challenges facing state agencies 
and municipalities, the government voted on a new legislative act on the 
right to adopt special measures in situations of serious threat to the public 
order and internal security in the country, including identity controls 
within Swedish borders. On December 15, the Prime Minister declared 
that “Sweden is beginning to leave the acute refugee crisis behind” 
(Riksrevisionen, 2017, pp. 12–13). A few days later, prime minister Löfven 
delivered his annual Christmas speech in which he claimed that “I am 
convinced that we could have managed the refugee crisis in a completely 
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different way if we had shared the responsibility among EU members”: 
“the solution exists on the EU level” (Swedish Government, 2015d). He 
concluded the speech with, “next year, if you are able, do participate a 
little bit extra in volunteer work. That will be my own new year’s promise. 
Make it yours” (Swedish Government, 2015d).
6.6  conclusIon: toWArd explAInIng BlInd spots
This chapter has shown how the Swedish authorities did not see the refu-
gee crisis coming, despite the high degree of international and societal 
attention. The knowledge of the crisis was widespread and the precursor 
events were many and strong, but the government did not act in time. 
Moreover, our analysis has indicated why the crisis remained a creeping 
crisis for the Swedish government for such a long time. These factors, or 
blinders, can now help us to formulate hypotheses for future studies that 
on a more solid empirical basis can explain how this crisis was initially 
“missed.”
6.6.1  Ideological Blinders
For the Swedish political elite, the migration question was above all a 
political-ideological issue before September 2015. Sweden had long nur-
tured its international identity as a “moral superpower” that stands up for 
the small states, international law, humanitarian aid and the UN system, 
including the UNHCR and the universal right to seek asylum. Through 
focusing the debate on how to keep a “welcoming attitude”, the Swedish 
governments attempted to uphold this identity and create an interpreta-
tive prerogative that anticipated a possible alternative threat or crisis nar-
rative by the right-wing political party the Sweden Democrats 
(Sverigedemokraterna) (gathering around 20% of the Swedish voters in the 
opinion polls at the time).
We hypothesize that the Social Democratic government did not address 
the situation with concrete measures because any step of preparing for the 
arrival of the refugees ran the risk of being branded as a shift toward a 
more restrictive refugee policy by the left-wing factions of the party, left- 
wing political opponents, and the press. On the other ideological end, 
operative steps toward a crisis mode could be framed as hypocritical by 
right-wing parties.
To avoid the xenophobic label, the government did not want to recog-
nize the refugee crisis in other parts of Europe as a crisis for Sweden until 
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September 2015 when refugees were emerging in Malmö. Until that time, 
it depicted the situation as a concern for other states. This is despite the 
fact that other European states, and international and non-governmental 
organizations, warned about the risk of a major crisis hitting Sweden. It 
seems as if the Swedish Social Democratic government for long treated the 
crisis as a “crisis of ideas” rather than a “real” acute crisis.
6.6.2  A Division Between Internal and External Threats
The sociologist Anthony Giddens distinguishes between “external risk”, 
experienced as coming from the outside (from nature: draughts, floods, 
famines) and “manufactured risk” – created by “the very impact of our 
developing knowledge upon the world”; he refers to risks that we have 
very little historical experience of confronting, such as environmental risks 
connected with global warming (Giddens, 2002, p. 26).
Traditional cultures knew mostly external risks and held the almost 
fatalistic view that there was not much to do to avoid them. In contrast, 
the manufactured risk is accompanied by a growing awareness that many 
of the threats we live with today are the result of our own impact on the 
planet and consequently make us realize that we can do something about 
it. This epoch-making transformation of humans into a new geological 
force has been described as a shift from the Holycen to the Anthropocene 
(Lewis & Maslin, 2018).
We could hypothesize that the Swedish authorities did not address the 
threat because they assessed the refugee crisis as an external threat to 
Sweden that they—in a fatalistic spirit—deemed they could do very little 
to stop. The government portrayed the situation as “external” by criticiz-
ing other European states for closing borders. Through its vague declara-
tory appeals, the government in practice admitted that it could not do 
much about this other than criticizing these states and spotlighting their 
duty to follow international laws and conventions. From an external risk 
perspective, this fatalism would explain why the government did not 
address the situation.
The problem with this hypothesis is, however, that there are indications 
that the government was not fatalistic in the sense that it felt that the crisis 
would eventually hit Sweden and it could do nothing to stop it. Rather the 
striking feature was the outright absence of a crisis consciousness and 
neglect of predictions of the consequences of the refugee streams toward 
Sweden. In non-committing terms, the government expected the EU 
6 MIGRATION, BORDERS, AND SOCIETY 
100
institutions and directly targeted member states to handle the problem. 
The government’s picturing of the crisis as external did not conjure up a 
fatalistic mood, but created the image that it was improbable that it would 
reach Sweden. In fact, the government would probably have addressed the 
crisis through precautionary measures if it had seriously thought that it 
would reach Swedish borders.
We can reformulate the hypothesis. Perhaps it was the mental map of 
Swedish officials in “domestic” agencies that made them perceive the refu-
gee crisis as “external” and not of immediate national concern nor within 
their mandate to solve. The European identity and transnational “we- 
ness” were not strong enough to turn the warnings and activities of fel-
low- EU members into a trigger for Swedish actions.
We may hypothesize that the Swedish government simply misjudged 
what it could do to minimize the manufactured refugee risk. Again, the 
problem is that there are no indications in our empirical material that the 
government assessed possible measures that could prepare Sweden for the 
crisis. Compared to other threats, such as climate change and cyber inter-
connectedness, where policies of prevention and preparedness are taken to 
address manufactured risks, the lack of preparation for the 2015 crisis is 
striking. The problem was not that the government failed to put in place 
accurate precautionary measures because of its limited experience with this 
kind of manufactured risk, but that it did nothing. To be fair, there was an 
element of failed risk prognosis. The Swedish authorities relied on the 
estimates of the Migration Agency of July 2015 of decreasing number of 
refugees. However, this prognosis was so contradictory to all other predic-
tions across Europe and in Sweden that it is not far-fetched to suspect that 
the government chose to ground its non-action on this prognosis for ideo-
logical and budget reasons.
Our case study has shown the added value of the concept of creeping 
crisis in relation to, for instance, the risk literature. It helps us to focus on 
explanations of why governments only partially, or not at all, address 
evolving threats despite the fact that international and domestic actors 
draw attention to them. It helps us explain why the Swedish government 
did not assess the situation as a threat even when it became clear that there 
was a risk of significant repercussions to the Swedish state and society. 
Clearly, this lack of action cannot fully be explained by prediction difficul-
ties, or the feeling that nothing can be done to deal with a threat from the 
external world. The insufficient action had other, more complex causes 
that need to be further examined more in-depth with the help of the 
creeping crisis concept.
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CHAPTER 7
From Creeping to Full-Blown Crisis: Lessons 
from the Dutch and Swedish Response 
to Covid-19
Alina Engström, Marte Luesink, and Arjen Boin
Abstract On the last day of 2019, China alerted the World Health 
Organization to a cluster of mysterious pneumonia cases. A new coronavi-
rus (Covid-19) was discovered. Within three months after the alert, 
Europe had become the epicenter of a global pandemic. Even though the 
virus spread easily and quickly within communities, it took its time to 
travel from China to northern Europe. Nevertheless, many governments 
were slow to respond to the emerging threat. This chapter analyzes the 
initial phase of the Covid-19 crisis in Sweden and the Netherlands, focus-
ing on the relationship between experts and decision-makers. The chapter 
discusses four factors that may help explain why the Swedish and Dutch 
governments were slow in their response. The governments assumed an 
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epidemic like the one in China would not happen in their country, the 
experts followed international scientific guidelines, citizens were expected 
to defy limitations on their freedoms, and both experts and decision- 
makers were confident with regard to the level of preparedness. Lessons 
are formulated for further analysis and future preparations.
Keywords Creeping crisis • Pandemic • Covid-19 • Coronavirus • 
Infectious diseases
7.1  IntroductIon: A Slow SurprISe
On December 31, 2019, China alerted the World Health Organization 
(WHO) that a cluster of pneumonia cases of unknown origin had emerged 
in a region of the country. In the months following, what was eventually 
diagnosed as a coronavirus spread from a seafood market in Wuhan—the 
first identified source of contagion—to virtually every corner in the world. 
The virus was deadly and highly contagious; that much was known. But 
many uncertainties persisted (Buckley & Myers, 2020).
Covid-19, the disease caused by the corona virus, slowly developed into 
the biggest crisis since World War II.  By mid-January 2020, cases had 
been reported in several countries surrounding China, including Japan 
and South Korea. In China, the cases grew exponentially and tough mea-
sures were taken by the government. On January 23, Wuhan City, as well 
as neighboring municipalities, was locked down to contain the spread of 
the virus (WHO, 2020a). Global media closely watched and reported on 
the unfolding story. The next day, the first COVID-19 case was reported 
in France (Spiteri et al., 2020). The virus had reached Europe.
Within days of that first case, coronavirus was reported in multiple 
European countries. Sweden detected its first case in the city of Jönköping 
(TT, 2020a). The patient had returned from a trip to China, albeit with-
out symptoms, on January 24, 2020. The case did not come as a surprise 
for Folkhälsomyndigheten—the Swedish Public Health Agency (FOHM)—
as it had been monitoring about 20 people who had traveled to the 
infected areas in China during the previous two weeks (TT, 2020b).
In February 2020, the number of corona cases increased, but there still 
seemed little reason for alarm. On February 13, the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) stated that “the risk associated 
with SARS-CoV-2 infection for the EU/EEA and UK population is 
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currently low” (ECDC, 2020, p. 1). On February 20, a corona case was 
reported in northern Italy. It marked the beginning of a coronavirus 
“explosion” in Europe. Within three days, the number of corona cases 
went up to 150 (Lawler, 2020). Northern Italy being a popular holiday 
destination, many European tourists unknowingly contracted the corona-
virus and brought it home with them.
The Netherlands reported its first case on February 27 (NU.nl, 2020). 
At the end of February, health experts and government officials in both 
the Netherlands and Sweden reassured their citizens that their respective 
health systems were well-prepared, and management protocols were in 
place (NOS, 2020a; Von Hall, 2020). That claim would come undone 
within a matter of weeks, however. During the first half of March, both 
countries experienced a sharp and rapid increase in Covid-19 patients 
requiring hospital care. It was during that period that both countries 
shifted into crisis mode.
Sweden activated its Crisis Management Council (Krishanteringsrådet), 
and as the national Public Health Agency (FOHM) raised the risk of 
domestic spread from “low” to “moderate”, a National Pandemic Group 
was activated (Folkhälsomyndigheten [FOHM], 2020a). Gatherings of 
more than 500 people were forbidden. Events then unfolded in rapid suc-
cession. On March 11, Sweden reported its first death caused by the coro-
navirus (TT, 2020a). On March 16, the FOHM recommended senior 
citizens to stay at home and everyone living in the Stockholm region to 
work from home. On March 17, upper-secondary schools and universities 
were advised to conduct distance education (primary schools and kinder-
gartens stayed open). On March 19, the FOHM advised against non- 
essential travel within the country in relation to the upcoming Easter 
holidays. On March 29, gatherings of more than 50 people were forbid-
den. On March 31, the government issued a national ban on visits to nurs-
ing homes.
The Netherlands also entered a crisis mode during the first week of 
March 2020. A Ministerial Crisis Team launched and held its first meeting 
on March 3. The first death related to Covid-19 was reported on March 6 
and, on the same day, people living in the province of Noord-Brabant 
were asked to stay home (Boin, Overdijk, Van der Ham, Hendriks, & 
Sloof, 2020). On March 9, the first Covid-19 press conference was held 
by prime minister Mark Rutte and Jaap van Dissel, head of the Outbreak 
Management Team (Rijksoverheid, 2020a). A succession of press confer-
ences followed, announcing additional measures including the cancelation 
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of large events, the closure of schools, bars and restaurants, and social 
distancing measures (Rijksoverheid, 2020b, 2020c).
The two countries instituted crisis regimes that would last for months 
and were, in many respects, quite effective. The curve was flattened, and 
public support for governments remained high.1 The top experts in both 
countries, Anders Tegnell in Sweden and Jaap van Dissel in the Netherlands, 
became public figures almost overnight. But while the effectiveness of the 
crisis regimes has been largely acknowledged in both countries, the timing 
of the response has become the subject of scrutiny.
The first public criticism in Sweden emerged from an opposition party 
in Parliament, the center-right Moderate Party, at the end of February. It 
accused the government of acting too late and doing too little (Lönegård, 
2020). By late-March, other opposition parties added to the critique.2 The 
Swedish response was also criticized by some parts of the scientific com-
munity (DN-TT, 2020). In the Netherlands, the criticism was initially 
rather muted, but during the first “corona debate” in Parliament, several 
opposition parties stated that the government had shown a weak response 
(Rutten, 2020). The criticism continued to grow and resulted in a widely 
supported request for a national inquiry (carried out by the Dutch 
Safety Board).
The case of the coronavirus pandemic in Northern Europe is instruc-
tive because it developed over a relatively long period. While shorter than 
most creeping crises profiled in this book, these developments unfolded 
over weeks. National officials could “see it coming.” Both the Netherlands 
and Sweden had time to act early, watching Southern Europe absorb the 
initial impact. Yet the governments of both countries took over six weeks 
to trigger their respective crisis regimes at a political level. In the interim, 
health experts played an outsized role when compared to politicians; as 
such, their assessment of the virus was instrumental in shaping govern-
mental perceptions about the need to act. This chapter takes the unique 
opportunity presented by Covid-19 to explore the role of health experts 
1 In the Netherlands, the approach chosen by the government was supported by 73% of the 
population and Rutte’s approval rate increased (Kester, 2020). The majority of the political 
parties agreed with or withheld their critique regarding the chosen approach. The approach 
was critiqued by only a few and also the experts received little criticism during the early stages 
of the crisis. In Sweden, the trust in government and the Public Health Agency increased 
steadily throughout March (Novus, 2020).
2 The Sweden Democrats criticized the FOHM for not closing schools and the Christian 
Democrats called for an audit of the government’s handling of the pandemic (Oscarsson, 2020).
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in declaring this initially creeping crisis, a concept defined in the introduc-
tion to this book, as a full-blown crisis.
Our analysis  helps to illuminate response patterns to a high-profile, 
unfolding creeping crisis—with a special emphasis on the expert-politician 
interface when the actual crisis hits. We seek to explain why both countries 
arrived at a fairly similar, delayed response. We start this chapter with a 
brief description of the pandemic management structures in place, focus-
ing on the role and position of national health experts. We then describe 
the six weeks between the first announcements of the virus and the impo-
sition of the crisis regime. We end with a few lessons to improve recogni-
tion of when a creeping crisis may be tipping into a full-blown crisis.
7.2  SettIng the Scene: nAtIonAl pAndemIc 
mAnAgement StructureS
7.2.1  Sweden: Agencies as Crisis Manager
Sweden has a unique governmental system. The central government is 
small, while executive power is concentrated in autonomous national 
agencies and local administrations have substantial powers. Agencies have 
most of the resources, expertise, and human resources to execute policies 
(Pierre, 2020, p. 4). Ministerial steering (Ministerstyre) of agencies is for-
bidden. The government has some formal levers in relation to the agencies 
(they are autonomous, not independent): it appoints the agency head, 
issues yearly “instructions”, and provides agencies with an annual budget 
that can be withdrawn at any time. The government relies on informal 
dialogues and unofficial suggestions, enhanced by “a strong sense of loy-
alty towards the government of the day among the civil servants” (Pierre, 
2020, p.  2). Importantly, the Swedish constitution does not allow for 
exceptions during crises. A national response to a large-scale crisis contin-
ues to be run by autonomous agencies.3
Swedish crisis management is guided by a simple principle: the actor 
responsible for a certain policy issue during normal times is also respon-
sible for that issue during a crisis (Becker & Bynander, 2017, p. 75). The 
Ministry for Health and Social Affairs and its agencies, the FOHM and 
3 A light degree of coordination does take place from the central government via a standing 
crisis council—a governance innovation started in 2005 following Sweden’s experience in 
the Asian Tsunami (Becker & Bynander, 2017).
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National Board for Health and Welfare (NBHW) are thus responsible for 
managing a pandemic in coordination with related agencies such as the 
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB).
The FOHM’s Director-General, Johan Carlson, is responsible for 
Sweden’s coronavirus strategy and gives advice to politicians at all levels 
(Bendjelloul & Lindqvist, 2020). Through instructions, the government 
has authorized the FOHM to issue guidelines for businesses and the pub-
lic to contain the spread of any virus. It can issue regulations (föreskrifter) 
with legal sanctions or general advice (allmänna råd) without legal sanc-
tions. Unlike laws, these do not require parliamentary approval. If a law 
must be changed during a pandemic, for instance to ban public gather-
ings, the agency issues a request (hemställan) to the government. 
Director-general Carlson is supported by chief epidemiologist Anders 
Tegnell and other civil servants at the FOHM. The chief epidemiologist 
oversees the monitoring of contagious diseases in Sweden.4
The FOHM can convene the National Pandemic Group (NPG) to 
ensure coordination of the measures aimed at containing the pandemic.5 
The NPG is an informal structure consisting of representatives from all 
agencies involved in pandemic preparedness and management (FOHM, 
2019).6 The aim of the forum is to address potential overlap and to coor-
dinate communication from and amongst the agencies (MSB and 
Socialstyrelsen, 2011, p. 51).
7.2.2  The Netherlands: Ministers as Crisis Manager
In the Netherlands, the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport (hereafter, 
Minister of Health) is formally responsible for the management of a pan-
demic response. The prime minister can oversee crisis response tasks that 
are not directly related to health questions. This coordination takes place 
in meetings of the Ministerial group “Crisismanagement,” which is chaired 
by the prime minister (NCTV, 2020).
4 It would thus be more logical to bring forward the Director General than the Tegnell at 
the press conferences and in media interviews (Olsson, 2020).
5 During a pandemic, the FOHM collaborates closely with the 21 regional infection con-
trol physicians (Smittskyddsläkare). They are in charge of reporting the epidemic develop-
ment in each region to the FOHM (MSB and Socialstyrelsen, 2011, p. 12).
6 The agencies represented in NPG are the FOHM, the NBHW, MSB, the Medical 
Products Agency (MPA), Swedish Work Environment Authority (AV), Swedish Association 
of Local Authorities and Regions (SKR/SALAR), and the county administrative boards.
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The Minister of Health benefits from the advice of experts, who are 
assembled in the so-called Outbreak Management Team (OMT). The 
OMT is formally convened by the National Institute for Public Health 
and Environment (RIVM) but operates independently. OMT members 
are doctors and researchers with university affiliations. Other experts may 
be invited to join OMT meetings and discuss topics from the point of view 
of their respective expertise (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu 
[RIVM], 2020). The OMT is headed by Jaap van Dissel, a professor of 
internal medicine specialized in infectious diseases and head of the Center 
for Infectious Disease Control (CIb) (RIVM, 2011).
The OMT offers its advice to the Ministry of Health, in which issues 
are discussed collectively by representatives of local government and other 
departments (in the so-called BAO committee). The BAO considers 
whether the OMT advice is feasible from a political, societal, and adminis-
trative perspective. The BAO  [Bestuurlijk afstemmingsoverleg] then 
advises the Minister of Health (RIVM, n.d.). The implementation of 
behavioral guidelines is in the hands of the 25 “safety regions” of the 
Netherlands (NCTV, 2020).
The OMT advice gained considerable stature and publicity during the 
first phase of the pandemic. Dutch prime minister Rutte often assured the 
public that he was acting on the basis of scientific advice, at one point say-
ing that the OMT advisories had a “holy” status (Rijksoverheid, 2020d). 
In reality, the relationship between the OMT experts and the political 
crisis managers adhered to the crisis “hierarchy”: experts offered advice, 
politicians made the decisions (Boin et al., 2020).
7.3  SIx crItIcAl weekS
The experts did not miss or ignore the information about a new virus 
emerging in China. By the second week of January, they had the virus 
firmly on their radar. Experts from both countries were quick to start 
research on the new coronavirus. In Sweden, experts at the national refer-
ence laboratory (Nationellt referenslaboratorium, NRL) for parasitology 
began diagnosing the virus (FOHM, 2020b). In the Netherlands, the 
Erasmus Medical Centre started participating in international research in 
collaboration with the WHO (NOS, 2020b).
Key experts in both countries were remarkably quick to offer state-
ments about the new virus. The first messages from the Swedish experts 
were positive and confident. On January 16, chief epidemiologist Anders 
Tegnell stated that for the coronavirus “to become a large outbreak, it is 
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required that the virus is good at spreading from human to human. That 
does not seem to be the case with this virus” (FOHM, 2020c). The chief 
expert moreover claimed that a new SARS-like epidemic was not likely 
(Alexandersson, 2020) and that the virus was less dangerous than the for-
mer coronaviruses of SARS and MERS (Höglund, 2020).
Experts in the Netherlands offered similar assessments, reminding the 
public that “there are no direct flights from Wuhan to the Netherlands”, 
“the virus does not appear to be very contagious,” and “we have protocols 
ready” (Nieuwenhuis & Van Zon, 2020; NOS, 2020a). On January 24, 
when the first corona case was reported in Europe, RIVM spokesperson 
Harald Wychgel stated that the risk of infections in the Netherlands was 
“very low” (Taha, 2020).
Chinese experts had a more alarming message for their international 
colleagues. In January, they confirmed that the virus was transmitted 
human-to-human (even though there was still uncertainty about how eas-
ily the virus was transmitted). The incubation period was estimated to vary 
between 3 and 14 days.
The experts of the Dutch Outbreak Management Team acted upon the 
scientific findings and advised the Minister of Health on January 27 to 
classify the new coronavirus an “A-disease” (an exclusive list of dangerous 
diseases such as Ebola, SARS, and Smallpox). The minister did so the same 
day (Jak, 2020). The Swedish experts issued the same request to their 
government on January 31. On February 1, the Swedish government clas-
sified the coronavirus an A-disease (FOHM, 2020d).
The A-status has legal implications in both countries. In the Netherlands, 
it places the response firmly in the hands of the Minister of Health, who 
receives far-reaching powers, and requires doctors and hospitals to report 
suspected cases (Jak, 2020). In Sweden, the A-disease status triggers the 
possibility for mandatory contact-tracing and reporting in accordance 
with the Communicable Disease Act. It gives authorities power to decide 
on quarantine measures and isolation of contagious individuals 
(FOHM, 2020d).
Nevertheless, experts still offered rather conservative assessments in 
public regarding the new and unknown threat faced by the public. Even 
after the arrival of the virus in Sweden on January 31, the FOHM and the 
government continued to downplay the risk of the virus spreading in 
Swedish society. The FOHM did not heighten its risk assessment from 
“very low” to “low” until three weeks into February (FOHM, 2020a). 
The government and experts were confident that Sweden was 
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well- prepared, even if the virus arrived. The government mimicked the 
messages sent by the experts. The shared view was that the new virus was 
not as dangerous as previous coronaviruses (Von Hall, 2020).
On February 1, 2020, the same day that the FOHM asked the WHO 
to clarify how the new coronavirus was transmitted (Runblom, 2020), the 
agency tweeted there was no scientific evidence that the virus spreads dur-
ing the incubation period (Folkhälsomyndigheten, 2020a). The following 
day, however, the WHO stated that the virus could in fact transmit during 
the incubation period (the FOHM shared this clarification with the pub-
lic) (Folkhälsomyndigheten, 2020b). On February 2, Sweden evacuated 
dozens of citizens from Wuhan, China. The FOHM advised people return-
ing from China to be attentive to symptoms; quarantine was not deemed 
necessary.
Dutch experts communicated in similar vein. In mid-February 2020, 
the OMT chairman, Jaap van Dissel, gave his second technical briefing to 
members of parliament. During the briefing, Van Dissel explained that 
much about the coronavirus was still unknown. He confidently stated, 
though, that random testing of people without symptoms would be inef-
fective (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2020a). On February 21, 
Aura Timen, a member of the OMT, said that based on the available data, 
she did not think the virus would spread quickly throughout Europe 
(KNAW, 2020).
The WHO had classified the coronavirus a public health emergency of 
international concern as early as January 30 (BBC, 2020). Yet, not much 
happened in February. Neither of the countries started screening incom-
ing travelers because experts argued it would be ineffective, nor were 
behavioral modifications suggested (FOHM, 2020c; Rijksoverheid, 
2020e). Events like carnivals, professional soccer games, and pop concerts 
continued unabated.
On February 27, the first coronavirus case was reported in the 
Netherlands (NU, 2020). The day earlier, a second corona case was spot-
ted in Sweden, almost a month after the first case had been reported (TT, 
2020a). Yet experts and politicians in both Sweden and the Netherlands 
remained calm when they heard the news and stayed confident that they 
could control the situation. That would soon prove an illusion. The explo-
sion of corona cases in northern Italy occurred during the Spring Break 
for many European countries. This synchronicity allowed for the virus to 
spread quickly throughout Europe.
7 FROM CREEPING TO FULL-BLOWN CRISIS: LESSONS FROM THE DUTCH… 
114
Indeed, everything changed in March. The number of corona cases 
started to increase rapidly in both countries. On March 3, the number of 
cases in Sweden shot up to 79 (Brischetto, 2020). That same day, 23 
corona cases were reported in the Netherlands (NOS, 2020c). The first 
Covid-19 patient died on March 6 in the Netherlands (NU, 2020). The 
first Covid-19 related death in Sweden occurred on March 11 (TT, 2020a).
On March 6, after receiving alarming messages from hospitals in the 
Dutch province of Noord-Brabant, Van Dissel said that “this is a wake-up 
call, a lot is eluding the medical radar” (Hoedeman & Klaassen, 2020). 
That weekend, testing of staff in several hospitals in Noord-Brabant 
showed that 4% of the medical staff was infected. On March 10, Van Dissel 
warned parliamentarians that the healthcare system could soon be over-
whelmed, and new cases might no longer be traceable (Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal, 2020b). Surprisingly, on March 13, Van Dissel reassured 
people in an interview with the daily newspaper de Volkskrant that it was 
safe to visit bars and restaurants (Van den Dool, 2020). The bars and res-
taurants were closed two days later.
In Sweden, on March 10, the FOHM heightened its risk assessment for 
domestic spread to “very high.” The following day, the first corona death 
was reported and the first measure (a ban on events with more than 500 
guests) was put in place (TT, 2020a). On March 12, Swedish authorities 
quit contact tracing as, according to chief epidemiologist Tegnell, this was 
“now meaningless” (Expressen TV, 2020). Sweden changed its course 
and no longer strictly followed the WHO protocols. Rather than attempt-
ing a suppression approach, as most European countries did, Sweden 
opted for a mitigation approach that sought to flatten but not eliminate 
the curve of infections.7
7 Many European countries opted for a suppression approach rather than a mitigation 
approach after the Imperial College London published Corona Report 9. The mitigation 
approach aims at slowing down the spread of the virus yet not necessarily stopping it com-
pletely. The suppression approach aims at reducing the growth of the virus as much as pos-
sible and keeping it at a low level. The report created quite a fuss because it stated that if the 
UK government were to continue its mitigation approach, hundreds of thousands of people 
would die because of Covid-19. A challenge of the suppression approach is, however, that it 
must be maintained until a vaccine is available (Ferguson et al., 2020).
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7.4  BlIndSIded: explAInIng the Slow reSponSe 
In the netherlAndS And Sweden
In both countries, top health experts repeatedly reassured politicians and 
the public that everything was under control. Even though much about 
the virus was unknown, experts suggested that they understood the virus 
and its mode of propagation. Perhaps most worryingly, they were slow to 
understand that they had been wrong about the virus for quite some 
time—thus delaying the response.
How is it possible that top experts, highly qualified and experienced, 
were slow to recognize an announced pandemic? We offer four possible 
explanations for the position of these experts, garnered from previous 
research as well as evidence from this case.
7.4.1  “It Won’t Happen Here”
For decades, a global pandemic has featured on virtually every list of pos-
sible future crises. The arrival of a new, deadly flu pandemic seemed just a 
matter of time. In recent years, modern societies have experienced new 
and deadly diseases (AIDS, SARS, MERS, bird flu). After the SARS out-
break in 2003, the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) was established (and located in Stockholm). The EU continued 
to develop its Early Warning Systems for health (Guglielmetti, Coulombier, 
Thinus, Van Loock, & Schreck, 2006). It is thus no surprise that both 
Sweden and the Netherlands had experts ready to advise—or in the case of 
Sweden, to manage—the decision-making process aimed at formulating a 
pandemic response.
Remarkably, however, the experts did not seem to believe that the 
coronavirus would wreak havoc in their own country. They learned about 
the new virus and dutifully began to study it. They agreed that it was a 
dangerous disease and classified it an A-disease. Nevertheless, they did not 
appear to accept the reality of a contagious virus crossing borders in a 
borderless world. A few months into the disaster, several experts in the 
Netherlands explained how they had underestimated the virus:
We never experienced this before, it is chilling … When we saw the first data 
from China, we said to each other: this is weird, this cannot be. The speed 
of development surprised us … [We thought:] This looks like a measure-
ment error—Jacco Wallinga, head of the Infectious Disease Modelling unit 
at the RIVM. (Boin et al., 2020, p. 32)
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I, too, saw the images from China. And I thought “Well, it will not be that 
bad”, and then it reached Italy and then I saw the images again … You see 
it, but you do not feel it. Only when you feel it, you are aware of it—Die-
derik Gommers, Professor Intensive Care Medicine at Erasmus Medical 
Centre. (Boin et al., 2020, p. 32)
On Friday February 21, I spoke at a symposium in Amsterdam. I had ana-
lyzed the situation in Europe: in Italy they had three corona cases, people 
from China, who had been in the hospital since the end of January. Nothing 
else. We had two groups of infections in Europe: one in France, one in 
Germany. So, I said during my speech that the risks were not that high. 
Later on, I was heavily attacked, I think rightly so; I was perhaps overconfi-
dent—Aura Timen, head of the National Coordination Centre for 
Communicable Disease Control at the RIVM. (Boin et al., 2020, p. 40)
In Sweden, experts were convinced that they knew how to handle a 
pandemic. Sweden would impose measures in a step-wise, incremental 
fashion in order to learn from experience which measures had the best 
effects. The experts soon found out that it was harder than they had envi-
sioned. Chief epidemiologist Tegnell admitted on March 8 that he initially 
thought China would contain the virus and that it would not spread out-
side of China (Nordström, 2020). About one month into the crisis, 
Tegnell stated that his agency should have understood that the death rate 
was going to be higher than anticipated (Torkelsson, 2020). In June, 
Tegnell turned self-critical and proclaimed “If we would encounter the 
same disease, with the knowledge that we have about it today, I think we 
would end up doing something between what Sweden did and what the 
rest of the world did” (Öhman & Rosén, 2020).
A few months into the pandemic, experts who had previously sup-
ported the Swedish strategy in the face of early criticism, turned critical 
themselves: 
If we were to do this again, I think we would have imposed tougher mea-
sures in the beginning. We should have known that we lacked sufficient 
preparedness in our health and elderly care. A lockdown would have given 
us the chance to prepare, think things through, and curb the spread of infec-
tion to a maximum. But even with the benefit of hindsight, I don’t know if 
I would have been wiser than our leadership was.
—Annika Linde, former chief epidemiologist of Sweden (Svahn, 2020)
What surprised me the most was how fast everything went. From individual 
cases to societal spread, from intensive contact tracing to another strategy 
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and then back to intensive contact tracing. If you look back, everything 
went really fast.—Maria Löfgren, infection control physician of Region 
Halland. (Trysell, 2020)
What surprised me the most was the initial development after the first 
reports from China on January 1, and the speed to which the contagion 
spread globally.—Per Follin, infection control physician of Region 
Stockholm. (Trysell, 2020)
7.4.2  “Just Following the Science”
During the early stages of Covid-19, experts in both Sweden and the 
Netherlands closely adhered to the paradigm and protocols of the WHO 
on the management of a pandemic. The protocols were quite limited in 
nature and had shaky foundations. The available scientific literature at the 
time offered little evidence upon which to base WHO prescriptions 
(Aledort, Lurie, Wasserman, & Bozette, 2007; WHO Writing Group, 
2006). The WHO prescribed a set of simple behavioral guidelines that 
were thought to be sufficient for an effective pandemic response. These 
guidelines pertained to personal hygiene and social distancing in combina-
tion with the isolation of infected people (“stay home if you have 
symptoms”).
Swedish and Dutch experts followed the WHO guidelines and advised 
accordingly. They repeatedly emphasized the importance of washing 
hands and sneezing in elbows. The next step—not shaking hands—was 
the epitome of governmental intervention, the highest ladder on the esca-
lation ladder (according to WHO wisdom at the time).
Another WHO prescription was to test patients and trace the contacts 
of people who had contracted the virus, in order to map the spread of the 
virus and identify new patients. Once the identification of patients and 
tracing their contacts was no longer possible, and the virus could no lon-
ger be contained, the WHO prescribed that so-called non-pharmaceutical 
interventions (NPIs) should be considered. On March 7, the WHO rec-
ommended measures to avoid crowding and mass gatherings. It suggested 
that countries had to “define rationale and criteria for use of social distanc-
ing measures such as (…) school closure” (WHO, 2020b, p. 2).
In the literature, as experts surely knew, there was little evidence for the 
effectiveness of social distancing, closing shops, schools, and restaurants. 
There was also little evidence suggesting that large-scale events should be 
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canceled (WHO Writing Group, 2006). In fact, in the words of the WHO 
(2006, p. 9), even “the effectiveness of personal hygiene is plausible but 
not evidence-based.”
This placed experts in a quandary. Should they stick with the science or 
follow unproven guidelines? In Sweden, the FOHM issued a request to 
the Swedish government to prohibit public gatherings on March 11. 
Swedish experts did not support the idea of school closure. But the gov-
ernment did not want to completely forego this policy option, should the 
experts change their mind. For that purpose, on March 19, the Parliament 
passed a new bill that empowered the government to temporarily close 
schools. Experts maintained there was no scientific evidence to support 
the idea that closing schools would reduce the risk of infection spread 
(FOHM, 2020e). All schools, except upper secondary schools and univer-
sities, stayed open. Sweden stuck with an approach founded on evidence- 
based knowledge.
On March 12, Dutch Prime Minister Rutte announced the first mea-
sures. People were recommended to work from home as much as possible, 
universities and colleges were told to provide online classes, and events of 
more than 100 guests were prohibited (Rijksoverheid, 2020b). On March 
15, it was announced that bars, restaurants, gyms, sports clubs and schools 
had to close (Rijksoverheid, 2020c). On March 23, all events were can-
celed, social gatherings were only allowed with a maximum of three peo-
ple while adhering to social distancing rules, and contact professions 
(hairdressers, nail salons, etc.) were told to close (Rijksoverheid, 2020f). 
Some of these measures (closing schools, bars, and restaurants) were not 
recommended by the OMT scientists. The political crisis managers, how-
ever, overrode their advisors.
7.4.3  “The Public Won’t Adhere to Extreme Measures”
Crisis managers sometimes base their decisions on misinformed beliefs. 
One persistent belief, for instance, is that the public will panic if it learns 
about the extent and potential impact of an impending threat. Another 
one is the assumption that people in a disaster setting will riot and loot.8 
International experts seemed to believe that non-pharmaceutical interven-
tions (social distancing, school closures, etc.) were “likely to be ineffective, 
8 There is extensive evidence showing that these beliefs are not true (see, for instance, 
Quarantelli, 1988).
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infeasible or unacceptable to the public” (Aledort et al., 2007, p. 208). As 
we now know, there is no truth to that belief (people and businesses every-
where voluntarily adhered to strict lockdown regimes).
In the early phase of the emerging threat, Dutch experts were con-
vinced that far-reaching measures might reach too far. For instance, the 
experts did not consider the termination of “carnaval” festivities—a tradi-
tional event in the southern Dutch provinces, which subsequently suffered 
terribly from the first onslaught of the virus. Van Dissel later explained 
that “he would not have been able to sell it” if he had proposed to cancel 
the festivities (Hoedeman & Klaassen, 2020). The OMT experts would 
experience more difficulties in “reading” the public mood, prompting the 
creation of a behavioral assessment unit to meet this challenge.
Sweden adhered to the notion that extreme, long-term measures might 
be ineffective, if not counterproductive. The FOHM settled on less 
extreme restrictions, designed in such a way that they could be followed 
by the public for an extended period, since the agency argued that “the 
virus will remain in society for a long time” (FOHM, n.d.). The Swedish 
strategy left much discretion to individual Swedes. Sweden thus followed 
the responsibility principle whereby authorities trust the public to adhere 
to their general advice. Similarly, the public trusts the authorities and dis-
plays a high degree of voluntary compliance. Nonetheless, when people 
did not follow the governmental recommendations, the authorities did 
not hesitate to toughen the measures. In some cases, the recommenda-
tions became laws (for instance, the national visit ban on nursing homes). 
The government also threatened to close restaurants if they did not follow 
the regulations imposed on them (Malm, 2020). These were adopted, 
however, quite late after the onset of the pandemic.
7.4.4  “We Are Well Prepared”
In the absence of a vaccine, preparedness had to rely on strong organiza-
tion. An effective response, from this perspective, is based on the identifi-
cation of the “index patient”—the first known patient in a country. 
Through tracking the contacts of the index patient, other infected people 
can be “chased down” and placed in quarantine. This tracking and tracing 
of suspected cases is no rocket science, but it requires substantial resources, 
well-trained personnel, and excellent managerial skills.
On paper, both countries were well prepared to perform this task. The 
Dutch had plans and organizational units in place. In 2005, the Center for 
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Infectious Disease Control (CIb) was created. This center was established 
to enhance the preparedness of the country in the face of the rising threat 
of new infectious diseases (RIVM, 2015). Over the years, Dutch prepared-
ness was tested by the emergence of various new diseases. The available 
plans and organizational structure performed well in response to these 
health threats. The SARS and Mexican Flu outbreaks, for example, were 
detected early on and the situation was quickly brought under control 
(Boin et  al., 2020). These successes inspired deep confidence amongst 
Dutch experts and politicians in their state of preparedness.
Unfortunately, this pandemic was different. Due to the long incubation 
time and the many asymptomatic cases, there were many index patients 
(until the first index patient was finally identified).9 In addition, the capac-
ity for testing suspected cases was limited. When the first corona case was 
reported in the Netherlands, the OMT stated that the best thing to do was 
to contain the virus by actively tracing patients and their contacts 
(Rijksoverheid, 2020g). However, the responsible organizational units—
the local health units—were not prepared for the task. On March 10, the 
head of one of the local health units said that her employees were very 
busy and that “the work pressure is sky high” (Tweede Kamer der Staten- 
Generaal, 2020b). On March 12, Van Dissel told the press that it was 
impossible to trace all new corona cases. The Dutch government gave up 
on mass testing and contact tracing (Rijksoverheid, 2020b).
The Swedes also had plans and organizational units in place to handle 
imported cases and to perform contact tracing. The Swedish authorities 
began conducting active contact tracing after the first case was discovered 
on January 31. For almost a month, the number of corona cases reported 
in Sweden remained in single digits. On February 26, when Gothenburg 
experienced its first case, Anders Tegnell claimed that “our current strat-
egy works—to inform people who have been in the affected areas who get 
symptoms and to offer them quick treatment” (FOHM, 2020f). By March 
12, however, the number of cases had reached such high levels that Tegnell 
admitted that contract tracing was impossible and said people in the region 
of Stockholm were no longer going to be tested (Expressen TV, 2020). 
Sweden’s testing capacity proved to be insufficient. On March 22, the 
FOHM announced that it no longer considered testing other than in hos-
pitals (Fall, Kämpe, Fall, Larsson, & Bergh, 2020).
9 According to the RIVM, the first (unofficial) corona cases were already in the Netherlands 
in January (Algemeen Dagblad, 2020).
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7.5  recognIzIng when A creepIng crISIS comeS 
to A heAd: leSSonS from covId-19
As seen in the case of Covid-19, the move from watching an unfolding 
crisis to preparing for its onslaught is mediated by the expert-politician 
interface. That interface can shape how societies prepare for impending 
crises, from the moment those crises begin to “creep.”
The world of science is ruled by methods of validation, which aim to 
separate mere beliefs from societal patterns and laws of nature. The politi-
cal arena revolves around value conflicts that must be abridged through 
negotiation and mechanisms of delegating and monitoring power. 
Politicians often ask scientists for advice, which they use as they see fit. 
Scientists bemoan that policy is not evidence based, but they rarely refrain 
from offering their insights when asked.
When in crisis, politicians tend to pay more attention to what scientists 
have to say. Suddenly they want to know what the basis is for their scien-
tific insights. Scientists are hard pressed to provide advice on which much 
may depend. They move into positions that are as close to decision- making 
power as non-elected officials may find themselves. The Covid-19 crisis 
was no exception. In the Netherlands, as in other countries, scientists who 
had labored anonymously for years suddenly shared the stage with politi-
cal crisis managers. In Sweden, scientists pretty much ran the response, 
placing politicians in the back benches of the crisis management arena.
So, what have we learned? Did the relationship between scientists and 
decision-makers help the latter to declare this creeping crisis a full-blown 
crisis, in good time? Should the relationship between policymakers and 
scientists be reconsidered?
To start, scientists clearly did not call Covid-19 for what it was: one of 
the biggest crises to hit the world since World War II. Experts followed the 
science, which, in hindsight, helps to understand why it took so long to 
declare this a full crisis. Well into the crisis, scientists “missed” the emerg-
ing crisis in the nursing homes (a creeping crisis within a creeping crisis). 
As we write this, in late 2020, it appears that scientists failed to call the 
“second wave”—a resurgence of Covid-19. These observations are, of 
course, disconcerting.
We identified an interesting divergence between the two countries. In 
the Netherlands, politicians closely followed the assessments of scientists 
during the incubation phase. But when it became abundantly clear that 
the experts had misread the threat, the politicians took over. Belatedly but 
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swiftly, they took measures that experts had waved off as not supported by 
scientific evidence.
In Sweden, science remained in the driving seat. Swedish scientists 
stuck with the evidence-based regime that their Dutch colleagues had pre-
scribed to their political headmasters. Put differently, Swedish politicians 
remained true to the designed crisis management principles and practices. 
The Swedish approach, as it subsequently came to be known, attracted 
world-wide attention. It was nothing but the regime that scientists had 
proposed in international journals and had agreed upon during interna-
tional conferences. Remarkably, Sweden was the only country that stuck 
with science (Milne, 2020). Whether the Swedes were right to do so will 
be the subject of much future research (it will take some time before the 
final assessment comes in). Sweden has become a test lab for pandemic 
management; that much is clear.
It also seems clear that the advisory role of scientists should not be 
abandoned. It is hard to see how a pandemic could be managed without 
the insights of science. But our analysis of two countries in which scientists 
play a major role in pandemic management offers a few pointers for fur-
ther discussion and analysis. These points are relevant in all creeping crises. 
Three points in particular merit attention:
Scientists advise, politicians decide—or not? The role of scientists seems 
circumscribed in modern conceptions of democracy. While scientists 
may have critical knowledge and insights regarding strategy and deci-
sions, democracies expect politicians to make those decisions. They are 
elected and they are responsible. Is there reason to reconsider this maxim?
Scientists should stick with the science. The scientists disappointed in the 
initial phase of the Covid-19 crisis. They did so because they stuck with 
the scientific paradigm. It seems logical that scientists should stick with 
the science. If the science is limited, so be it. Scientists should admit 
ignorance and hand the decision back to politicians. They may start 
working to address the uncertainty by conducting research.
Who should declare a crisis? The calling of the pandemic was in the hands 
of politicians, but they did so based on scientific assessments. Politicians 
dutifully categorized Covid-19 an A-disease when scientists advised 
them to do so. But scientists failed to persuade politicians of the urgency 
of the threat and the need to act. The reason is simple: they did not 
believe it was necessary. This evokes the question: who should declare a 
crisis and based on what evidence?
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CHAPTER 8
Political Attention in a Creeping Crisis: 
The Case of Climate Change and Migration
Elin Jakobsson
Abstract This chapter discusses the creeping crisis of rising human 
displacement induced by environmental degradation and natural 
catastrophes. Sea-level rise, droughts, and the increased occurrence of 
hurricanes and floods already have, and increasingly will have, drastic 
effects on migration patterns. Climate-induced displacement already 
outnumbers displacement from war or violence. Nation states and the 
international community have consistently failed to properly address this 
phenomenon. Only recently has political attention begun to increase. This 
chapter argues that our understanding of climate-induced migration can 
be improved with the help of the creeping crisis concept. In addition, 
climate-induced migration may provide insights to the underlying 
mechanisms of creeping crises. More to the point, this chapter explores 
the rise and fall of political attention in this case, offers insights on what 
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lies behind this and reflects upon the broader implications for the literature 
on creeping crises.
Keywords Creeping crisis • Climate change • Climate-induced 
migration • CIM • Global migration
8.1  IntroductIon
Climate change is one of the most severe crises facing humankind. Climate 
change is a label that covers a number of multifaceted and interconnected 
changes taking place as the result of CO2 emissions and a warming climate. 
Those changes have destructive effects, from shortages in food and water 
to decreased biodiversity, from air pollution to mortalities from heat 
waves, from increasingly intense forest fires to—the focus of this chapter—
rising human displacement.
Climate-induced displacement now outnumbers displacement from 
war and violence. In 2019, nearly 25 million people left their homes as a 
result of various kinds of natural disasters (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre [IDMC], 2020). The risk of being displaced by 
disasters has more than doubled since 1970 (Ginetti, Lavell, & Franck, 
2015). The World Bank predicts that over 140 million people will be 
internally displaced in 2050 as a result of climate change (Rigaud 
et al., 2018).
Despite clarity on the existence of the problem, much uncertainty 
remains. The scale of the problem depends on the severity of climate 
change consequences, on whether households and societies can adapt, and 
on how many of those living in exposed areas can or will leave. Moreover, 
research shows that climate-induced displacement is deeply intertwined 
with other types of migration, not only with economic migration but also 
with migration from climate-induced conflicts (see, e.g., The Government 
Office for Science, 2011).
The effects of climate change differ across the world. Climate-induced 
migration involves persons being forced off their South Pacific island as 
sea levels rise, just as it can include persons losing their home in the 
Bahamas after a tropical storm, an evacuation of an Australian town 
threatened by bush fires, or farmers in Tanzania leaving their villages after 
years of drought making land uncultivable. Common to these diverse 
types of forced mobility is that they relate to—and are exacerbated 
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by—different kinds of natural disasters which are becoming more frequent 
and more intense following increasingly severe climate change. Lost 
housing or land, threatened food or water security, and decreased income 
resulting from failed crops are typical examples of climate-related drivers 
of human mobility. Like all types of migration, mobility induced by climate 
change is primarily within-state but increasingly cross-border.
Our understanding of climate-induced migration can be improved with 
the help of the creeping crisis concept. Moreover, climate-induced 
migration as a case provides new insights about the underlying mechanisms 
driving creeping crises, as first presented in the introduction to this book. 
Climate-induced migration is the result of a complex interaction of 
“facilitating” factors, including climate change itself but also disasters and 
destruction generated by climate change. Multiple developments, and 
occasional interactions between them, combine into long chains of deeper 
problems; for instance, movement stems from flooding, flooding from 
climate change, and climate change from certain societal choices. 
Additional problems emerge “downstream” from migration flows. 
Uncontrolled migration can cause social unrest in receiving societies. Poor 
migration management and uncoordinated border closure force migrants 
to take dangerous journeys or may trap them in limbo, creating unsafe 
camps and exacerbating poverty (Lustgarten, 2020). Unplanned migration 
can also increase population density and put even more pressure on 
ecosystems (IOM, 2009).
The next section of this chapter sets the scene, describing the threat 
potential as well as the “pace and space” of the climate-induced migration 
phenomenon. Section 8.3 traces the political discussion and moments of 
attention regarding climate-induced migration, mainly at the international 
level. Despite repeated expert warnings, and clear manifestations, policy 
makers have failed to address climate-induced migration in any substantial 
way, whether through legal protections or even adaptation and resilience. 
Section 8.4 briefly reflects upon the synchronicity between precursor 
events and political attention. The fifth and final section formulates insights 
for research on creeping crises.
8.2  the Pace and SPace of the crISIS
Environmental change has always been a driver of human movement. 
Most types of environmental degradation—sudden or gradual—worsen 
people’s living conditions to some degree. At a certain point, degradation 
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requires changes in lifestyle and even forced migration. The increased 
frequency and intensity of such events paint a grim picture of the human 
consequences of climate change and forebode even worse events.
Recent disasters have given us a preview of future events. In October 
1998, Hurricane Mitch hit Central America, the worst hurricane to strike 
the area in over a century. The event killed thousands of people and 
displaced over 50,000 persons. In Nicaragua, one of the most affected 
countries, households exposed to heavy rainfall during Hurricane Mitch 
experienced a 50% larger risk of displacement compared to less exposed 
households (Carvajal & Pereira, 2010; Kniveton, Smith, Black, & Schmidt- 
Verkerk, 2009; Westhoff et al., 2008). The Indian Ocean earthquake and 
Tsunami in December 2004 caused extreme devastation. Approximately 
1.7 million people were displaced as a result of the tsunami, mainly in 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India (Inderfurth, Fabrycky, & Cohen, 2005). 
Hurricane Katrina forced over one million people from their homes in the 
U.S. Gulf Coast in August 2005, and tens of thousands of those remained 
displaced years after (Kromm & Sturgis, 2008). In May 2009, Cyclone 
Aila forced about 2 million people from their homes in Bangladesh. 
Damaged houses and lands, together with loss of working opportunities 
and reduced food and water security, were the main factors driving people 
from their land (Islam & Hasan, 2016). 2019 was a particularly bad year 
for disasters and disaster-related displacement, hitting a range of countries 
and communities hard. Cyclones Idai and Kenneth displaced 2.2 million 
people in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe (Wachiaya, 2020), while 
major moves in human settlements were accelerated by Hurricane Dorian 
in the Bahamas. Widespread wildfires in California, Australia, and the 
Amazon have had similar effects.
On top of all these dramatic examples, we should not forget the gradual 
and indirect disasters that are also major drivers of displacement: sea-level 
rises in low-lying island states, for instance, or the incremental movements 
caused by drought. This kind of movement may take a pre-emptive form; 
for example, preventative evacuations take place and populations 
sometimes never quite recover. A large part of the disaster displacement 
figures for 2018, for instance, come from typhoon evacuations in the 
Philippines (IDMC, 2019).
Systematic data on disaster displacement is scarce, especially before 
2008. Today, the most advanced dataset on disaster displacement comes 
from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). Their data 
shows that displacement from slow-onset disasters is generally much more 
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difficult to capture than sudden-onset disasters. For instance, only since 
2017 has the IDMC included drought in their calculations, and while the 
number is not insignificant (approximately 764,000 in 2018), these figures 
are heavily underestimated (IDMC, 2019). In addition, research shows 
that it is generally difficult to measure displacement in situations where 
climate change is a driver or contributing factor. Most climate-related 
displacement may be disguised as, or perhaps intertwined with, a variety of 
other compounding factors, including urbanization, work migration, 
starvation (i.e., searching for food or water), or flight from climate- 
induced conflict.
Persons living in areas severely affected by sudden- and slow-onset 
disasters, and which are already vulnerable for other reasons, have the 
most difficulty in adapting to environmental changes and are therefore 
most at risk of being displaced (Kolmannskog, 2008; Piguet, Pécoud, & 
de Guchteneire, 2011; Swing, 2008). When people are forced to move, 
the displacement itself is a crisis to the individual. From a broader 
perspective, however, there are other consequences of large migration 
flows. Poverty, insecurity, marginalization, social unrest, and further 
ecological degradation can result (Ionesco, Mokhnacheva, & Gemenne, 
2017; Rigaud et al., 2018). If properly addressed, however, through aid, 
assistance, management of flows, migration can come with multiple 
benefits to the receiving community and may be an effective way for 
persons and societies to adapt to a changing climate (Jakobsson, 2018; 
UNHCR, 2011). The potential benefits, in short, are there to be had if 
adequate attention and response is given.
When applying the definition of a creeping crisis to this case, climate- 
induced migration appears to conform closely. First, large-scale 
uncontrolled climate-induced migration can be seen as a threat to societal 
values and life-sustaining systems. This is true for the displaced persons, of 
course, whose livelihoods are threatened. It also holds for the potential to 
destabilize societies and redraw the world’s population settlements in 
relatively short periods of time.
It is important to note here that, if using the creeping crisis concept to 
identify a “threat agent,” that agent here not be climate migrants as such, 
but rather the chain of phenomena that include environmental changes, 
disasters, and the resulting circumstances that force displacement. 
Moreover, one should be careful when speaking of migration in crisis 
terms, as there is a risk of framing vulnerable groups of people as “threats” 
to (primarily) western societies. This chapter underlines that the potential 
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full-blown crisis lies in the societal (social unrest, destitution) and 
ecological pressures that may result from an inadequate response to these 
increasing migration flows—apart from the individual crisis experienced 
by those displaced. The scale of this threat, though, depends highly on a 
variety of factors and will further vary based on whether governments 
respond effectively. A failure to “bend” the emission curve will see 
temperatures likely rise significantly over decades (IPCC, 2014b), but 
effects will be incremental and may appear less than catastrophic. Such 
dynamics play into the threat framing problem addressed further below.
Second, the climate migration crisis adheres to the creeping crisis 
concept because it evolves over time and space. It has a long incubation 
time, “an epochal character” without a clear beginning (as mentioned, the 
relationship between mobility and environmental changes has always been 
present) and no clear end. It manifests itself in different locations, around 
the world, and damage differs considerably. Even though the circumstances 
may escalate to the point where it constitutes a full-blown crisis to all 
societies, it is difficult to say in advance when such a tipping point might 
be reached.
Third, as we have seen, no one is in the dark about the contours and 
seriousness of this problem. There are regular occurrences of the crisis 
that, while perhaps paling in comparison to what is ahead, already draw 
attention and some degree of response. Fourth, as we will see below, the 
existing and potential climate migration crisis has attracted varying degrees 
of attention over the past decades. Attention comes and goes, sometimes 
but not always in relation to actual precursor events. Few coherent and 
collectively held framings (amongst global leaders, for instance) of climate- 
induced migration as an existential threat can be found.
This leads to a related issue: that climate-induced migration as a policy 
issue thus far remains insufficiently addressed, the fifth and last criteria of 
the creeping crisis definition. If climate-induced migration would have 
been properly dealt with through climate change mitigation or effective 
protection and relocation measures, it could have been treated as a regular 
crisis and managed accordingly. But a lack of action, as returned to in the 
conclusion below, propels the creeping nature of the problem. Climate- 
induced migration continues, and even deepens in severity, with every 
precursor event that takes place. Such events are dealt with, and then 
attention fades. The notion of a creeping crisis helps to disentangle this 
growing problem’s component parts, outline its dynamics, identify its key 
challenges, and suggest opportunities for action.
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8.3  PolItIcal attentIon 
and clImate-Induced mIgratIon
The story of climate-induced migration as a creeping crisis is one of 
gradual and growing political attention that, while notable, has not yet 
reached a tipping point. Moreover, while migration responses are initiated 
at the national level, very few receiving countries in the world have 
discussed changing asylum or migration legislation to include climate- 
induced migrants or displaced in any real sense. Instead, political attention 
in this case primarily comes from international organizations (IOs) and 
international NGOs.
In 1985, researcher Essam El-Hinnawi at the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) presented a report titled 
“Environmental Refugees”—one of the first uses of the concept and the 
moment when it first made its way into the minds and onto the agendas of 
policy makers. The report warned of how environmental degradation 
could drive large numbers of people, especially in poor countries, on the 
move, creating a new category of refugees (El-Hinnawi, 1985). From 
there, attention to the issue grew in academic circles while any sense of 
ownership was found only amongst smaller groups of engaged individuals, 
often within large IO secretariats. For instance, the United Nations 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) made repeated announcements about how they 
increasingly saw environmental-related factors as a driver of overall refugee 
movement during their operational work in the field. The UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees at the time, Antonio Guterres, started an 
awareness campaign, informally including climate-induced displacement 
under the UNHCR’s mandate. The argument was that the circumstances 
of displaced persons resembled those of refugee-like situations 
(Guterres, 2009).
Several reports of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) also drew attention to the effects of climate change on 
human migration. In their 1990 assessment report, the IPCC stated that: 
“migration and resettlement may be the most threatening short-term 
effects of climate change on human settlements” (IPCC, 1990, chap. 5, 
pp. 5–9) and that “forced migration and resettlement would be the most 
severe effects of climatic change as a result of natural disaster and loss of 
employment” (IPCC, 1990, chap. 5, pp. 5–10). The 1992 report stated 
that “the gravest effects of climate change may be those on human 
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migration” (IPCC, 1992, sect. 5.0.10). Such sentiments continued to be 
expressed over the years. An IPCC report from 2007 noted displacement 
as one of the central consequences of climate change (IPCC, 2007) and a 
working group contribution to the 2014 IPCC report stated that “climate 
change over the 21st century is projected to increase displacement of 
people” (IPCC, 2014a, p. 20).
In 2007, climate-induced migration climbed further up the international 
agenda. This was not the result of a particular displacement event but 
rather of an active and successful connection between displacement and 
issues of climate security at large (Jakobsson, 2018)—a popular topic in 
the UN at the time (Mobjörk et al., 2016) and one promoted by policy 
entrepreneurs. For instance, the British Foreign Secretary, Margaret 
Beckett, warned the UN Security Council that climate change could result 
in migration on an unprecedented scale (UN Security Council, 2007). 
Two specific ways of framing the issue contributed to increased political 
salience of the issue. One framing was the impression, buoyed by press 
attention and visual imagery, of climate refugees as a security threat (Boas, 
2015; White, 2012). The other was the use of climate migrants as “the 
human face of climate change” (Gemenne, 2011; Warner, 2011). Both 
narratives, which originated and evolved in the period 2007–2009, 
facilitated the inclusion of climate-induced migration in the UN Security 
Council, the UNHCR and ultimately in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Jakobsson, 2018).
The leap in political attention paved the way for the issue’s inclusion in 
the UN climate negotiations. UN humanitarian agencies joined forces to 
send a strong message with regard to the issue’s relevance to gathering 
climate change negotiators (McAdam, 2014; Warner, 2011). The 
strengthened legitimacy brought by the involvement of the humanitarian 
community, alongside tireless work from advocates and entrepreneurs 
(not least the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, IASC), led to the formal 
recognition in the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework of climate change 
induced displacement, migration, and planned relocation. This major step 
included calls for all countries to undertake “measures to enhance 
understanding, coordination and cooperation in this area” (UNFCCC, 
2011, sect. 14f). While this formulation appeared rather weak and non- 
binding, it signaled a jump in attention, international attention, and 
provided a stepping-stone for advocates to demand further political 
attention (McAdam, 2014). The inclusion in the Cancun Adaptation 
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Framework also clearly connected this issue to climate change politics, 
leading to an increased politicization of the issue (Jakobsson, 2018).
In 2011, Guterres again boosted attention for climate-induced 
displacement, this time as part of the 60th anniversary of the Refugee 
Convention. In parallel, a UNHCR expert meeting drew attention to the 
existing legal gaps for climate and disaster-related displacement, noting 
the lack of legal protections in current international law. However, both 
the proposal for the UNHCR to lead the charge on protection for disaster 
displacement and the proposal to fill the existing protection gaps were 
blocked by the UNHCR Executive Committee and its ministerial 
conference later that year. This made it difficult for the UNHCR secretariat 
to further advocate and enhance protection mechanisms for climate- 
induced displacement during that year. Disagreement amongst national 
governments over the effect of adding climate-induced migration to 
existing refugee issues slowed the process. There was also a feeling among 
stakeholders that there was still too little research on the issue (McAdam, 
2014), that the UNHCR already had too much on its plate, and that there 
was a general fatigue associated with having to take on further responsibility 
for refugees (Interview with practitioner October 9, 2017).
The difficulties surrounding the UNHCR’s ownership of this issue 
inspired the Norwegian and Swiss governments to establish the Nansen 
Initiative, a platform in which states could meet to discuss cross-border 
disaster displacement and exchange best practices. The Nansen Initiative 
helped to anchor the issue on the international agenda following the UN 
breakdown discussed above. It also became clear that efforts to spur 
political attention must be more broadly targeted toward the “right” 
people (Interview with practitioner October 9, 2017). While the inclusion 
of migration into climate change politics helped provide a spot on the 
international political agenda, over the years it became clear that the parts 
of governments represented there were not the ones that could take 
measures to address the rights of refugees and migrants. One interviewee 
explained it as follows: “If you are looking at who the actors are there, 
then there are ministries of environment and finance and foreign affairs. 
They are not ministries dealing with migration issues. So, the real specialists 
are outside the UNFCCC process” (Interview with practitioner October 
13, 2017). In short, national governments needed to take more 
responsibility.
A major step was the COP21 meeting in Paris on climate change, in 
late 2015. That agreement established the Task Force on Displacement 
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(TFD) to “develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, 
minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of 
climate change” (UNFCCC, 2015, sect. 49). The fight to include that 
language was hardly easy; opposition emerged and, at times, that particular 
text was even dropped from the draft (Interview with practitioner February 
19, 2016).1 Another advance was that lobby groups began pushing for its 
inclusion in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in the 
beginning of the year (Interview with practitioner October 9, 2017). 
Advocates believed it was important to establish climate-induced migration 
in a disaster risk reduction policy because the latter is seen as more technical 
and less political than the more controversial question of refugee rights 
associated with the UNHCR (Interviews with practitioners February 2, 
2017; March 16, 2017 and March 28, 2017). Furthermore, climate- 
induced migration earned a prized reference in the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (goal 13 on climate action). Finally, 109 governments 
endorsed the Nansen Protection Agenda, an unbinding yet symbolically 
important blueprint for how to exchange and make use of best practices 
on cross-border disaster displacement.
In recent years, issues of climate change, migration and displacement 
have received renewed political attention. The Nansen Initiative was 
succeeded by the Platform for Disaster Displacement (PDD) with the aim 
to promote implementation of the Nansen Protection Agenda. The newly 
established Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
(GCM) (and to some extent the Global Compact on Refugees) from 2018 
clearly mentions disaster displacement and acknowledges that climate 
change can be a driver of migration. Moreover, the framework suggests 
possible solutions such as humanitarian visas, temporary work permits, 
and planned relocation. In doing so, it reflects both the language and 
suggestions of the Nansen Protection Agenda and the TFD 
recommendations from 2018. The TFD had a renewed and stronger 
mandate from the UNFCCC: to guide capacity building and to promote 
the issue within the new Global Compact, mentioned above, and global 
platforms for disaster risk reduction (UNFCCC, 2019).
1 Moreover, in the UNFCCC context, issues of climate change and migration are discussed 
under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), which adds to the 
issue’s sensitivity since that connects it to matters of compensation.
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Climate-induced migration thus gradually rose on international 
agendas, propelled by policy entrepreneurs, issue linkages, and inclusion 
in wider agreements on climate change. The issue, one might surmise, was 
able to ride the wave of climate change attention more broadly. Yet, there 
was no global groundswell of support for the issue as an impending crisis. 
Crucially, an insufficient number of national governments have given 
sustained, political-level attention to climate-induced migration.
8.4  ImPlIcatIonS for SynchronIcIty
The political attention dynamics outlined above took place largely in 
isolation from the precursor events that revealed deep problems associated 
with a changing climate. In the crisis literature, along with public policy 
research, disasters and extreme events are seen as external shocks that 
generate attention and shake up policy systems. Opportunities for change 
thus emerge (Birkland, 1997; Sabatier, 1999). In the case here, though, 
attention does not seem clearly linked to actual events. Analysis in 
Jakobsson (2018) shows that advocates were more successful using issue 
linkages and “strategic framing” (Rhinard, 2017) than exploiting shocks 
(e.g. disasters) to drive the issue up the policy agenda. This is consistent 
with research showing the effectiveness of linking new issues to previously 
held norms—defined as widely accepted standards of behavior (Florini, 
1996; Rost Rublee, 2009). For instance, the largest single boost in atten-
tion came in the period 2007–2009, mentioned above, when climate-
induced migration was presented as a security threat, and as part of the 
climate and security agenda that was popular in UN discussions at 
that time.
This suggests that attention-related tipping points, to the extent they 
exist, are not necessarily linked to the accumulation of evidence, knowledge, 
or a plethora of worsening precursor events. Those factors are all present 
in this case, but no massive, global shift in attention has taken place. What 
shifts can be found are the result of policy dynamics. It may be more useful 
to think of attention, synchronicity and creeping crises in relation to 
traditional theories on “windows of opportunities” (see e.g., Kingdon, 
1984) or “attention cycles” (Downs, 1972). Creeping crises play out over 
long periods of time, meaning that event-driven dynamics and policy 
cycle-driven dynamics may intermingle to drive attention forward (or 
backward) at specific moments of time, but rarely in a linear way.
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How is attention related to response? As Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 
(2020) have pointed out: “attention is one thing, but what really counts is 
a response” (p.  125). In the case of climate-induced migration, the 
response has been faltering at best. There is an almost complete lack of 
concrete, meaningful national responses to this creeping crisis. At the 
international level, too, some aspects of the response to climate-induced 
migration are worth highlighting.
One is that decision venue matters. Where the issue “lands” for 
consideration—the institutional setting within which the issue can be 
discussed—determines whether it is acted upon. When framed as a climate 
change issue, the problem falls under the UNFCCC; when framed as a 
refugee issue it falls under the UNHCR; when framed in other ways, other 
institutional venues become relevant. These venues are more or less 
sympathetic to addressing the issue. The UNFCCC venue, focused on 
climate change, was occasionally more sympathetic than the UNHCR, in 
which proposals to help refugees in urgent situations (at a time when 
Europe was struggling with a migration crisis of its own—see the chapter 
by Landström and Ekengren in this volume) dampened political interests 
in strengthening protection mechanisms. At the same time, the UNFCCC 
was not equipped to handle issues of refugee and migrant rights. We can 
also note that xenophobic discourses crept into all migration-related 
discussions during these times. This case thus teaches us that it is not only 
important to trace political attention when studying creeping crises. It is 
of equal importance to investigate what underlies “active neglect”—efforts 
to keep the issue off the agenda.
Another notable dynamic in this case is the effects of what might be 
called a “partial response” to this creeping crisis. During more climate- 
related disasters, the international community mobilizes a familiar, tech-
nocratic response: aid and assistance flow amply to address the immediate 
destruction caused by the disaster. That model of attention and response 
works well in the short-term, but a sense of resolution (along with 
agenda crowding) prevents longer policy discussions of root causes of 
the problem or its longer-term effects, such as displaced population. The 
world thus lacks a template for addressing climate-induced migration, in 
contrast to immediate disasters. Disasters receive wide attention and a 
full response, while climate-induced migration receives sporadic atten-
tion and virtually no meaningful, concrete response at all. The issue is 




8.5  concluSIonS and reflectIonS
This chapter set out to explore the case of climate-induced migration 
through the lens of the creeping crisis concept. Like other creeping crises, 
this case shows that, despite repeated calls for adequate responses since the 
mid-1980s, very little substantial action has been taken. The potentially 
severe effects of climate change on human mobility have been known for 
at least 35 years, but thus far, political responses have been generally 
cautious, to say the least. A number of key factors can be identified as 
possible explanations for a sustained lack of attention and response.
First, as set out above, there is a general lack of political will to properly 
address this problem. This lack of will corresponds to (a) a general 
reluctance to finance adaptation, compensation and risk reduction 
abroad—even though some small measures have been taken; (b) the 
general difficulties in finding a political willingness to mitigate climate 
change at large; and, (c) a reluctance to tackle the politically sensitive issue 
of refugee protection. The last point stems from a rise in anti-immigration 
and populist parties, as well as a fear of renegotiating the international 
consensus on refugee rights. There is also a general reluctance to give 
more responsibilities to the UNHCR (which member states considered 
already overwhelmed by the responsibilities for conventional refugees) 
(Interviews with practitioners February 17, 2016 and October 9, 2017).
Second, this case demonstrates the difficulties of making policy makers act 
when there is a low sense of urgency and “pressingness”—capturing an 
essential problem with addressing creeping crises at large. One of the practi-
tioners interviewed for this chapter said that some crucial stakeholders believe 
this is not yet a “real” issue, and that other issues are more pressing (Interview 
with practitioner October 9, 2017). Another aspect is that, apart from the 
clear manifestations of climate-induced displacement, other indicators are 
more subtle and complex and do not necessarily send urgent signals. For 
instance, empirical research shows that climate change often merges with 
other migration patterns related to economic migration or urbanization, 
especially in relation to slow-onset natural disasters such as drought.
Third, this case shows the lack of collectively agreed definitions and clear 
terminology surrounding the issue. Importantly, the victims of climate-
induced migration are a diverse group, both in terms of causes of flight and 
pattern of mobility. This diversity results in confusion regarding the causal-
ity, scope, and responsibility assigned to this creeping crisis (Castles, 2010; 
European Commission, 2013; Piguet et al., 2011; Swing, 2008; Interviews 
with practitioners, February 16–17, 2016; October 10, 2017).
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Fourth, previous research shows that once a policy issue gains salience, it 
needs to be “coupled” with a policy instrument or a solution; otherwise, a 
rise in issue attention risks stagnation (Kingdon, 1984). In this case, the 
policy response suffers from a lack of available and feasible solutions. There 
is no model of response akin to disaster management. In the times when 
political attention has been most intense, such as 2007, 2011 or 2015, there 
has been no concrete, comprehensive solution that would adequately miti-
gate climate-induced migration and protect those displaced. One reason for 
this is the lack of an agreed response. Our understanding of this major soci-
etal problem has deepened in the past 35 years, but it has also become 
increasingly clear that it cannot be handled through one solution or mea-
sure. Even in the specific field of refugee protection, it has been shown that 
displaced migrants constitute a wide and diverse group, requiring a huge 
array of different protection measures needed for different kinds of climate-
induced movement (McAdam, 2011). Wildavsky’s (1984) insights on the 
obstacles to crisis response—“no solution, no problem”—appear relevant 
here. A low sense of urgency, the complexity of the problem, the lack of an 
obvious solution, and fleeting attention—all work against politicians’ moti-
vations to tackle this increasingly worrisome creeping crisis.
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CHAPTER 9
Earthquakes in Groningen: Organized 
Suppression of a Creeping Crisis
Alexander Verdoes and Arjen Boin
Abstract Natural earthquakes do not occur in the northern part of the 
Netherlands. Yet, small earthquakes have regularly struck the area since 
the 1980s. For a long time, it was denied that these earthquakes were 
caused by the extraction of gas in the area and that these earthquakes 
could cause any damage. When more, and more severe, earthquakes struck 
the province of Groningen, these claims became unsustainable. In 2012, a 
relatively strong earthquake hit the area and the earthquakes became a 
national policy issue that threatened the legitimacy of the state. The crisis 
lingered on until 2018 when the national government finally realized that 
prolonged extraction would cause a deep crisis and decided to terminate 
the extraction of gas well before the depletion of the field. We argue that 
this visible and enduring crisis was not recognized and sufficiently 
addressed because of a societal dependency on the extraction of gas. The 
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crisis was actively suppressed by the main actors, which ultimately under-
mined the legitimacy of the gas production and the state.
Keywords Creeping crisis • earthquakes • Dutch gas fields • crisis 
incubation • crisis response
9.1  IntroductIon: EarthquakEs In holland?
Every Dutch schoolchild knows that earthquakes are rare in the 
Netherlands. In the northern part of the Netherlands, earthquakes never 
occurred—until recently. In December 1986, an earthquake struck the 
Drenthe province, near a gas extraction site. The following years witnessed 
small earthquakes near other small gas fields in Drenthe and in the prov-
ince of North-Holland. But the number of earthquakes really accelerated 
in the Groningen province, where more and more gas has been extracted 
since 2000. At the time of writing, in late 2020, over 1700 small earth-
quakes have been registered in the northern provinces of the Netherlands.
The accumulated damage has been substantial (thousands of houses 
have been damaged), but the industry consortium exploiting the gas fields 
in the northern provinces simply denied any causal relations between their 
activities and the earthquakes. The Dutch authorities also denied that 
these earthquakes were caused by the extraction of gas or could cause any 
significant damage. As the number and intensity of the earthquakes 
increased, together with the rising harm caused by the earthquakes, this 
claim became harder and harder to sustain.
Over the years, the earthquakes developed from a local safety threat to 
a national policy concern. When an M3.6 earthquake1 struck the village of 
Huizinge (in Groningen province) in 2012, citizens began to mobilize 
against gas production. In January 2018, a small earthquake (M3.4) 
struck the small town of Zeerijp (also in Groningen province). This event 
proved a tipping point: the public began to directly relate the earthquakes 
with the gas fields in the north. The national government finally realized 
1 The reference “M” refers to a Richter Scale magnitude ranking. The Richter scale (M) is 
a logarithmic scale. A one-step increase on this scale means that an earthquake is ten times 
stronger. It should be noted that the Richter scale may not be the most appropriate measure 
to determine the impact of earthquakes because of the interaction between shallow 
earthquakes, compaction related subsidence, weak soil, soft sediments, and constructions 
that were not designed to withstand earthquakes.
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that prolonged extraction would lead to a deep crisis. The legitimacy of 
the state was at stake (Schmidt, Boersma, & Groenewegen, 2018).
In the 2018 quake’s aftermath, the Minister of Economic Affairs, Eric 
Wiebes, decided to terminate the extraction of gas to ensure the safety of 
the region (Tweede Kamer, 2017–2018a). The minister also announced a 
new compensation and restoration scheme for the victims of the earth-
quakes. This was a major and very costly policy reversal. The Groningen 
gas fields had been a financial windfall for the Netherland since the 1960s, 
generating between 5–10% of national revenues.
Below we explore why this creeping crisis, a concept defined in the 
introduction to this volume, could persist for such a long time. To answer 
this question, we make use of primary sources (parliamentary documents) 
and secondary sources (academic articles, policy papers and reports, and 
media reports). We begin the chapter with a brief reconstruction of how 
lucrative gas extractions in the northern Dutch provinces slowly devel-
oped into a legitimacy threat for the national government. We describe 
how the government and the exploitation consortium (known as the 
NAM, or Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij) responded to these earth-
quakes and how these responses were perceived by citizens. In the final 
section, we identify factors that explain why this creeping crisis was allowed 
to persist.
9.2  a crIsIs In slow MotIon
The unfolding crisis of the Dutch gas fields can be described in four time 
periods: the initial incubation period (1959–1986), a phase in which a 
number of precursor events gradually increased attention (1986–2012), a 
major jump in attention and rise on governmental agendas (2012–2018), 
and a final phase that led to a full-fledged response: the announced closure 
of the gas fields (2018–2020).
9.2.1  Incubation: Increasingly Dependent 
on a Financial Bonanza
In 1959, the Slochteren gas field was discovered. Located in the province 
of Groningen, it turned out to be one of the largest gas fields of the world 
(Sintubin, 2018, p. 2001). The new source of income was an unexpected 
gift to a poor country still rebuilding its war-torn society.
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In 1962, the first Dutch gas policy was published (OVV [Onderzoeksraad 
voor Veiligheid], 2015, p. 33). This policy was based on two pillars. The 
first pillar held firm to the belief that fossil fuels would soon be replaced by 
nuclear energy. Therefore, the aim was to start the extraction of gas as 
soon as possible and deplete the field quickly in order to maximize its 
value before the expected arrival of nuclear energy. The second pillar 
defined the state as a major player in the extraction, transportation, and 
selling of gas in cooperation with private parties (OVV, 2015, p.  33; 
Mulder & Perey, 2018, p. 12).
In 1963, Dutch State Mines (a state enterprise under the authority of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs) and the NAM (a joint venture between 
Shell and ExxonMobil) signed an agreement to coordinate the extraction, 
transportation, and sales of gas (OVV, 2015, p.  33). The NAM was 
granted a lasting concession to extract the gas, while also becoming 
responsible for safety and liable for the consequences of extraction.2 Later 
that year, the extraction of Groningen gas began. At the same time, an 
enormous operation began to enable the consumption of gas by industry 
and households. In addition to Dutch households, many households in 
Belgium, France, and Germany quickly became dependent on 
Groningen gas.3
After the 1973 oil crisis, gas prices rose. The resulting gas revenues 
contributed substantially to the national budget. In the 1980s, the share 
of gas revenues in the national budget peaked, amounting to about 18% of 
the state revenues (OVV, 2015, p. 21). During this time period, local resi-
dents did not have any noticeable objections. They were happy with the 
(indirect) economic benefits that befell the economically disadvantaged 
region. Furthermore, citizens were proud that they could contribute to 
the post-war reconstruction efforts and to the emerging welfare state 
(Bakema, Parra, & McCann, 2018, p. 8).
It was in this same period that the first negative side-effects were 
encountered. The NAM acknowledged in 1971 that gas extractions in 
Groningen would result in subsidence of the soil. This sinking, according 
to the NAM, would not be problematic. Across an area of 900 sq. km, the 
2 After the discovery of the Slochteren field, the NAM continued to explore gas fields, and 
it discovered several smaller gas fields in other parts of the Netherlands.
3 All the infrastructure was designed for Groningen gas, which is characterized as low 
calorific. High calorific gas from Russia, or Norway must be treated with nitrogen first, 
before it is compatible with the gas infrastructure (Mulder & Perey, 2018, p. 11; Sintubin, 
2018, p. 2002).
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soil would subside approximately one meter over time, but this process 
would be gradual. Because the process was so predictable and slow, the 
NAM claimed that damage could be prevented.4
The first small earthquakes—no more than light tremors at the time—
were felt in 1976. The NAM denied that gas extraction could cause proper 
earthquakes (Scholtens, 2018, p. 27). The Royal Netherlands Meteorological 
Institute (KNMI), which is responsible for measuring seismic activity in the 
Netherlands, also denied the possibility of earthquakes (Kester, 2017, p. 18). 
The responsible ministers ascribed the observed tremors to vibrations in the 
atmosphere, which, they claimed, were probably caused by fighter jets 
breaking the sound barrier in the area (Tweede Kamer, 1988–1989).
9.2.2  Precursor Events: Increasing Earthquakes 
and Rising Attention
In December 1986, an M2.8 earthquake near a small gas field in Assen 
was strong enough to be registered by the KNMI’s seismic sensors in 
Utrecht (approximately 150 km away) (Kester, 2017, p. 18). Other small 
earthquakes followed near smaller gas fields in the provinces of Drenthe 
and Noord-Holland. The NAM acknowledged that there were “vibra-
tions,” but it denied any relation between the tremors and the extraction 
of gas. The NAM also stressed that it was impossible to establish the ori-
gins of the shocks, mainly because they were not monitored (OVV, 
2015, p. 37).
A geographer and member of the provincial assembly of Drenthe, Mr. 
Van der Sluis, suspected a causal relationship between the extraction of gas 
and the earthquakes occurring nearby. He held the NAM responsible for 
the damages that were caused by the earthquakes. The NAM fiercely 
denied his claims and made personal attacks on Van der Sluis, suggesting 
he was an ignorant geography teacher (OVV , 2015, p. 37). The NAM 
asserted that it was the sole authority on this topic (Van der Voort & 
Vanclay, 2015, p. 6) while the KNMI declared that Van der Sluis’s theory 
could not be true (Van der Voort & Vanclay, 2015, p. 6). Meanwhile, 
geologists in the US and France established that gas extractions could 
indeed cause earthquakes (OVV, 2015, pp. 59–60). The NAM and the 
4 In 1983, the NAM and the province of Groningen agreed that the NAM would be 
responsible for damage caused by the subsidence (OVV, 2015, pp. 34–35; Van der Voort & 
Vanclay, 2015, pp. 5–6).
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KNMI denied that this was possible in the Netherlands because the geo-
logical conditions were very different. Both organizations saw no need to 
initiate further studies (OVV, 2015, p. 64).
The earthquakes triggered concerns among Dutch Members of 
Parliament (MPs) (Tweede Kamer, 1988–1989). They observed that 
earthquakes were suddenly occurring in an area where normally earth-
quakes do not occur. Ministers De Korte (Economic Affairs) and Kroes 
(Infrastructure) again pointed to air vibrations as the likely source. 
Nevertheless, De Korte ordered the KNMI to install seismometers to mon-
itor the earthquakes. The first seismometers were installed in Assen in 1989 
and in Finsterwolde in 1992 (Kester, 2017, p. 18; OVV, 2015, pp. 37–38).5
In 1990, the province of Groningen commissioned studies from the 
Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT) and Delft University. Both 
studies concluded that it was very unlikely that “induced earthquakes” 
could occur in Groningen. Even if they did occur, the impact of these 
tremors could not exceed M3 and would thus not cause any damage 
(OVV, 2015, p. 38). Despite these reassuring findings, more and more 
earthquakes were registered, which fueled concerns among MPs (Tweede 
Kamer, 1990–1991).
In response, the Minister of Economic Affairs initiated a multidisciplinary 
investigation in 1991. Two years later, the investigation committee 
published its findings. For the first time it was acknowledged that the 
extraction of gas could cause earthquakes. However, these earthquakes 
could not exceed a magnitude of M3.3 and were not considered cause for 
concern (OVV, 2015, p. 39). The NAM endorsed the findings but refused 
to compensate any damages to buildings (Van der Voort & Vanclay, 
2015, p. 6).
More studies were initiated. Research conducted by the KNMI 
corroborated the findings of the 1993 study that established the link 
between earthquakes and gas extraction (OVV, 2015, p. 40). Meanwhile, 
the Groningen province started to receive damage reports from citizens. 
In 1995, the Groningen provincial government informed its residents that 
earthquakes could strike in extraction areas with a possibility of minor 
damage. Citizens were informed how they could claim compensation for 
damages (OVV, 2015, pp. 40–41).
5 Not much later, the first earthquakes were also registered in the Groningen area and it is 
very likely that earthquakes already struck Groningen before the earthquakes were monitored 
(Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen [SodM], 2013, pp. 10–11).
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In 1997, an M3.4 earthquake struck the town of Roswinckel in 
Drenthe. This was the biggest earthquake thus far. More research was 
conducted, and the maximum potential magnitude was increased to M3.8. 
The new report predicted that the situation would not deteriorate (OVV, 
2015, pp. 41–41; Van der Voort & Vanclay, 2015, p. 6).
In 2000, gas production from the smaller fields peaked. To compensate 
for the decreasing production from the smaller fields, extraction from the 
larger Groningen field increased (OVV, 2015, p. 22). At the same time, 
the earthquakes started to become a bigger problem in the Groningen 
province. In 2003, for instance, three earthquakes struck the village of 
Loppersum (OVV, 2015, p. 45). The maximum possible magnitude was 
increased again to M3.9 (OVV, 2015, pp. 46: 82).
In 2006, an M3.5 quake struck the Groningen villages of Westeremden 
and Middelstum. In the aftermath of this earthquake, an expert from the 
Dutch Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) stated in the 
media that the earthquakes would not increase in magnitude. This asser-
tion did not reassure local residents, however, who remained concerned 
about the increasing magnitude of the earthquakes, the possible damage 
that these earthquakes could cause, and the increasingly rapid extraction 
of gas (OVV, 2015, p. 47). Local citizens began to lose their confidence 
in the NAM. This was caused by the gradual increase of expected magni-
tude (from M3.0 in 1990 to M3.9 in 2003). Additionally, citizens were 
concerned that the earthquakes could cause damage to their houses, which 
the NAM had long denied (OVV, 2015, p. 48).
In 2007, the NAM presented a new extraction plan for the Slochteren 
field. Despite the earthquakes in the area, the planned period for extractions 
was extended from 2040 to 2068. The Minister of Economic Affairs 
accepted the plan. The possibility was noted that induced earthquakes 
could cause damage to houses, but it was also noted that damages could 
simply be compensated (OVV, 2015, pp. 47–48).
The relatively few people who had suffered damage to their houses 
were upset about the treatment they received from the NAM. They felt 
that the NAM did not take them seriously. The NAM continued to con-
test that earthquakes had caused the damages. In response, residents 
established an advocacy group, the Groninger Ground Movement 
(Groninger Bodem Beweging (GBB)) in 2009 (OVV, 2015, p. 49). The 
GBB would come to play an important role in putting the earthquakes on 
the political agenda. However, they were only capable of doing this after 
they were able to demonstrate that the earthquakes increased and 
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intensified, causing negative social effects. National newspapers thus far 
had shown very little interest in the risks related to gas extraction. All this 
changed in 2012, which delivered a so-called trigger event (Kester, 2017; 
Opperhuizen, Schouten, & Klijn, 2019, pp. 724–725).
9.2.3  A Trigger Event: Arrival on the Political Agenda
On 16 August 2012, an M3.6 earthquake struck the village of Huizinge. 
This was the most powerful and long-lasting earthquake to hit in the prov-
ince of Groningen. Residents fled their residences and local buildings. 
Regional television had a live broadcast of the event. The earthquake 
caused considerable damage: residents filed about 2500 damage claims 
(Tweede Kamer, 2012–2013a, p. 1).
The State Supervision of Mines (Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen (SodM)) 
initiated a study after the Huizinge earthquake and confirmed that earth-
quakes had become more frequent and intense, and, importantly, that 
these developments were connected to the extraction of gas. The SodM 
also concluded that it was impossible to estimate the maximum magnitude 
of future earthquakes (SodM, 2013, pp. 10–11; 23). In January 2013, the 
KNMI confirmed the findings of the SodM study (OVV, 2015, p. 53). 
These reports garnered considerable media attention and put the issue of 
extraction-related earthquakes squarely on the national political agenda 
(Schmidt et al., 2018, p. 517). Later that month, the SodM advised the 
Minister of Economic Affairs to reduce the extraction as soon as possible 
to minimize the risks of more, and more severe, earthquakes (OVV, 
2015, p. 53).
In reaction to these reports, Minister Kamp (Economic Affairs) 
reassured citizens that victims would be compensated and proposed 
measures to prevent and mitigate damages caused by future earthquakes 
(Tweede Kamer, 2012–2013a).6 However, Kamp did not reduce the gas 
production. Households and businesses in the Netherlands, Germany, 
Belgium, and France depended on the Groningen gas field. It was simply 
not possible to replace the Groningen gas with gas from other sources, at 
least not in the short term.7 In addition, reducing the gas production 
6 To prevent damages, the NAM would assess constructions and, if necessary, reinforce 
constructions (the so-called strengthening operation).
7 There was insufficient capacity to treat high calorific gas with nitrogen to make the high 
calorific gas compatible with the gas infrastructure that was designed for the low calorific 
Groningen gas (see footnote 3).
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would have negative consequences for the government budget. Instead, 
Kamp initiated 14 investigations so he could take an informed decision 
about the future of gas extraction in the Netherlands.
In a subsequent parliamentary debate (Tweede Kamer, 2012–2013b), a 
majority stressed that the safety of the residents should be prioritized above 
economic interests. A majority also agreed that compensation by itself was 
not an adequate response to the earthquakes. Instead, the production 
should be reduced to safe levels, or it should be stopped altogether. The 
minister refused to take a decision because he wanted to await the results 
of the additional investigations. Minister Kamp did admit that the Huizinge 
earthquake had generated a new sense of urgency among politicians and 
experts. He argued that reducing production would not substantially 
reduce the safety risks. According to the minister, a 20% reduction would 
decrease the probability of an M3.9 earthquake in the next 14 years from 
7% to 5.6%. While the expected safety benefits were marginal, reduction of 
production would have severe consequences for businesses and house-
holds, in the Netherlands and abroad. Additionally, this would also sub-
stantially deplete the national budget amid an economic recession. After 
this debate, and with the announcement of 14 new studies, the earth-
quakes disappeared from the agenda (Schmidt et al., 2018, p. 519).
The provincial government of Groningen was not satisfied with the 
minister’s response and initiated its own research committee: the so-called 
Meijer Committee (2013). In November 2013, the committee published 
its report, which put the earthquakes back on the political agenda (Schmidt 
et al., 2018, p. 519). The committee observed an imbalance in the costs 
and benefits from gas extraction; it also noted a growing resistance against 
the national government and the NAM.  The province of Groningen 
received about 1% of the national income generated by gas production, 
but it suffered the bulk of the negative effects. Moreover, the report 
argued that NAM did not communicate with the victims while the author-
ities denied real estate value losses because of the earthquakes.
Residents were upset with the NAM’s damage settlement procedure, 
too. They perceived the damage settlement procedure as nonresponsive, 
unwilling, and random (Postmes et al., 2018). Damages were repaired, 
but only after a long procedure (after each earthquake, people had to go 
through the demanding procedure again). The slow and uncertain dam-
age settlement procedure and the strengthening operation made it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for a substantial number of people to live a normal 
life (Postmes et al., 2018; Stroebe et al., 2019).
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This widespread feeling of injustice was strengthened by the refusal of 
the NAM and the national government to cut gas production, as the 
SodM had advised. Shortly after the Meijer Committee released its report, 
it became known that a record amount of gas was being extracted from 
the Groningen field (OVV, 2015, p. 55). One could forgive the citizens of 
Groningen province for thinking that the Minister of Economic Affairs 
had initiated the 14 studies merely to delay a decision on the reduction of 
gas extraction (Bakema et al., 2018, p. 10).
The government tried to address the loss of trust by promising an 
investment of 1.2 billion EUR in the regional economy (OVV, 2015, 
p. 55). Additionally, a “dialogue table” was initiated, which aimed to build 
consensus between the gas industry, local actors, and citizens (Bakema 
et al., 2018, p. 11). The dialogue table quickly proved unsuccessful, how-
ever, as it reproduced existing power hierarchies and did not strengthen 
the representation of local actors in the decision-making process. It was 
disbanded at the end of 2015 (Bakema et al., 2018, p. 11).
Minister Kamp approved a new extraction plan in 2014. This led to 
another backlash. Even though the SodM advised the minister not to 
approve an earlier version of the plan in 2013, the plan was accepted. The 
only concession in the plan was a minor reduction in the extraction; no 
other substantive policy changes were made (OVV, 2015, p. 54; Schmidt 
et al., 2018, p. 522). Another problem with this new plan was that local 
stakeholders had not been involved in the decision-making process. 
Subsequently, the media and local policymakers framed the approval of 
this plan as a one-sided and unilateral decision (Schmidt et  al., 2018, 
p. 522).
The position of residents was strengthened vis-à-vis the NAM and the 
government when in 2015 the Dutch Safety Board published its report on 
safety in Groningen. This body concluded that authorities had ignored the 
risks related to the gas extraction before the 2012 Huizinge earthquake 
(OVV, 2015).
Until 2015, the NAM was responsible for both the damage assessment 
and for the compensation of victims. Both the NAM and the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs no longer considered this situation appropriate. In 
2015, the Ministry of Economic Affairs therefore founded the Centre for 
Safe Living (Bakema et al., 2018, p. 10). The new center was tasked with 
assessment, financial pay outs, and repair of damages. This was not an 
immediate solution for the problem, because it further complicated the 
already complex damage settlement procedure. This complexity 
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discouraged citizens to report damages (Kuipers & Tjepkema, 2017; 
Mulder & Perey, 2018; Stroebe et al., 2019). It was not until the 2018 
Zeerijp earthquake that a new process was established (Bal, Smyrou, & 
Bulder, 2019, p. 3).
Citizens continued to mobilize against gas production via the GBB 
advocacy group and other local interest groups (Mulder & Perey, 2018, 
p. 9). They succeeded in generating substantial attention in the national 
media. A public broadcaster aired (during prime time) a documentary 
about the damage settlement procedure. Attention in the newspapers for 
the problem increased dramatically between 2013 and 2015 (Opperhuizen 
et  al., 2019). Meanwhile, the NAM and the government limited their 
participation in the public debate. This caused a further backlash for the 
NAM because discussion of the earthquake risks was dominated by worst- 
case scenarios. In these scenarios, an M5 earthquake would strike the 
region. The scenarios fueled feelings of insecurity among residents 
(Sintubin, 2018, p. 2005; Vlek, 2019, p. 1073). In hindsight, we can see 
that this was the period during which the NAM slowly began to lose its 
“social license”—or legitimacy—to drill. It became increasingly difficult 
for political parties to support gas extraction in the northern provinces 
(Van den Beukel & Van Geuns, 2019, p. 21).
Around 2015, politicians started to change their positions, increasingly 
emphasizing safety and environmental concerns over economic consider-
ations. Several political and judicial decisions were announced that favored 
local residents and put more demands on the NAM and the state (Van den 
Beukel & Van Geuns, 2019). First, Minister Kamp decided in 2015 that 
citizens in Groningen should not be exposed to more safety risks than 
other Dutch citizens were (Tweede Kamer, 2015–2016). To comply with 
this safety norm, more buildings had to be reinforced (Tweede Kamer, 
2015–2016; Stroebe et al., 2019, p. 29). In the same year, the Council of 
State (the highest administrative court) ruled that gas production should 
be reduced to limit the risks for inhabitants. Following this verdict, the 
Dutch government capped the production of gas to a minimum (Raad van 
State, 2015). In 2016, a new mining law was adopted, which reversed the 
burden of proof in Groningen: the NAM had to prove that damages were 
not caused by the earthquakes (Van den Beukel & Van Geuns, 2019, 
p. 15). In 2017, two judicial verdicts hampered the extraction even fur-
ther. An ordinary court ruled that the NAM is responsible for psychologi-
cal damage caused by earthquakes. The Council of State decided that the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs should reconsider the extraction plan 
(Postmes et al., 2018, p. 28).
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The drastic change of attention and response was facilitated by an 
important development: gas production was rapidly becoming economi-
cally unviable. By the end of 2017, the NAM had to pay about 1.2 billion 
EUR in compensations (Van den Beukel & Van Geuns, 2019, pp. 15–16); 
it had to pay about 1 billion EUR to compensate for the depreciation of 
the real estate in the region. Additionally, an enormous project to 
strengthen about 22,000 buildings in the area came with a price tag of 
about 10 billion EUR (Van den Beukel & Van Geuns, 2019, pp. 15–16). 
The costs of extracting gas thus increased substantially. The Groningen 
gas field was no longer the financial asset it had been for so long.
In January 2018, an M3.4 earthquake struck Zeerijp. The Minister of 
Economic Affairs decided, finally, that the extraction of gas would have to 
be terminated to ensure the safety of the region (Tweede Kamer, 
2017–2018a).
The Zeerijp earthquake was a tipping point (see also Tweede Kamer, 
2017–2018b). The damage settlement procedure also changed after the 
Zeerijp event. The Temporal Committee Mining Damage Groningen was 
established (since July 2020 the Institute for Mining Damage Groningen) 
and functions independently from the NAM (Bal et al., 2019). This new 
committee seems to be a success: residents have become more likely to 
report their damages, and compensations are paid relatively quickly 
(Jach, 2019).
Even though production was cut back, earthquakes have not stopped. In 
May 2019, another strong earthquake hit the area, causing damage in the 
city of Groningen (the capital of Groningen province) (Bal et al., 2019). 
Not much later, the minister announced that the production would be ter-
minated even earlier than planned (Tweede Kamer, 2018–2019a). The pro-
duction is scheduled to stop in 2022; the field should be closed in 2026.
9.3  conclusIon: a crIsIs that kEpt on crEEpIng
Over the years, the small earthquakes that periodically hit the citizens of 
the Groningen province attracted little public or political attention. The 
citizens who saw their houses damaged or depreciated could only turn to 
the company that had caused the damage. The NAM consortium long 
denied the problem and made the damage pay-out process a frustrating 
one. It took decades before this creeping crisis was finally recognized as a 
real crisis for those living through it. By then, the crisis had also become 
an institutional crisis as the trustworthiness of the national government 
suffered a severe blow (Schmidt et al., 2018).
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The question, then, is: how is it possible that a persistent and clearly 
visible creeping crisis is not recognized as such? Our chapter identifies two 
closely related factors that together help to formulate an answer to that 
question, and enlighten our understanding of creeping crises more 
generally.
The first factor is societal dependency. Politicians had very little incentive 
to recognize, let alone address, the problem. Even a small reduction of 
earthquake risk would have serious consequences for the national budget. 
In addition, there was no short-term replacement for the gas on which 
Dutch, Belgian, German, and French households relied. According to 
Minister Wiebes, terminating the extraction of Groningen gas was never 
seriously considered before 2018 (Tweede Kamer, 2018–2019b). The 
social dependency ended only after a series of decisions that widened the 
responsibility of the government and the operation of the field became 
economically non-viable. In addition, alternatives for the Groningen gas 
had to be developed (the construction of a nitrogen factory in Zuidbroek 
and the expansion of a nitrogen factory in Wieringermeer) and foreign 
contracts had to expire, to lower dependency on gas and enable the gov-
ernment to end the extractions.
The second factor is active suppression. The main actors (NAM and the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs) had no interest in the safety of citizens. For 
a long time, their sole interest was to maximize profits. These organiza-
tions did not look for crises to manage—they tried to actively prevent a 
crisis from attracting attention.
It was long believed that compensations and strengthening buildings 
could mitigate what was a clear creeping crisis. Instead, these management 
strategies became part of the problem. It was not recognized that a few 
cracks in the wall could cause severe problems for residents. Meanwhile, 
the number of earthquakes and their intensity increased, which overbur-
dened the already deficient compensation mechanisms and overdue repair 
and strengthening operation. This made it very difficult for victims to live 
a normal life. Because these problems were not addressed, and the govern-
ment and the NAM did not limit the production of gas, local residents 
believed that they were not taken seriously by the state and the NAM. The 
earthquakes did not just damage buildings, but they also damaged the 
legitimacy of the gas extraction and trust in the (central) state.
The efforts to keep this creeping crisis out of the limelight planted the 
seeds for its rise on the public and political agenda. The actions taken by 
the authorities to mitigate the effects of the earthquakes gradually 
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undermined the legitimacy of gas production and the state. The state was 
ultimately forced to terminate the gas production almost 50 years before 
the gas field would have been emptied. In this rare case of a creeping crisis 
eventually acted upon, and ostensibly solved, these dynamics shine light 
on the potential pathways through which other creeping crises described 
in this book might be resolved.
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CHAPTER 10
Understanding Creeping Crises: Revisiting 
the Puzzle
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Abstract This chapter returns to the research question that animated the 
case studies and summarizes the findings of the chapters in this book. It 
offers provisional answers to our research question and formulates an 
agenda for future research. Much of the chapter is devoted to thinking 
through the implications of the creeping crisis perspective for the practi-
tioner community. We build on our research findings to argue that the 
time for action is now and formulate a set of recommendations that can 
help jumpstart this agenda.
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10.1  IntroductIon
This book pivots around the assumption that the world is facing threats to 
the survival of the planet. The security and prosperity of mankind is at 
stake because of climate change, forced migration, terrorism, pandemics, 
cyber breakdowns, the erosion of privacy and growing inequality. The 
puzzle is simple: why are governments not prioritizing these threats and 
treating them as the large-scale crises that so many experts argue they are?
The book demonstrates that knowledge about causes and effects of 
these threats is not the real problem. The knowledge base is solid, avail-
able, and steadily growing. Experts seem to have little doubt what the 
facts are. Advocacy groups regularly warn of impending problems if greater 
action is not taken. Yet governmental efforts to prevent and manage these 
threats do not stand in proportion to their almost existential magnitude.
In this book, we outline a perspective that helps to explain why the 
discrepancy between our understanding and handling of these threats is so 
large. The concept of creeping crisis brings together what are really two 
sides of the same coin: the objective analysis of threat potential and the 
subjective definition and understanding of what should be considered a 
threat and how it can be met. We make a distinction between objective 
facts regarding how these threats incubate, evolve, and signal their existence 
and the subjective processes through which these threats are seen to 
undermine shared societal values and whether they are given political and 
societal attention.
This perspective has served us well in this book. It steered our empirical 
investigation of creeping crises in fields ranging from antimicrobial resis-
tance (AMR) to climate change, from returning foreign fighters to energy 
extraction. A few intriguing insights are worth repeating here:
• Few threats seem so well-documented and so immediate as AMR 
(Chap. 2), but the apparent blessings of immediate cures and eco-
nomic gains prevent political leaders from addressing the longer- 
term threat that results from this neglect.
• The WannaCry cyber crisis (Chap. 3) was waiting to happen since 
the U.S. National Security Agency kept secret a major vulnerability 
in computer operating systems. That move gave rise to a series of 
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interconnected developments and precursor events that led to 
WannaCry—with more serious attacks likely in the future.
• The study of foreign fighters (Chap. 4) suggests that the risks of radi-
calization and terrorist attacks will increase if they are not allowed to 
return home from the refugee camps where they remain in limbo.
• Climate change induces migration, but it remains hard to estimate 
the number of people potentially displaced. This pervasive uncer-
tainty, along with competing agendas, paralyzes government action 
(Chap. 8).
• Many people may feel uneasy about the rise of Big Data, but it is not 
easy for governments to act forcefully if that means undermining 
new technologies, which many believe we depend on for future pros-
perity (Chap. 5).
• Deep-seated ideological debates created blind spots that prevented 
the Swedish government from making a realistic assessment of the 
2015 migration crisis (Chap. 6).
• Respected experts in the Netherlands and Sweden, sticking with the 
scientific state of the art, slowed down their governments’ reaction 
to the well-documented emerging threat that we now refer to as 
Covid-19 (Chap. 7)
• The marriage between commercial and political interests led to an 
organized effort to suppress attention for damaging earthquakes that 
were the result of the profitable exploitation of the Dutch natural gas 
fields. A national response was long avoided, despite the many pre-
cursor events of minor quakes and tremors (Chap. 9).
In each case we had no problem identifying an epistemological network 
of experts who seem to understand the nature and consequences of the 
threat that is either coming or already with us. These networks are well- 
established, well-funded and operate across borders. They are frequently 
linked to international institutions. Whether we talk about climate change, 
AMR, Big Data, or foreign fighters, the research done is typically 
world-class.
The chapters together reinforce the importance of the main puzzle ani-
mating our approach: it appears that these creeping crises are far from 
“unknown”—they do not belong to the category of the proverbial “Black 
Swan” (Taleb, 2010). These are not long-tail events that we discount 
because we don’t understand or don’t know about them. These are all 
thoroughly studied and well-documented threats that draw the constant 
attention of what we might call a “warning community.”
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10.2  understandIng the Problem: generatIng 
attentIon for the seemIngly obvIous
The key challenge, as this book makes clear, is not one of understanding. 
It is the challenge of generating political and societal attention that might 
lead to meaningful action. Experts suggest solutions, but politicians seem 
unconvinced that the public will support a radical shift in policy. We know 
from the work of policy scholars that the attention of politicians and poli-
cymakers is somewhat of a scarce commodity (scholars say that policy 
agendas have a limited “carrying capacity”). But policy scholars typically 
consider crises to be precisely those “focusing events” that should gener-
ate attention (Birkland, 2006; Kingdon, 1984).
Why is that not happening in these cases? Why do politicians and the 
public at large systematically ignore what appears to be written on the 
wall? Our case studies highlight several types of factors at play, which we 
briefly summarize below.
10.2.1  The Complexity of Incubation
There is no shortage of experts casting this or that threat into their analyti-
cal spotlight. Whether we are talking about biological processes (AMR) or 
technological developments (Big Data), we can find a handful experts who 
seem to know nearly everything about the threat at hand. But somehow, 
this expert knowledge does not escape from the academic confines in 
which that knowledge is accumulated, honed, and tested. The general 
public and politicians seem to have only a very rudimentary knowledge 
base, which does not even come close to the actual state of the art. In fact, 
it may well be dangerously simplified or outright wrong. It is easy to see, 
then, how politicians and citizens can misunderstand the real danger of a 
seemingly new development.
It does not help that expert assessments of a threat are often cast in the 
language of risk management. Experts want to be helpful: they try to esti-
mate the likelihood of some event occurring and the damage it may cause. 
The chapter on the Groningen earthquakes provides an illuminating 
example. Experts assessed the chances of an earthquake of a certain mag-
nitude and they then tried to predict how much damage would be likely. 
In making such assessments and predictions, they are held to the maxims 
of science. One of those maxims instructs them to be transparent about 
the range of uncertainty in which they operate. Predicting future events is, 
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by definition, a rather imprecise and uncertain endeavor. It should not 
surprise anyone that experts tend to be rather cautious in their predictions, 
which may thus fail to rally citizen or politicians toward a response. It is 
not that they underestimate creeping crises; they just can’t say much with 
a high degree of certainty. So, they do not.
What makes the task even more difficult is that, regarding creeping 
crises, scientists are not dealing with linear processes that allow for predic-
tions of critical thresholds. These are non-linear processes, marked by long 
periods of simmering and sudden punctuations or “tipping points.” And 
these punctuations are incredibly hard to predict, as complexity scholars 
tell us. That’s why policymakers and politicians are surprised time and 
again by crises that seem long in the making but suddenly explode 
into view.
10.2.2  The Distraction of Precursor Events
Creeping crises tend to produce precursor events. If understood correctly, 
these precursor events are treated like dire warnings of impending doom. 
They would be the canary in the coal mine, a signal that things are about 
to fall apart. But in many cases, these precursor events are classified as 
minor incidents that can be easily managed. They are treated in isolation 
from the undercurrent that produces the incident. The focus is on the 
immediate cause, not the systemic processes that give rise to that cause. 
AMR, for instance, is often analyzed as a series of unfortunate incidents in 
impoverished countries, not as an accumulation of multiple dynamics that 
may cause global mayhem. People on the run from war are treated as 
unwanted refugees, not as an indicator of sweeping climate change.
Precursor events tend to be manageable (as they are mere incidents). 
But their manageability provides cover for the underlying crisis. As the 
incident is managed, the attention for the incident disappears. We might 
say that the incident absorbs all the attention, providing a false sense of 
closure. It is like the “near miss” at a busy airport: quickly and thoroughly 
investigated, but soon forgotten. Immediate causes will be addressed (the 
inattentive controller) but the real story—too many planes using the air-
port—disappears from view.
There is an unrecognized force that prevents us from seeing the con-
nection between precursor event and the underlying crisis development. 
We may refer to this as the dynamics of impatience. In modern society, we 
are all in a rush to move on after an incident has caused a snag in the 
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fast- flowing processes that facilitate if not propel our endless haste. The 
relentless pursuit of efficiency cannot be interrupted by deep exploration 
of underlying forces. We have lost the patience to interrogate an incident 
and divine its causes and drivers. A precursor event is yesterday’s news 
before we know what actually happened.
In other cases, the response to a precursor event comes rapidly and 
forcefully but ends up fueling the underlying crisis. This happens when the 
response to a precursor event is considered a failure. The failure becomes 
the object of attention. Concern lingers on the symptom rather than the 
cause. Processes of politicization and media amplification isolate the fail-
ure from the importance of the mission.
The chapter on the WannaCry crisis is suggestive in this regard. The 
security threat was created by national security officials themselves. The 
capacity to trigger crises for their enemies backfired when their new cyber 
weapons suddenly caused a crisis for friendly nations. The obvious need to 
investigate national officials distracted attention from the “real” crisis: 
critical industries everywhere could be rendered dysfunctional from one 
moment to the next. In the case of foreign fighters, the immediate response 
included labeling individuals as domestic security threats and barring their 
return. The lesson: unintended consequences of the focus on symptoms 
(rather than underlying causes) may be more diffuse, global threats down 
the road.
10.2.3  The Dynamics of Crisis Framing
The case studies in this book bring home a well-known truth among stu-
dents of policy agendas and even marketing: there is no such thing as an 
objective definition of truth. A powerful problem definition or “frame” 
helps to define a threat in such a way that few or many people recognize 
that threat (Schön & Rein, 1994). And there are many ways to frame a 
problem.
The case studies strongly suggest that it is hard to formulate a crisis 
frame that convinces enough people to move the dial on the opinion 
barometer. We seem to lack the language to capture the immensity of a 
threat that has not occurred yet (Ghosh, 2017). Whether we talk about 
the scary possibility of untreatable germs or the idea that climate change 
may soon make our planet uninhabitable, we seem at a loss for words to 
hammer that message into the collective conscience and onto the political 
agenda. It is easier to worry about relatively small threats (airplane crashes) 
or threats directly in front of our face (Covid-19).
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Governments appear at times reluctant to frame something as an 
impending crisis. Perhaps this is because a crisis frame runs counter to the 
political paradigm of the moment (migrants in Sweden), or it may be 
because a crisis frame implies responsibility (the Groningen earthquakes). 
Interestingly, the international community (the amalgam of NGOs, inter-
national organizations and think tanks) appears to have few qualms in 
framing this or that development as a creeping crisis. But such frames 
invite limited action if the frame does not gain any traction at the 
national level.
10.2.4  Societal Dependence
One rather simple but powerful explanation of the limited attention that 
creeping crises sometimes receive is the societal dependence on the condi-
tions that spawn these threats. The Dutch government was less than eager 
to recognize gas-induced earthquakes since the sale of that gas filled the 
coffers of the Dutch government. Information technology security 
requires a degree of decoupling from our cherished computers, mobile 
phones and the Internet. How can we recognize climate change as an 
urgent crisis if the solution would require a total revamp of the economic 
drivers that provide our prosperity?
The threat of antimicrobials is illustrative. It may kill us in the future, 
but there is precious little attention given to this broadening threat. The 
chapter in this volume describes how human practices, e.g., prophylactic 
use, create the conditions for its spread in time and space. It demonstrates 
how the addressing of the conditions at one level feed the threat in another 
system. But it also makes clear that many, many people—especially those 
with low incomes—depend on the cheap medicine that lies at the heart of 
the problem. It is easy to understand why people who cannot afford even 
the most basic preventive facilities, such as clean water, will not forego an 
affordable medicine that can keep them healthy today (even if it may kill 
them in the future).
No solution, no problem—this is how Aaron Wildavsky famously 
explained the lack of attention for seemingly pressing issues.1 In other 
words, if our dependency on a technology or a way of life prevents us from 
considering alternatives, we don’t really have to pay much attention to a 
1 The provenance of the expression is not clear. An Internet search suggests that the Dalai 
Lama also used this quote.
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potential threat that plays out over the long time. If major sacrifices are 
politically infeasible, we should not expect much attention to the threat 
that would demand them. Put in yet another way, well-functioning societ-
ies may place the discussion of prosperity-generating technologies and 
practices outside of reform discussions. Creeping crises derive much of 
their energy from such taboos.
10.2.5  Failure of Imagination
In many of our chapters, national officials perceived emerging crises as 
“only external” and thus as not of immediate concern or within their man-
date to solve. The idea that threats might soon crawl across time and space 
did not fit their mental maps. The migration crisis of 2015 was notable for 
the lack of “we-feeling” amongst EU member states; instead, states fol-
lowed their own routines and impulses even when fellow member states 
issued warnings. Similarly, the case of foreign fighters shows how the issue 
is treated primarily from a national perspective, without concern for 
broader global threats thus created. Perspectives may even be shaped in 
finer ways: based on a certain agency perspective or epistemological lens. 
This may blind decision-makers to creeping crises, especially those with a 
transboundary character.
Not everything can be boiled down to probability and numbers. In the 
case of Covid-19, experts on infectious disease modeling lamented that 
“The speed of development surprised us…we thought: this looks like a 
measurement error” (Engström, Luesink, & Boin, 2021). Estimates by 
migration experts on the likely pace and spatial dimension of traveling 
migrants in 2015 were incorrect. Internet security breaches, such as 
WannaCry, can hit at any time with little warning. Recognizing these 
threats “bubbling under” requires a different approach than a typical risk 
approach. Experts that rely on quantitative thinking and shun intuitive 
understandings of emerging crises may find themselves at a disadvantage 
when trying to imagine what future adversity may look like.
Even with clear warning signs, creeping crises forebode a future that 
policymakers may not be willing or able to contemplate. The classic case 
of a failure of imagination were the 9/11 terror attacks in the US. The 
plot was long in the making and there were clues floating around. But 
analysts did not grasp the importance of the clues; they did not “put the 
pieces of the puzzle together” as the saying goes. It is hard to imagine 
what you don’t know (Kahneman, 2011).
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The national experts had all the international information on the spread 
of Covid-19 they needed to take early decisions but seem to have hesitated 
because they had no personal experience of an outbreak—they could not 
feel it like their Italian colleagues who were living through the pandemic. 
Cognitive understanding was simply not enough to generate sufficient 
action. As the Dutch medical professor put it after having analyzed the 
many facts and images from China and Italy, “You see it, but you do not 
feel it. Only when you feel it, you are aware of it” (Engström et al., 2021).
Creeping crises place a premium on politicians’ abilities not just to 
crunch numbers, but also to imagine future ramifications of accepted prac-
tices to recognize the crisis that is right in front of you. Below we discuss 
research paths that may lead to a less abstract, more practice-oriented, and 
temporally informed understanding of the creeping crisis.
10.3  recommendatIons for PractIce: tIme 
to start organIzIng
Creeping crises present practitioners—even those who want to see them 
and do something about them—with hard challenges. Some creeping cri-
ses just go away, some keep eroding; only a few will materialize and cause 
real damage. How do we know which emergent threat should be 
addressed? Why act if the chance of an actual crisis is low and the cost of 
the only available solution is high? What could possibly trigger a meaning-
ful political response?
Our starting point in answering these questions is simple: the risks of 
these creeping crises are too large to ignore. The unprecedented complex-
ity and cross-border integration of the systems that we collectively and 
unthinkingly rely on should justify an effort to understand and address 
these risks. In our view, this is a leadership responsibility. We formulate a 
set of basic principles that should provide the building blocks for the effec-
tive and legitimate management of creeping crises.
Embrace the creeping crisis. Modern society is besieged by creeping cri-
ses. Denial may be tempting and even rewarding in the short run. But the 
threat is real. There is an even better reason for taking creeping crises seri-
ously: they point to deep underlying causes of future dislocations. Creeping 
crises are portents of invisible shifts that may have all sorts of consequences. 
The concept is not just relevant for crisis managers, but also for those who 
seek to predict critical developments. Leaders can create a much better view 
of the future by embracing the concept and perspective of creeping crises.
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Organize the radar. As we have seen, creeping crises are not easy to 
recognize (even if they develop right before our eyes). A sustained effort 
must be made to identify this type of threats. They must be actively 
defined. The signals must be pursued, often across boundaries into unfa-
miliar or unfriendly domains. This type of effort will require an amalgam 
of risk analysts, intelligence experts, complexity specialists, and political 
networkers. Such collections of talent are probably easier found in the 
world of hedge funds than in government circles. It will take quite an 
effort to build such teams.
Learn to capture attention. Even the direst threats generate only fleet-
ing attraction. After the first Covid-19 wave crested, societies everywhere 
moved back to normality with remarkable speed. We now know that 
Covid-19 had temporarily returned to creeping crisis status, only to 
reemerge with a vengeance months later. It is hard to capture attention. It 
is much harder to maintain it. Leaders will have to learn how to keep the 
creeping crisis in focus without succumbing to the negative questioning 
that (social) media, opposition forces and concerned citizens are sure to 
produce.
Invest in quick and massive intervention capacity. Actively collecting 
signals of a creeping crisis is a good start, but it is hardly enough. A tar-
geted intervention, preferably quick and massive, is necessary to terminate 
these threats. The problem is that the lack of public and political recogni-
tion may undermine such interventions, especially if these interventions 
touch upon perceived entitlements. What is needed is legally sanctioned 
intervention capacity. Leaders need the room to act forcefully, but these 
prerogatives need to be controlled by democratically sanctioned institu-
tions. This brings us to the realm of discretionary powers, which are usu-
ally reserved for massive disasters, war, or large-scale crisis events. There is 
a need to explore how these powers can be employed to battle creeping 
crises, without eroding democratic checks and balances. Intriguingly, 
creeping crises offer more opportunities for action. It is easier to create 
specific capacities if threats are slowly evolving, long-term, and well-known.
Treat interventions as an experiment. Addressing a potential threat with 
sacrificial strategies is not just politically risky, but is also akin to improvis-
ing yourself out of a maze. It is an extreme form of crisis management 
without the rally-around-the-flag support that makes untried remedies 
more acceptable. More often than not, it will resemble an experiment. 
One might as well treat it as an experiment, then (Ansell & Boin, 2019). 
That means formulating a “null hypothesis,” carefully monitoring for 
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intended and unintended results, modifying the intervention to optimize 
the result. Such an approach requires measured communications about 
the nature and effects of the intervention, in order to avoid the derailing 
effects of exaggerated expectations and subsequent disappointment.
Avoid a false sense of closure. We have noted how an effective response 
to precursor events can lead to a sense of closure. We recognized the threat 
and we dealt with it. We can move on; no need to look back. Closure is in 
order, however, only after the links between the event and underlying 
forces have been extensively probed. It has to be ascertained that the 
underlying cause has been removed. The treatment of mere symptoms 
may hide the real crisis from view, providing it with room and oxygen to 
grow and morph.
Explore connections with societal dependencies. It is critical that signals of 
creeping crisis are studied to see if and how they are rooted in societal 
dependencies. If it they are, the political challenge will be of gargantuan 
proportions. The task of organizing an intervention is also unexpectedly 
urgent, as the creeping crisis is likely targeting the pillars of future prosper-
ity. This realization buys political and societal leaders time to imagine an 
alternative future that is both believable and attractive. If sacrifices are on 
the table, leaders must persuade voters that an alternative to today is not 
only necessary but also preferable.
Be transparent. It is tempting to address creeping crises without much 
fanfare. The successful prevention of a future crisis is, after all, not a vote 
generator. It even generates political risks. There’s a paradox: when you 
do well, you may stand accused of crying “wolf.” Better to work in the 
background, without rocking the boat too much. While understandable, 
that sort of thinking is not just a mistake. It is also a lost opportunity to 
prepare citizens for a new future. The public interrogation of creeping 
crises can kick-start a societal debate about the necessity and desirability of 
long-unquestioned practices. A creeping crisis can help to bring home the 
message that certain things are best changed before they wreak havoc.
10.4  PartIng thoughts: Why the research 
must contInue
If our recommendations for practice seem long on generics and short on 
specifics, it is because we still know so little about this phenomenon of the 
emerging-yet-still-to-fully-materialize crisis. In fact, we are still searching 
for a language that can help capture the type of threat we are facing. We 
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are building an analytical perspective to capture a specific phase of threat 
development. The perspective brings together the analysis of threat accu-
mulation with the attention span of politicians, media, and citizens. 
Importantly, we have shown that these are all interrelated, creating what 
we may term the dynamics of crisis development.
We showed that there is no linear logic underlying these dynamics. 
There are long spells of stability or decline. There are different types of 
tipping points: in the accumulation of threat, attention, and response. We 
have shone a light on precursor events, which may trigger a response that 
feeds the underlying threat development. To really understand how these 
processes arise and interrelate, we need more study. We need to bring 
together risk experts and complexity researchers, political scientists, policy 
scholars and crisis management students. There is much work ahead, 
clearly.
There is a need for a process-oriented focus on the complexity of creep-
ing crises, including their non-linear evolution and sudden manifestations. 
We recommend that researchers take a closer look at the human practices 
and the temporal dimensions behind the creeping crises. We are sympa-
thetic to a pragmatist approach (Ansell & Boin, 2019; Dewey, 1930) and 
practice approach (Bourdieu, 1990; Ekengren, 2018) to help move the 
study of creeping crises forward.
It is important work. This book offers a clear and workable definition 
of creeping crisis because, without one, it is hard to garner attention for it 
(as our chapters on climate-induced migration gas-induced earthquakes 
make so clear). What can’t be defined, one could say, can’t be measured. 
We need to define indicators of accumulation, escalation, and tipping 
points. What can’t be measured is easily disputed. There is a risk here, 
then, that the problem at hand becomes an object of increasingly abstract 
discussion. Real action requires sustained attention. That only happens 
when the creeping crisis can be convincingly related to cherished values, 
norms, and practices. Researchers have a short road to relevance before 
them, if they wish to see it.
The most pressing question, perhaps, relates to our capacity to live with 
the various creeping crises that may or may not materialize, sooner or 
later. There is a level of uncertainty that clashes with the modern aversion 
against unwanted and unscheduled events. The urge to control risks sits 
uneasily with the idea that we do not understand these risks. Research can-
not answer these questions, but it can provide knowledge and insights that 
may shape an informed discussion. We will continue on our mission. We 
invite readers who feel inspired to join us.
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